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Abstract 
THE AUSTRALIAN HERITAGE COMMISSION: A VAIN HOPE? 
THE ROLE, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE AUSTRALIAN HERITAGE 
COMMISSION 1975-1995 
Created in 1975, the origins of the Australian Heritage Commission (AHC) lay in two 
decades of community concern about the perceived degradation of the Australian 
cultural and natural heritage. 
The Australian Heritage Commission has provided advice to the Commonwealth on all 
major environmental issues during the period under analysis. Despite possessing 
considerable intellectual resources to carry out its work, the AHC has been the subject 
of intense criticism both from within and without the government service. Despite the 
obvious importance of the organisation in a growing area of government policy, there 
has curiously been little if any independent academic evaluation of its operation and 
assessment of its performance. 
This thesis argues that the AHC has been unable to effectively fulfil the original 
expectation of the Hope Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate; that is that the 
timely collection and analysis of environmental and historical data would reduce the 
level, complexity and number of national environmental disputes. Through the 
establishment of the AHC, it was also believed the Australian Government could better 
coordinate a national response to any given conservation issue. While largely 
succeeding in its primary task of gathering, interpreting and presenting data relevant to 
the National Estate, these actions alone have not prevented long running and 
acrimonious land use conflicts. 
Entrenched opposition to the AHC as a visible representation of environmentalism in 
government has caused destabilisation of the organisation and reduced its 
effectiveness. For much of its life, the AHC has also had insufficient resources to carry 
out its statutory workload. These circumstances encouraged the Commonwealth to 
develop new approaches to resolving environmental issues including the formation of 
the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC). 
This thesis outlines the development and impact of a single agency, which has been 
required to operate in the turbulent and uncharted waters of Australian environmental 
politics and policy for two decades. It traces the evolution of the AHC as an 
organisation, adopting a framework using the key recommendations of the Hope 
Inquiry which led to its establishment. The thesis examines the role of the AHC as an 
adviser to Cabinet on environmental policy emphasising the importance of scientific 
research and data collection; and its responsibility for the establishment and 
maintenance of the National Estate. The relationship between the AHC and other 
Commonwealth Government bodies providing advice or information to Cabinet forms 
an important part of the thesis, as does an assessment of the AHC's contribution to the 
changing face of Commonwealth policy over two turbulent decades. 
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Introduction 
It is now over twenty years since the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 was 
passed by the Whitlam Government. This thesis traces the organisational history of 
the Australian Heritage Commission (AHC) between 1976 and 1995 and evaluates 
its performance as the principal Commonwealth Government advisory body on the 
National Estate. The AHC has operated during a period of rapidly expanding interest 
by Commonwealth and State Governments in the area of environment policy and 
management. The impact of this expansion on the AHC is also considered. 
Between 1972 and 1975 the Whitlam Government created three key environmental 
organisations; the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Commission, the Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, and the Australian Heritage Commission. The 
origin of these statutory authorities can be traced to the emergence of an Australian 
environmental movement during the 1960s and arguments for a greater commitment 
from all levels of government to the protection of the nation's natural and cultural 
heritage. Major disputes, including the damming of Lake Pedder and the threat of oil 
drilling on the Great Barrier Reef, also convinced environmentalists and sections of 
the Australian Labor Party (ALP) that the Commonwealth should play a leadership 
role in heritage policy. For this to be achieved new heritage legislation, the creation 
of specialist management bodies 1 and a reinterpretation of Section 51 (xxix) of the 
Australian Constitution was necessary. 
In 1973 the Whitlam Government commissioned Justice Hope to head an Inquiry 
into the National Estate. The subsequent report detailed a wide range of policy 
options available to the Government.2 These options included the creation of a 
powerful new statutory authority to provide high level advice on all aspects of 
government activity which impinged on the administration of the National E§tate. 
With a large board of influential conservationists and senior Commonwealth official, 
it was envisaged the new body would perform two central functions. The first 
1 The passage of the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 dramatically 
enhanced the role of the Commonwealth Government in environmental disputes by requiring 
developers affecting Commonwealth land or assets to submit an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS) prior to approval being granted. 
2 Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate, 1974, Report of the National Estate, (Justice. R. 
M. Hope, Chairman), AGPS, Canberra. 
2 
function was to act as an environmental advocate within government to advise 
Cabinet on specific issues as required. By so doing it was hoped that conservation 
considerations would become central to the Commonwealth decision making 
process. The AHC's second function was to develop a Register of the National 
Estate (the Register) by identifying areas that possessed significant cultural or natural 
heritage values. The intent of this Register was to alert both government and non 
government agencies to locations which required considerable sensitivity when 
preparing development proposals. It was also proposed that areas placed on the 
Register should form the focus of new Commonwealth conservation strategies. 
These strategies were identified as land acquisition schemes, heritage research 
projects, financial assistance to community conservation projects and public 
awareness programs. It was anticipated by the Committee of Inquiry that the 
National Estate Commission would play a major coordinating role in many of the 
above areas and also manage a generous grants program.3 
The translation of these objectives into draft legislation was jointly undertaken by the 
Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) and the Department of the 
Environment. The Australian Heritage Commission Bill 1975 received broad bi-
partisan agreement when tabled in parliament. In particular, the need for a register, 
was accepted. Parliament supported the new Commission possessing the power to 
compel both Ministers and DeJ?artments to consider the adverse impact of 
development proposals effecting the National Estate. 4 Despite such support for the 
establishment of the AHC, there appeared less consensus outside Parliament on the 
level of resources which should be made available to the new organisation. This led 
to differences within the Commonwealth bureaucracy which Lloyd and Troy 
highlights. 
The department wanted the Australian Heritage Commission to be a small 
and expert body with DURD responsible for the negotiation and 
administration of agreements with the states. Some of the members of the 
Interim Committee on the National Estate wanted the Commission to 
have rather more staff than the Department would accept. DURD was 
3 The possible function, structure and role of the new Commission along with interim strategies are 
contained in Chapter 10 of the Report of the National Estate. 
4 This applied to all stages of the Bill as it passed through both Houses of the Commonwealth 
Parliament. 
3 
concerned that additional staff would provoke aspirations within the 
Commission to engage in program administration. At one point the staff 
numbers proposed for the Heritage Commission were comparable with 
the staff of the department.5 
Despite such manoeuvres over resourcing, the Australian Heritage Commission Act 
1975 created an independent statutory authority with broad powers to identify and 
protect the National Estate, overseen by a large, representative, board of up to 
eighteen Commissioners. Thus, in general, the legislation conformed with the 
recommendations and spirit of the Committee of Inquiry. The issue of staffing and 
the appointment of commissioners had not been resolved by the time the Whitlam 
Government was defeated in December 1975. 
A major review of the Act was subsequently undertaken by the Fraser Government 
in line with its broad ideological commitment to reduce the size and scope of 
government. The Australian Heritage Commission Amendment Act 1976 saw a 
significant reduction in the organisation's capacity to influence government policy. 
This was achieved by the removal of all references to the AHC 's role in providing 
advice on Commonwealth funded development projects. The number of potential 
Commissioners was also reduced to seven. These changes were combined with a 
policy of providing minimal staff f9r the Commission throughout the Fraser years.6 
In 1990 minor amendments to the Australian Heritae:e Commission Act 1975 were 
passed. No attempt was made, however, to return those powers removed by the 
Fraser Government or provide new ones despite the rapid expansion of 
environmental issues in the 1980s. This can be principally explained by the fate of 
the Register of the National Estate, the subject of unrelenting criticism by industry 
groups since its inception. Originally promoted as an 'alerting' register by its 
proponents, organisations such as the Australian Mining Industry Council have 
consistently claimed the Register is a de-facto land management regime, stifling 
economic development by encouraging opposition to development from 
5 CJ. Lloyd & P.N.Troy, Innovation and Reaction, The life and death of the Federal Department of 
Urban and Regional Development, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1981, pp. 184 - 185. 
6 14 permanent full time staff commenced in 1976 and I.his number rose to 17 by 1982. 
4 
environmental groups.7 
The Commission has been the subject of fierce attack over procedures in processing 
National Estate applications and the methodology used to define the heritage 
significance of a given area. The AHC has further antagonised vested interest groups 
and individual State Governments with its provision of advice to Cabinet on national 
conflicts including the Franklin Dam dispute, the Lemonthyme and Southern Forests 
Inquiry, Kakadu and the National Forest Industry Policy. This endemic criticism led 
to the AHC being the subject of four major reviews which, arguably, have reduced 
its overall effectiveness. The subsequent establishment by the Commonwealth of the 
Resource Assessment Commission (RAC) in 1989 and sectorally focussed 
Ecological Sustainable Development (ESD) working groups in 1990 reflected a lack 
of confidence in the Australian Heritage Commission model as a means ofresolving 
national environmental issues. 
These circumstances led to an effective displacement of the Commission as a key 
source of strategic policy advice in favour of new bodies such as the RAC and 
specialist units within the Department of Primary Industry and Energy and 
elsewhere. The period 1985-1987 was marked by relatively static funding despite a 
substantial increase in demand for technical data on the National Estate following a 
number of proposals related to broad scale forestry. 
A desire to remain relevant as a policy body, and political pressure to place greater 
emphasis on resolving environmental conflict, subsequently lyd the AHC to adopt 
and promote the concept of Regional Assessment. The Commission argued that, by 
placing the emphasis on determining the existence of heritage values on a regional 
and not simply a local level, it was feasible to negotiate meaningful land use 
agreement with individual State Governments. Following the satisfactory negotiation 
of an agreement with the Western Australian Government over the future 
management of the South West forests, the AHC was able to mount a successful 
claim for a substantial increase in staffing and a new role in helping to broker 
national land use. arrangements. This breakthrough revitalised the Commission and 
helped update the concept of the National Estate.8 
7 Opposition was encouraged by the rapid listing of areas. Within five years of the Register 
commencing over 6500 places were on the Register. 
8 The development of the Regional Assessment concept enabled the Commission to successfully 
argue for more staff. Between 1989 and 1993 permanent full time staff numbers increased from 50 
to 73. 
5 
Methodological issues 
This thesis examines a single government instrumentality established at a time of 
expanding Commonwealth Government interest in environmental policy. There are 
acknowledged methodological problems in drawing broad conclusions from a single 
case or example. Comparative analysis is also problematic given the lack of an 
appropriate basis of comparison. The framework and analysis, therefore, is drawn 
from the report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate chaired by 
Justice Hope. 
The examination of the Australian Heritage Commission also raises important issues 
relating to the role of individuals in the policy process. While a number of 
individuals have had a significant influence in shaping the work of the Australian 
Heritage Commission, it is also clear that policy development is an impersonal 
process involving numbers of players. Policy is the intereraction between ideas, 
individuals and institutions, and thus the understanding of the policy system as a 
whole is more imponant than the activities of an individual. 9 Policy in areas such as 
the environment may also develop reactively as a consequence of events rather than 
as a planned response to a particular problem. JO 
A traditional historical approach is adopted in tracing the major events which have 
significantly shaped the organisation over the last twenty years. This method allows 
the relationship of landmark events, such as the election of the first Hawke 
Government and the subsequent administrative changes to the AHC to be seen in 
context. 
An evaluation of the Commission's work is made within the framework of the 
objectives set for the organisation by the Hope Inquiry and the aspirations of the 
Hon. Tom Uren MHR who had initial carriage of the Act through Parliament. As 
indicated above, this thesis focuses firstly on the evolution of the AHC as an 
organisation and secondly on its contribution to Commonwealth environmental 
9 These arc discussed, for example in, P Mouzelhs, Organisation and Bureaucracy, An Analysis of 
Modern Theories, Aldine De Gruyter, New York, 1967, pp. 66 to 77. 
10 A particularly good example is Wesley Vale where no effective policy on pulp mill development 
existed prior to the dispute. 
6 
policy. This work utilises criteria derived from the Hope Inquiry recommendations 
as a framework. The thesis considers the AHC in relation to its role in 
(a) advising Cabinet on environmental policies; 
(b) being responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the National 
Estate; and 
(c) acting as an environmental advocate. 
While it is understandable that the passage of time and events guarantees the form 
adopted by the Commission would substantially differ from that originally 
envisaged, it is reasonable to gauge performance against the aims and objectives set 
down in the original Act. 
Significance of the thesis 
Despite the obvious importance of the AHC to those seeking an understanding of 
Australian environmental politics, the author is only aware of two substantial 
academic works which attempt to evaluate different aspects of the Commission's 
performance. I I This thesis represents the first comprehensive attempt to research the 
origins of the Commission, describe its administrative role as an environmental 
agency and explore the extensive ,public comments made about the organisations 
performance. The varying political views of the protagonists involved in 
environmental disputes and the perspective of the Commission is captured through 
the extensive use of media releases and daily newspaper reports as source material. 
The ever-shifting views of politicians on enviromental issues is contrasted with the 
consistency of advice given by Commission staff. This approach lends an 
immediacy and freshness to the presentation while highlighting the ideological divide 
which separates the key players. 
Because the Commission has now operated for some 20 years, the organisation 
represents a yardstick against which the performance of newer agencies, including 
11 D. Rosaeur, Conservation of Forests: the changing role of the Australian Heritage Commission, 
a report prepared for Senator Chamarette under the inaugural Australian National Intemships 
Program, November 1993 and 
G. Davies The Australian Heritage Commission : A Tlung We We Want to Keep?, unpublished 
MA thesis, University or Canberra, 1992. 
7 
the now defunct Resource Assessment Commission, can be assessed. An 
investigation of the AHC also highlights the capacity of specialised government 
structures to diverge over time from the principles upon which their legislation was 
based. Indeed the Commission represents a case study of the corrosive effect that 
long term policy conflict can have on the capacity of a government body to fulfil its 
charter. 
More generally this study makes a significant contribution to furthering an 
understanding of the interplay between public interest groups, organised political 
parties and government agencies in the protection of natural and cultural heritage 
values. 
Premises and Proposition 
The AHC has been unable to implement the substance of the Hope Inquiry 
recommendations with respect to protecting the National Estate. This was initially 
due to the decision of the Fraser Government (197 6-1982) to remove significant 
powers contained in the original legislation and to limit resourcing. The election of 
the Hawke Government in 1983 did not reduce broad resistance among development 
interests and commercial land use groups to a core Commission function; the 
compilation of a Register of the National Estate. As a consequence, any hope by 
Commission supporters that a change of Government would enable the organisation 
to operate as originally envisaged by the Committee of Inquiry was quickly 
dissipated. 
The major proposition advanced in this thesis is that the failure of the AHC to 
function effectively as an environmental advocate within Government arose from the 
dominance of the National Estate process in its work. The proposition will be 
evaluated by examining the AHC's role in environmental policy making and 
management decisions in the period 1976-1995. This examination notes that an 
important impact flowing from the establishment of the Resource Assessment 
Commission in 1989 was to increase the relevance of advice from the AHC. As 
senior political figures struggled to respond to forestry and mining industry requests 
for resource security in the late 1980s, the AHC was able to clarify critical 
conservation issues as part of the debate over resource security. An important 
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outcome for the Commission from this process was a substantial increase in 
Government funding and status. 12 The thesis concludes that the Commission, for 
the first time, is able to more freely fill the strategic role envisaged by the Hope 
Inquiry as emphasis has moved from defending the integrity of individual National 
Estate listings to the incorporation of heritage values into wider regional resource 
management strategies. 
Scope and Limitations 
A study of the Commission offers an opportunity to reflect on the difficulty of 
developing a bureaucratic entity which can respond effectively to the new political 
force of environmentalism. It also illustrates the difficulties faced by a policy-driven 
statutory authority constrained by a service delivery function that is the subject of 
intense criticism from vested interest groups 
A lack of analytical literature on the Commission has required the author to rely 
primarily o'n annual reports, departmental correspondence, media releases, 
newspaper coverage, party policy documents and literature prepared by peak 
industry and conservation organisations. This provides an opportunity to interpret 
the sometimes daily responses from Ministerial offices to rapidly moving 
environmental disputes involving tbe National Estate and the AHC. 
In assessing the role and performance of the AHC, the thesis concentrates on 
describing and analysing the public policy pronouncements of the Commission 
followed by an assessment of their impact over the medium to long term. This 
discussion is placed in the context of contemporary political events to assist in 
understanding the environment in which key decisions were made. The author has 
not, however, attempted to detail the origins of individual policy initiatives given that 
it is not only difficult to achieve but adds little to the debate about the performance of 
the organisation. How policy is fom1ulated and processed internally in the AHC is 
also outside the scope of the thesis, despite the obvious importance of such 
processes. 
Preparation of the thesis has not requ)red a review of internal administrative 
12 The AHC was able Lo secure nearly 20 add1Lional staff between 1992 - 93 to manage a new 
Regional Assessment section. 
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processes such as the assessment of National Estate applications except when these 
processes have been the subject of public criticism. No comment has been made on 
the quality of Commission management in general, nor individual officers in 
particular. A detailed economic analysis of the Commission's expenditure of funds 
has not been carried out although reference is made to staffing and budget figures as 
a means of demonstrating the level of government commitment and organisational 
growth over an extended period. 
Outline of thesis 
The contents of this thesis and the history of the Australian Heritage Commission 
have been broken down into four distinct phases. Phase one illustrates the 
relationship between the emergence of new community aspirations for the protection 
of the nations environment, the absorption of these sentiments into the political 
process and their translation into legislation. This process is set against an 
extraordinary period of political history which saw the end of 23 years of 
conservative government and the beginning of a brief, turbulent period of ALP 
administration. 
Between 197 6-1982, the Commission operated in a climate of government fiscal 
restraint. Limited resources and a :eduction in the level of legislative responsibility 
encouraged AHC staff to focus on establishing a viable Register of the National 
Estate. Intense criticism of the Register by special interest groups prompted both a 
review of the organisation by the Fraser Government and strenuous efforts by staff 
and Commissioners to promote greater understanding of the National Estate concept 
within the community. At this time the AHC provided strategic advice to the 
Commonwealth concerning the future of the Franklin River which brought the 
organisation into conflict with the Tasmanian Government. 
The election of a new Labor Government and a surge in large scale resource 
development proposals during the years 1983 to 1989 resulted in turbulent times 
both for environmental politics and the AHC. A willingness by Commonwealth 
Environmental Ministers Barry Cohen and Graham Richardson to intervene at a State 
level on resource management issues, and the creation of new World Heritage areas, 
encouraged a string of national environmental disputes. These factors, combined 
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with a desire by the forest industry to. obtain resource security, encouraged the 
Commonwealth to develop a range of new environmental policies which attempted to 
find common ground between conservationists and industrial groups. 
Faced with the distinct prospect of being sidelined as a principal adviser on 
environmental policy, the Commission entered its fourth phase of development 
through the introduction of the Regional Assessment process. This new process was 
designed to help the Commonwealth and the WA Government reach agreement over 
the future management of Kauri forest areas. It placed greater emphasis on 
consultation with stake holders and used a wider range of heritage criteria than was 
used in the National Estate process. Commenting on the process and the challenge it 
posed to the traditional operational culture of the Commission, Professor Haigh 
Beck noted: 
In trying to balance the needs of the timber industry and the 
preservation of heritage the Commission carried out a regional 
assessment. Over 200 criteria relating to the natural, historical an·d 
Aboriginal environments were applied. 
The stake holders included not only the timber industry and 
conservationists but also th~ local population, many of whom farmed 
land on which were places of national estate value. They too had to be 
consulted. This was a new experience for the Commission which was 
then still more accustomed to dealing with other experts.13 
This current change of approach has undoubtedly increased the opportunity for 
negotiation between the AHC and commercial interests over the predicted impact of 
development proposals on National Estate values. In so doing, the number of policy 
options that could be made available to Cabinet has also expanded. The range of 
powers possessed by the AHC, however, remains limited and its capacity to wield 
influence outside National Estate issues is dependent on ever changing political 
circumstances and the capabilities of senior staff and Commissioners. 
The mere survival of the Commission is testament to the enduring values enumerated 
13 H. Beck, 'Social & AesLheLic Values: New assessment meLhodologies for involving the 
community', In Place, 1995, Australian HcriLagc Commission, p. 16. 
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in the Hope report and its current renaissance is a testament to the resilience of the 
organisation and its staff. The Regional Assessment process may begin a period 
when the AHC will be relatively free of endemic criticism and achieve the objectives 
which were laid down in the original Australian Herita!!e Commission Act 1975. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTEMPORARY AUSTRALIAN 
CONSERVATION MOVEMENT. 
In May 1972 the Hon. Peter Howson, Minister for the Environment, Aborigines and 
the Arts described the previous decade of public agitation on environmental issues 
' ... as a lively public conscience on this important issue. '14 As the following chapter 
reveals, an identifiable and vocal environmental movement had emerged onto the 
Australian political landscape by the early 1970s. It was an event which led 
irreversibly to a resurgence of policy development in the dying days of the Liberal-
Country Party administration and the creation of a new environmental - urban and 
regional planning bureaucracy during the subsequent Whitlam years. As evidence of 
this linkage, the antecedents of two key pieces of Whitlam Government 
environmental legislation, the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 and the 
Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals ) Act 1974, can be found in the 
Howson ministerial statement. 
Major disputes in the previous decade such as the damming of Lake Pedder, revealed 
inadequacies in government decision making procedures at both a Federal and State 
level. The need to integrate environmental concerns into the planning process was 
acknowledged by Howson when he announced 
... the Government has decided to introduce a system of 'impact 
statements' designed to protect the environment. That is to say that 
when a Commonwealth Minister prepares a submission to the 
Cabinet on any proposal that has some relevance to the environment 
that submission must be accompanied by a statement setting out the 
impact the proposal is likely to make on the environment.15 
In making the statement Howson acknowledged the national implications of this new 
approach by confirming State Governments would be required to provide assurances 
that environmental considerations had been taken into account where Commonwealth 
funds were sought for a given project. To act in tandem with this initiative a 'Land 
14Australia,Parliament 1972, Australian Environment, Commonwealth Policy and Achievements, 
Statement by the Minister for the Environment, Aborigines and the Arts, The Hon. Peter Howson, 
MP. 24 May, 1972, Commonwealth Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 3. 
15 ibid, p. 4 -5. 
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Use Advisory Council' was proposed. This body was to provide advice where 
Commonwealth decisions could conflict with such 'environmental assets as national 
parks in Commonwealth Territories'.16 Minister Howson believed an important 
objective for this new body was to receive referrals from Cabinet and 
correspondingly to provide independent advice. This proposal was to be 
incorporated in the Australian Heritage Commission legislation. 
The Howson Statement confirmed that by 1972 the formulation of national 
environmental policies had become both legitimate in a bureaucratic sense and 
necessary from a political perspective. Formation of national pressure groups such 
as the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) in the late 1960s reflected a 
maturity in the conservation movement which could no longer be ignored by the 
political parties. Rapid changes to the inner urban environment and the 
suburbanisation of city fringes without sufficient concern for quality of life issues 
had begun to disturb increasing numbers of Australians. 
This chapter details the emergence of an Australian conservation movement in the 
1950s and 1960s. It highlights the importance of the Lake Pedder campaign in 
raising political consciousness about environmental issues, as well as demonstrating 
the failure of traditional bureaucratic techniques to achieve acceptable outcomes. The 
chapter also argues for a link b~tween community activism and major policy 
development within the ALP. As the Howson statement demonstrates, however, the 
formation of new bureaucratic structures concerned with protection of the 
environment by either a LCP or ALP administration had become inevitable by 1972. 
An historical perspective 
Concerted government action to protect popular Australian native flora and fauna by 
creating recreation reserves outside the large cities began in the 1860s. A desire to 
establish recreation areas and to 'scientifically' manage forested areas led to the 
creation of a number of national parks and reserves in all States. Well known 
examples include the Royal National Park (NSW, 1879), Ferntree Gully (Victoria, 
1887), Lamington National Park (NSW, 1915) and Cradle Mountain - Lake St Clair 
National Park (Tasmania, 1921). In a similar manner to arguments proposed for 
protection of wilderness zones today, the creation of a National Parks was seen as 
16 ibid, p.5. 
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the best way of excluding developments likely to damage the natural and scientific 
values of a locality. 
Throughout the nineteenth century the dominant land management ethic was the need 
to efficiently convert flat or undulating forested areas into grazing lands for sheep 
and cattle or growing areas for wheat. The gradual development of national parks 
and reserves during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, while significant, 
was of secondary importance in a conservation sense to the creation of a commercial 
forestry industry. 
By the turn of the century official thinking at a state government level began to 
recognise the need to manage uncleared crown land for future wood production. The 
expanding requirements of the domestic building industry for milled timber alone 
necessitated some prudence. As Bolton points out: 
Gradually a more constructive attitude was emerging towards 
Australia's native forests. Commissions of inquiry in 
Tasmania and Victoria in 1898 and in Western Australia in 
1903 stressed that forests could not be regarded as in the past 
as a limitless resource, but should be managed, and harvested 
so as to allow for renewal ard regeneration.17 
These inquiries led to the formation of Forestry Commissions in all States except 
Queensland during the following twenty years. Overseas foresters with experience in 
other areas of the British Empire were recruited to advise on Australian forests and a 
Commonwealth School of Forestry was established in the 1920s. 
The emergence of a 'wise use' water in the United States further reinforced a role for 
government in the land conservation arena. During the 1930s dam construction and 
irrigation works helped form the backbone of capital works projects in rural areas 
which further entrenched this trend. These projects also reinforced the application of 
technical expertise to 'new' and emerging problems such as soil erosion. In 1938, 
the New South Wales Soil Conservation Service was formed in response to a 
perceived decline in soil standards in the western and south western regions of the 
17 G.Bolton, Spoils and the Spoilers, Australians make their environment, 1788 - 1980, George 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1981, p. 105. 
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State. Similar initiatives were developed in South Australia and elsewhere as the 
economic implications of soil degradation became more widely understood. 
The contradictions inherent in the push for ongoing economic development, 
particularly the tension between the exploitation of natural resources and their long 
term sustainability, was articulated by an emerging group of technically proficient 
public servants. As Fawley confirms 
... the newly established forestry profession put forward proposals 
for forestry reservations nationally and also argued against continuing 
alienation of forest lands for fa1ming. Queensland Director of Forests, 
E.H.F. Twain (1918-32) advocated an economic - scientific ordering 
of land development policy and opposed in particular the rapid opening 
of northern rain forest lands for small farmers.18 
During the early part of the twentieth century a range of non-economic, purely 
conservation-based, measures were adopted to ensure the preservation of Australia's 
natural beauty spots, flora and fauna. The Tasmanian Government passed the 
Scenerv Preservation Act 1915, the first of its kind in Australia, which set up a 
series of permanent reserves for areas of outstanding scenic merit. 
Massive expansion of farming during the 1920s and 1930s saw great pressure on 
native vegetation with some species of wild flowers becoming scarce. In 1926, the 
NSW Parliament passed legislation to protect native plants and similar legislation 
was enacted by the Commonwealth and States, with the exception of Tasmania, over 
the next 13 years. 
The end of the Second World War was accompanied by an aggressive immigration 
policy in Australia and the initiation of a number of major resource and development 
projects such as the Snowy Mountains Hydro-Electric Scheme. These schemes 
heralded unprecedented threats to extensive natural areas and familiar urban space. In 
1960, the Australian author Robin Boyd produced a landmark urban social 
commentary The Australian Ugliness. He described the fruits of a booming post war 
economy on the urban landscape as 
18 F. Fawley The Role of Social Sciences m Natural Resource Management, Proceedings of 
Symposium, ACT Conservation Service, ConservaLion Series No 5, Canberra, 1990, p. 8. 
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... the modern world of wires and poles, service stations and soft 
drink signs, cut outs, whirles, flags, fairy lights and mutilated trees, 
as functional but as artistically heedless as an anthill and as accidental 
as a rubbish dump.19 
This scene was far from the popular image of Australia depicted by the nation's 
artists and writers. The link between economic growth and quality of life concerns 
were again being made as they had a century before. With the suburbs of Sydney 
and Melbourne expanding, the ease by which Australians could have direct physical 
contact with the natural beauty of the Australian bush was diminishing. 
Impact of the Lake Pedder controversy 
A central feature of South West Tasmania was a small isolated lake of some three 
square kilometres in size and located in the Serpentine Valley. The unsuccessful 
campaign to preserve this feature from inundation by a new hydro electricity scheme 
was a defining moment in the struggle to create an effective community based 
conservation movement. It also heralded the need for national environmental 
guidelines for large scale land use programs. 
In 1972, after a bitter five year campaign to save Lake Pedder, Sir Garfield Barwick, 
Vice President of the Australian Conservation Foundation, summarised the need for 
improved government land management procedures. 
The tragedy of Lake Pedder - tragic because of a failure to give proper 
weight to values not expressed and perhaps not expressible in money 
terms - will, I hope, stimulate the establishment of proper land-use 
authorities throughout the Commonwealth, where these do not already 
exist, with the necessary knowledge, expertise and authority to 
determine the proper use of land before it is committed to any 
development or exploration.20 
19 Quoted m a speech given by the Hon Barry Cohen MP to the National Conference of Landscape 
Architects, 25 August, 1984. 
20 G. Barwick, Pedder Papers: Anatomy of a Decision, Australian Conservation Foundation, 
Melbourne, 1972 quoted m A. Gilpin The Australian Environment, 12 Controversial Issues, Sun 
Books, Melbourne, 1980, p. 203. 
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The conclusions drawn by Sir Garfield Barwick resonated throughout a subsequent 
Commonwealth Report on Lake Pedder commissioned by the newly elected Labor 
Government.21 This report was tabled in Parliament during September 1973 and had 
a number of objectives, one of which was to examine the feasibility of reversing the 
damming of Pedder. Another was to document the decision making process ' ... with 
the aim of drawing lessons appropriate for future schemes involving the Australian 
Government. '22 
The conclusion subsequently drawn from the report had a direct relationship to the 
passing of the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 and the 
Australian Herital!e Commission Act 1975. Throughout the debate over Lake 
Pedder, the conservation movement made two fundamental criticisms of the 
Tasmanian Government and the Hydro Electric Commission. The first was that the 
Government withheld vital information preventing an informed public debate. The 
Hydro Electricity Commission's (HEC) failure to reveal early planning and to give 
timely warning of its intentions was, for example, seen as grossly undemocratic, a 
move designed simply to circumvent publ!c discussion. 
A second line of criticism (which was more fundamental, but equally alarming) was 
that a faulty decision making process was followed by the Hydro Electric 
Commission and the Tasmanian Parliament itself. Conservationists believed three 
grounds for supporting the retention of Lake Pedder, public recreation, scientific 
values and aesthetics, were not fully explored by Government. The consequence of 
this was a one-sided debate focusing solely on economics. The Tasmanian 
Government's Scenery Preservation Board played no formal role in the debate and 
the State's National Parks and Wildlife Service was not formed until 1971. 
Arguments focusing on public recreation and environmental values were aired only 
by conservationists. As no effective bureaucratic advocate for the pro-environmental 
perspective existed at either a Federal or State level, the Lake Pedder issue was 
fought out primarily at a political rather than a policy level. No government 
evaluation of arguments to preserve the Lake on aesthetic grounds was carried out 
21 Australia, Parliament, 1973, Commitlee of Inquiry into the future of Lake Pedder, 1973, Interim 
Report, Commonwealth Printing Office, Canberra. 
22 ibid p. 10. 
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despite procedures and methodologies existing overseas. 
When scientific research was commissioned by the HEC through two Tasmanian 
museums, their work was seen as inadequate by conservationists. In turn, those 
recommendations which called for further research were ignored by the HEC and the 
State Government despite significant discoveries made by independent researchers 
immediately prior to flooding. 
The Tasmanian Government agreed in mid 1967 to establish a Select Committee of 
the Legislative Council to review the decision to proceed with the dam as a means of 
capping debate and confirming appropriate procedures had been followed. 
Considerable criticism was, however, levelled at the operation of the Committee. 
Criticism was directed at the Committee's terms of reference, its guidelines and its 
expertise. The Committee did discover that two confidential alternative schemes to 
flooding Pedder had been explored by the HEC but had not been publicly revealed. 
The Committee also accepted that the decision making process was, to some degree, 
faulty. 
Commenting on the findings of the Tasmanian Select Committee, the 
Commonwealth Inquiry noted: 
It is not our intention, in this Report, to suggest what organisational 
structure might have been appropriate. It appears sufficient, now, to 
note that some witnesses suggested that the organisation was such as 
to allow doubts that it would produce a properly balanced decision. 
We accept that there are grounds for such doubts.23 
The view of the Commonwealth Inquiry was, therefore, that the Tasmanian 
Government had not discharged its responsibility to arrive at a decision which could 
stand critical analysis. 
Gilpin suggests that the perceived failure of government decision making with regard 
to Lake Pedder led to the introduction of environmental impact legislation at both a 
State and Commonwealth level. He notes: 
23 ibid, p. 11. 
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Much of the correspondence between the Australian Conservation 
Foundation and the Tasmanian Government, during the campaign, 
was not solely with Lake Pedder but also with the prospective 
improvement of procedures . 
... The Lake Pedder case obviously gave some impetus to the 
development of the environment impact statement procedure in respect 
of environmentally significant or controversial projects.24 
Certainly following Lake Pedder, two extremely significant developments occurred 
in 197 4 which were to guide the management of development projects to the current 
day. In NSW, the Liberal State Government adopted new guidelines prepared by the 
State Pollution Control Commission for assessing the environmental impact of 
development projects commissioned by Crown authorities. At i Commonwealth 
level, the new Labor Government passed the Environmental Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974. Described by the Commonwealth Minister for Environment, 
the Hon. Moss Cass, as .' ... one of the most significant pieces of legislation ever 
passed', the Act required an environmental impact statement be prepared for not only 
Commonwealth projects but those funded by or requiring Commonwealth approval. 
The early seeds of both this legislation and the Australian Heritage Commission Act 
1975, if not sown, were certainly fertilised by the Lake Pedder debate. To perceptive 
observers like Sir Garfield Barwick the real issue or situation was a profound lack of 
protection for environmental assets, ' ... the case of Lake Pedder emphasises the lack 
of any national power to protect what are in truth national assets'.25 Despite the loss 
of Pedder, the struggle changed the political debate by highlighting for the first time 
the existence of a sizable group in the national community willing and able to 
articulate a pro-environmental line which crossed party boundaries. 
Liberal Premier Angus Bethune ultimately argued that Pedder should be flooded 
because Tasmania needed additional hydro-electric capacity to support industry and 
that this resource should be generated at the cheapest possible price. Even at the time 
these views were put forward in the Tasmanian Parliament, they were being 
24 A. Gilpin The Au.1tralwn Environment, 12 Controversial Issues, p. 211. 
25 G. Barwick, ACF Pedder Papers, Anatomy of a Decision, p. 63. 
20 
challenged nationally. At a Commonwealth level, for example, Liberal policy in the 
run up to the 1972 election was quite different. As part of a call to 'preserve the gifts 
nature has given us' it was argued that 
... it is a fact of recent history that while the technological revolution 
of the 60s and 70s has brought great benefits ... it has also had by-
products which are despoiling our land and polluting the air and water 
around us.26 
In 1972, both the Federal Liberal and Labor Parties were promoting policies which 
would, and eventually did, lead to some degree of statutory protection of such areas 
as Lake Pedder from uncontrolled development. Few serious observers dispute that 
Lake Pedder had outstanding scenic qualities which alone could justify its 
preservation. In addition to the normal political imperatives, there was also a sense 
among contemporary observers that, if Lake Pedder could be flooded by a 
determined State Government, what other assets however 'priceless' could be lost? 
Formation of conservation groups 
Governments, perhaps appropriately, rarely lead but rather follow public opinion. 
Conservation policy in Australia is no exception. In its submission to the Hope 
Inquiry, the Department of Urban .and Regional Development (DURD) argued that 
the proposed Government action in the National Estate area followed over 10 years 
of vociferous debate on conservation issues. This agitation had created 
circumstances whereby Government legislation was both necessary and appropriate. 
In recent years, however, there has been a remarkable change in 
attitude generally throughout the physical environment... It appears 
that we are now at a threshold position, with the need to formulate 
Government policies to encourage and even anticipate this awakening 
national interest.27 
The direct antecedents of the contemporary conservation movement, both in the built 
26 Federal Liberal Party elccLion pamphlet quoted in Committee of Inquiry into Lake Pedder, 
Interim Report, p. 21. 
27 Department of Urban and Regional Development, The National Estate- Principles and Policies, a 
submission to the task force on the Natwnal Estate, Commonwealth Printing Office, Canberra,, 
1973, p. 1. 
21 
and natural environment, lie in the first three decades of the twentieth century. Until 
recently the tendency of published works was to focus on conservation issues dating 
from the 1960s. Major writers in this category include Gilpin (1980) and Seventy 
(1988) In 1901, however, the Royal Australian Historical Society was formed in 
Sydney, followed by other State bodies over the next twenty years. These 
organisations, although primarily focused on the production of semi-learned 
journals, were concerned with the preservation of historic sites. In 1932, a 
community-based National Parks and Primitive Areas Council was formed in NSW. 
Its aim was to promote the creation of new national parks. Such societies were 
encouraged by an increasing interest by the Australian Academy of Sciences during 
the 1940s and 1950s in the preservation of representative natural ecosystems 
throughout Australia. 
A new stirring of community concern for conservation issues was reflected in the 
development of the National Trust of Australia from its formation in 1945. Its 
subsequent growth illustrates the emergence of a relatively small but organised group 
willing to question the prevailing development at all cost orthodoxy of the 1950s and 
1960s. In 1960, the Trust had a national membership of just under 5,000. During 
this period, the Trust's endeavours dwarfed those of government and other 
organisations. It was noted by the Hope Inquiry that voluntary bodies had made a 
singular contribution. 
It is doubtful if any government in Australia has, for example, made a 
contribution toward conservation of the built environment to match the 
voluntary work of the National Trust. Similarly, many of our national 
parks have been set up on the broad basis of proposals developed by 
National Parks Associations many years before.28 
Between 1960 and 1970, the number of conservation bodies in Australia doubled 
totalling some 584 in 1973.29 These ranged from ad-hoe committees concerned to 
save a section of bushland to national conservation organisations. Perhaps the most 
significant of those formed was the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) 
created in 1965. Far from being an overtly political, let alone radical, organisation, 
28 Commlllee of Enquiry into the Nallonal Estate Report, 1974, p. 136 
29 The figure is quoted in a variety of reports but was originally drawn from a directory of 
conservation organisations prepared by the Australian Conservation Foundation in 1973. 
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the ACF represented the emergence of a conservation group with mainstream 
political and social credentials. The foundation President was a former Liberal 
Attorney-General and then current Commonwealth Chief Justice, Sir Garfield 
Barwick. This new organisation also exhibited a range of new characteristics which 
distinguished itself from other bodies at that time. From its establishment, it strove to 
mobilise national public opinion behind both specific environment conflicts and more 
general concerns such as forest protection. 
The failure of the Lake Pedder campaign demonstrated to the ACF that conservation 
issues had to be fought on a national basis with emphasis placed equally on 
mobilising public opinion and developing new policy options. The inadequate nature 
of government procedures exposed by the ACF undoubtedly encouraged both 
political parties to address the new public concern with environmental issues in the 
lead up to the 1972 election. 
Bolton suggests that a long term impact of Lake Pedder was to encourage various 
State Governments to introduce environmental planning legislation in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.30 Lake Pedder also radicalised the ACF which subsequently 
aggressively pursued a range of issues including protection of the Great Barrier Reef 
in the mid 1970s. 
The adoption of conservation policies by the ALP 1969 - 1972 
Following the landslide defeat of the ALP in the 1966 election, Mr E G Whitlam 
assumed leadership of a party both small in Parliamentary numbers and in need of 
organisational reform. Over the next eight years, Whitlam successfully transformed 
the electoral standing of the Labor Party through the systematic development of new 
and appealing policies designed to attract voters in the vital outer urban seats of 
Melbourne and Sydney. Freudenberg records that, prior to the promotion of 
Whitlam as leader, the ALP policies in key areas such as urban affairs, health, 
education and foreign affairs were either 'vague or silent'.31 As such ' ... the task 
was not to alter policy but to create one'.32 
30 G Bolton, Spoils and Spoilers, Australians make their environment 1788 - 1980, p. 159. 
31 G. Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, Gough Whit/am in Politics, Penguin Australia, 
Melbourne, 1987. 
32 ibid, Introclucuon, p. xii. 
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Central to Whitlam's thinking was the belief that all Australians should have access 
to the essentials of a well-organised suburb, a school, a good sewerage and water 
supply system, a community centre, a neighbourhood park and adequate roads. He 
argued that a function of an ALP Government was to ensure that all Australians 
should have equal access to these facilities. As early as 1961 Whitlam linked 
provision of services to equality. 
This concept of equality - what I call positive equality - does not have 
as it goal quality of personal income. Its goal is greater equality of the 
services which the community provides. This approach is based on 
this concept: increasing a citizen's real standard of living, the health of 
himself and his family are determined not so much by his income but 
by the availability and accessibility of the services which the 
community alone can provide,33 
The ALP entered the 1969 election with a set of policies based on the premise that 
suburban Australia deserved a greater share of Commonwealth resources and access 
to better Government planning. This strategy is credited with causing a remarkable 
swing to the ALP, creating a situation whereby the Party only required a net gain of 
four seats to win Government. The .1969 election result also confirmed that the Party 
had to substantially improve its performance in the outer Sydney and Melbourne 
electorates to win in 1972. 
With the emergence of urban quality of life issues as critical to ALP electoral 
success, Whitlam began to focus on environmental issues to increase the 
differentiation between their party and the LCP. Inspiration for a new policy 
framework was to come from a 1963 speech by United States President, John F 
Kennedy, who argued for an expanded role for Government in environmental 
protection. 
We must expand the concept of conservation to meet the imperious 
problems of the new age. We must develop new instruments of 
foresight and protection in order to recover the relationships between 
33 ibid, p. 74 
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man and nature and make sure that the national estate we pass on to 
our multiplying descendants is green and flourishing.34 
Not only did the ideas contained in this speech resonate with Whitlam's own but 
they contained a key phrase to describe elements of the cultural and natural 
environments which demanded preservation for future generations, the 'national 
estate.' By adopting this phrase as his own from 1970,35 and broadly promoting the 
notion that the nation's heritage was imperilled, Whitlam laid the political foundation 
for the Australian Heritage Commission. 
A major theme for Whitlam and other key ALP spokesmen in the area of the 
environment and urban affairs was the necessity for Commonwealth powers to be 
expanded. This action would enable a national conservation strategy to be devised 
and implemented. Whitlam placed emphasis on utilising Section 96 of the 
Constitution which emp9wered the Australian Parliament to ' ... grant financial 
assistance to any state on any such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks 
fit'.36 The identification of these powers was essential to the implementation of ALP 
policy between 1972 and 1975 as it allowed both the assumption of new government 
powers and the internationalisation of Commonwealth responsibility. 
In his 1972 policy speech, Whitlam promoted the view that the Australian 
community under successive Liberal Governments had alienated the community 
from the operation of government and involvement with the preservation and 
utilisation of the nation's wealth. The National Estate in this context was used to 
describe what he saw as a quasi-spiritual dimension in Australian life, emanating 
from the natural environment and those man-made features of singular aesthetic or 
cultural importance. Support for the preservation and exploration of the National 
Estate by the community was seen as a technique to achieve a central objective of a 
Labor Government, ' ... to liberate the talents and uplift the horizons of the 
Australian Community'.37 
34 Report of the Committee of I nqutry into the National Estate Report, 1974, Preface. 
35 1b1d. In 1970 Wh1tlam was quoted as argumg '[The Australian Government] should see itself as 
the curator and not the liquidator or the National Estate'. 
36 G Freudenberg, A Certain Grandeur, Gough Whlllam in Politics, p. 72. 
37 E.G. Whitlam, On Australia's Constitwwn, W1descopc, Campbell, Victoria,1977, p. 267. 
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Another Whitlam assumption was that Australia's major cities were facing a crisis 
caused by rapid growth and that the quality of life for ordinary Australians was 
therefore under threat. In the 1972 election campaign, the ALP promised ' ... a deep 
and direct national involvement in Australian cities'.38 In a perceptive and popular 
move Whitlam linked a mainstream concern of Australians, their own home, to that 
of the environment. Through the establishment of a Land Development Commission, 
he promised the Commonwealth would acquire land for the dual purpose of 
providing cheap land for housing, and for national parks, coastal reserves and the 
preservation of historic sites. He described it this way. 
A Labor Government will have two over-riding objectives: to give 
Australian families access to land and housing at fair prices and to 
preserve and enhance the quality of the national estate of which land is 
the very foundation.39 
The establishment of a Land Development Commission had an added benefit. 
Whitlam believed the Commonwealth could assume a new and dominant role in the 
protection of sensitive areas through such a Commission. The Commonwealth 
Government, it was proposed, could use its expertise and financial resources to 
select and acquire land of national importance. Once this acquisition was completed, 
the land could then be transferred with proper safeguards to Stare and Local 
Government as well as with conservation bodies. Particular reference was made to 
the Blue Mountains, a major recreation area for hundreds of thousands of people 
located in the outer suburbs of Sydney. 
Whitlam further proposed the establishment of a new national parks service which 
would oversee the development of new parks in the ACT, Jervis Bay, the Northern 
Territory and a 'Central Australia Wilderness area', all areas under direct 
Commonwealth jurisdiction. Central to these proposals was the philosophical 
position held by Whitlam and Uren that city dwellers, as a matter of equity, required 
areas for leisure activities in relatively close proximity to where they lived. Improved 
holiday conditions and a reduction in the working week led Whitlam to argue that the 
constructive use of leisure had become an important issue. In the 1972 policy speech 
38 ibid p. 281. 
39 ibid, p. 281. 
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he declared: 'There is no greater social problem facing Australia than the good use of 
leisure'. 40 
This view was set against a background of a buoyant economy which expanded 
throughout the 1960s. Unlike the environmental movement, Whitlam believed 
growth was a panacea, the fuel which would power the ALP reform program. 
Whitlam claimed ' .... socialists no longer have to ration for scarcity but plan for 
abundance. '41 
The 1972 ALP policy speech argued that, with even a moderate growth in the 
economy, there would be an automatic growth in Government revenue producing 
$5,000 million over three years. These funds would be sufficient to finance a range 
of key Labor proposals. The 1972 'It's Time' campaign was a manifestation of the 
ideas and concepts which the ALP (and Whitlam as leader) had promoted in the three 
years leading up to the election. In essence, Australia and Australians were asked to 
throw off the past and embrace the future. The famous 'It's Time' song captured this 
mood. The ALP attracted sections of the community which had been awakened 
politically by the environmental debate and by the emphasis placed on 'quality of 
life' issues by Whitlam and ALP spokesman Tom Uren. The result of the election in 
December 1972 was a gain of eight seats for the ALP, giving it a Parliamentary 
majority of nine over the Opposition. The big gains were in the suburbs of Sydney 
and Melbourne where these issues had become part of the political agenda. 
The emergence of a vigorous, politicised environmental movement in the late 1960s 
assisted the election of a reformist government concerned with improving the social 
and environmental conditions of urban Australians. The flooding of Lake Pedder and 
the unchecked destruction of familiar historic buildings proved to a growing section 
of the community that existing government mechanisms to protect the environment 
were inadequate. Chapter Two will discuss the translation of the ALP environmental 
policy mandate concerning the National Estate into the Australian Heritage 
Commission. 
40 ibid, p. 295. 
41 G. Freudenberg, p. 77. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ORIGINS OF THE AUSTRALIAN HERITAGE COMMISSION 
Justice Hope, in his landmark Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National 
Estate, referred to the subject of his report as the 'crystallisation of an emergent but 
hitherto almost unfocused idea'. 42 This chapter will also argue that the emergence of 
both the Australian Heritage Commission and the concept of the National Estate did 
not directly spring from the ALP election manifesto, but rather the consequence of an 
intense period of environmental policy formulation in late 1973 and early 1974, set 
against a background of administrative jousting between the Department of Urban 
and Regional Development and the Department of Environment and Conservation. 
The election of a Labor Government did, however, draw together leading 
conservationists, government policy makers and key Ministerial figures such as Tom 
Uren and Moss Cass. It was this coalition that translated a broad commitment by the 
ALP to an expanded role for government in protecting the environment by 
legislation. In so doing Whitlam and Uren were later able to legitimately claim for 
Labor an outstanding environmental record between 1972 and 1975. 
ALP environmental policy and initiatives in Government 1972 - 1975 
The first 12 months of the Labor Government was a period of tumult as the new 
administration introduced a range of fresh ideas and new directions. The zeal with 
which the new Government took power is best illustrated by the decision of the new 
Prime Minister to establish a 'two man government'43 immediately the election 
outcome was known. This unusual step enabled the new Prime Minister and his 
deputy, Mr Lance Barnard, to implement immediately a number of election promises 
including the abolition of conscription. 
During 1973, a record 254 Bills were introduced into Federal Parliament which 
greatly exceeded the highest previous figure of 169 Bills in 1968. The outcome of 39 
42 Report of the Commiuee of Inquiry into the Natwnal Estate Report, page 20. 
43 This was a popular phrase to describe the period when WhiLlam and Barnard carried out a range of 
executive functions prior to the appointment of the full Cabinet. A discussion of this period is 
contained in S. Reid,& C.J. Lloyd, Out of the Wilderness, Cassell, Melbourne, 1974. 
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inquiries instigated by the new Government were also reported to Parliament during 
the same period. As part of this whirlwind of activity, the number of Government 
Departments increased from 27 to 37.44 As Whitlam pointed out, the direction of 
Government was to seek new mechanisms by which Government could implement 
the philosophical and practical aspirations of ALP policy. 
Our changes and reforms did not end with the restructuring of 
Government Departments. We armed the administrative machine with 
new functions and organisations to deal with the increasingly complex 
and difficult problems of planning for the needs of a growing 
industrial society. Some of the organisations were given permanent 
statutory form, such as the Schools Commission: ... others had their 
statutory charter utterly transformed, such as the Grants Commission, 
and the Cities Commission.45 
In this context the Department of Urban and Regional Development (DURD) and the 
Department of Environment and Conservation were established. Political 
controversy surrounded the formation of the latter as it was perceived by many as a 
ploy to ensure there were sufficient positions in Cabinet for senior backbenchers. It 
was also suggested that the functions of the department of Environment and 
Conservation could have sat easi.!y within DURD. Creation of the Departments 
reflected a major redirection of the machinery of Government. Under the previous 
Government, there had been only a one person Office of the Environment within the 
Prime Minister's Department in 1971. 
The task of the new Department of the Environment and Conservation was to 
implement key policies listed in the ALP policy speech. They included the drafting of 
Environmental Impact Statement legislation, the formation of an Australian National 
Parks and Wildlife Service and the creation of a Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority. Head of the Department of Environment and Conservation, Dr Don 
McMichael, reiterated the status of the speech when he stated: 'What you have to 
remember is the importance of the ALP policy speech, if it was in the policy you 
were right.'46 
44 ibid page 82. 
45 G. Whitlarn, The Wh1tlarn Government, 1972 -75, Viking, Ringwood, Victoria, 1985, p.83. 
46 Dr Don McMichael made this observation to the author in a taped interview in December 1990. 
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Whitlam, as a long-standing internationalist, was also keen for the new Department 
to raise Australia's profile in the world conservation community. A major step in this 
direction was taken when Australia, as a consequence of work carried out by the 
Department, became the seventh nation to ratify the UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention in August 1974. Whitlam reflected later that his action ensured 
.. the Federal Parliament could exercise its jurisdiction over external 
affairs to preserve sites of outstanding universal value such as the 
Tasmanian Wilderness, the Great Barrier Reef and areas of tourist and 
aboriginal significance in the Northern Territory.47 
A reading of the Department of Conservation and Environment's first annual report 
confirms the importance of the World Heritage Convention and describes the 
preparation of the Environmental Assessment (Impact of Proposals) Bill 1974. 
Building on concepts explored by the previous Liberal minister, the Department 
drafted legislation which made it mandatory for Commonwealth Departments to 
commission Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for major building or land use 
proposals. Such statements were to be made public. Additional procedures were also 
formulated whereby environmental considerations had to be taken into consideration 
where Commonwealth funds wer~ to be used to assist State Government projects. 
Other areas of concern for the Department in its first eighteen months included the 
development of an Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, the definition of 
new pollution criteria and standards and an increased profile for Australia in the 
international conservation ~U"ena. 
In addition to these initiatives, the new Department of the Environment and 
Conservation's first eighteen months saw it establish its own identity and consolidate 
its role in the protection of the natural environment. The Department's struggle to 
establish its own bureaucratic territory was assisted initially because, as Lloyd and 
Troy recall, 48 a number of the political advisers in the rival DURD believed that too 
great an involvement with 'environmental fire-fighting' would distract DURD from 
its urban responsibilities. 
47 E. G. WhiLlam, The Whit/am Government, 1972 - 75, p. 530. 
48 CJ. Lloyd, P.N. Troy, Innovation and Reaction, The Life and Death of the Federal Department 
of Urban and Re!!.ional Development, p 53. 
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Despite this, conflict emerged between the two Departments over responsibility for 
the conservation of natural areas during 1973 and 1974. Although the central focus 
of DURD was urban planning issues, the Department was recognised within the 
Commonwealth Public Service as an aggressive organisation which sought to 
maximise its responsibilities.49 This expansionist policy was assisted by a broad 
brief as defined in its own annual repon. 
Our responsibility is to encourage collaboration and cooperation in all 
aspects of urban and regional developments, and to stimulate public 
debate on both narrow and broad issues. 50 
A second factor which encouraged a blurring of responsibilities between DURD and 
the Department of Conservation and the Environment over protection of the natural 
environment was the contrast between the two responsible Ministers, Dr Moss Cass 
and Mr Tom Uren. The former had no background in environmental matters and, as 
O'Connell and McLean argue, 
.. on becoming Minister it would appear he had no specific political 
program he wished to implement and no precise (or even general) 
strategy to deal with the rnighty counter forces his administration 
would inevitably deal with.51 
In contrast was Tom Uren's broad yision had for the preservation of Australia's built 
and natural heritage. Uren believed comprehensive action was necessary because 
'Australia's national estate is under threat, and we are forced to mount expensive 
programs to defend it'.52 This commitment was reflected in the almost immediate 
decision by Uren to establish a National Estate Grants Program to assist State and 
Local Government along with community groups to preserve historic buildings and 
49 ibid page 92. 
50Department or Urban and Regional Development,T/zird Annual Report, 7974-75, Par!. Paper No. 
230, 1975, p. 7. 
51 M.A. O'Connell and N. McLean, 'Mos~ Cass: An Interview', Dissent, No. 34, Winter 1976, p. 
33. 
52Australia, Parliament 1975, Department of Urban and Regional Development, Urban land, 
Problems and Policies, Par!. paper 15, AGPS, Canberra 1975, Foreword. 
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areas of great natural beauty. In the 1973 Budget, despite opposition from Treasury, 
a fund of $2.5 million for preservation of the National Estate was established. 
This early initiative was both a tangible and a symbolic commitment by the 
Government to the environment, a commitment which received considerable acclaim. 
Further inter departmental conflict emerged, however, over the allocation of grants. 
Final responsibility for decision making rested with DURD although many of the 
grants were designed to assist with the preservation of the natural environment. 
Furthermore, the grant program did not address areas of major environmental 
conflict such as Lake Pedder and the clear felling of native forests, areas in which the 
Government was receiving considerable criticism. 
While the ALP's reform agenda during 1973 focused unprecedented attention on 
environmental issues, a clear philosophy within government towards preserving the 
National Estate had not emerged. The establishment of a coherent approach towards 
this important goal and the design of appropriate bureaucratic structures was to be 
the task of the Hope Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. The 
implemention of this approach is discussed in the next section. 
Recommendations of the Hope Inquiry 
On May 17 1973, the Prime Minister announced to Parliament that Mr Justice Hope 
had been appointed to act as Chairman for a 'task force' into the National Estate. By 
way of explanation he stated to Parliament: 
The task force will be asked to advise the Australian Government on 
any additional policies which should be applied to preserve and 
enhance the national estate and the role the Australian Government can 
play in assisting the implementation of these measures and policies.53 
Under the Committee's terms of reference, a key task was to define the nature and 
condition of the National Estate and to assess both existing and potential measures 
for its protection by the Australian Government. King cynically suggests that the 
creation of the Committee was necessary to enable Whitlam to actually define what 
53 Australia, House of Representatives, Weekly Hansard, 15-18 October, 1973, p. 2264. 
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he meant when using the nebulous term 'National Estate' in his election speech.54 In 
this context the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate could be viewed as no 
more than a sop to the environmental movement which had supported the ALP in the 
election. 
Whitlam's own review of the achievements of the Committee of Inquiry does, 
however, provide a key to understanding the Government's broad objectives in 
supporting the task force. First, there was a need for the Government to define in 
detail those areas of the nation's built and natural environment truly worthy of 
preservation. Without such a process it could be· argued that almost any area 
cherished by a community should be protected. 
The second concern of Whitlam was that government receive independent bi-partisan 
advice on individual environmental problems. In 1973 the primary source of pro-
conservation advice on issues such as Lake Pedder was from two (not disinterested) 
sources, the Department of Conservation and Environment and community based 
organisation such as the ACF. 
Both issues relate to the complex issue of successfully resolving conflict over the 
environment, a task which previous Governments at both a Federal and State level 
had been largely unable to achieve. It was in this area that Whitlam had high hopes 
for his own Government, and for this reason he described the achievements of the 
Committee of Inquiry in the following terms. 
Two recommendations were central to the report, first, to set up an 
AHC on a broad and representative basis ... and ... secondly, to 
establish and maintain a Register of the National Estate.55 
McMichael argues that the impetus to establish the Committee came from Uren and 
senior public servants in DURD. The aim was to gather arguments that would justify 
a rapid expansion of its role in the financing and administration of environmental 
protection.56 McMichael points out that, although the Committee of Inquiry into the 
54 Ross King, 1975, 'Hobbies, The Nallonal Estate, and Equity', Meanjin vol. 34, No. 1, p. 63 
55 E.G. Whitlam, The Wlutlam Government 1972-5, p. 548. 
5 6 Information contamed in personal commun1cal!on on a tape forwarded to author by Don 
McMichael, December 1990. 
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National Estate was promoted as a joint project, it was DURD and not his own 
Department that played the senior role. 
A review of the 1973-7 4 DURD Annual Report and the general approach of the 
Department to conservation confirms that the formation of the Committee was seen 
as justifying a course of action already commenced. DURD had established a large 
scale National Estate grant program and begun to develop a clear statement of 
objectives for it. The central thesis of the program was the need to rapidly acquire 
land and properties of National Estate value. DURD argued strenuously that 
... the National Estate must emerge fairly quickly as a nucleus of 
tangible body of property if it is to catch the imagination of the 
Australian people.57 
The establishment of the grant program itself could not provide the philosophical 
underpinning for protecting the National Estate, define its boundaries or confirm the 
most appropriate strncture for administering government assistance. This was to be 
the task of the Committee of Inquiry. The administrative drive of DURD was, in 
turn, combined with the political imperative of the Labor Government to demonstrate 
its superiority in managing environmental issues. 
The eight member Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate under the 
·chairmanship of Justice Hope represented a cross section of individuals in the 
community deeply involved with the conservation movement including Milo 
Dunphy, Judith Wright and David Yenken. Over a 16 month period the Committee 
received 650 submissions from individuals, community groups and government 
agencies from throughout Australia. 
The 415 page report produced by the Committee remains the definitive statement on 
the National Estate. As a document it is a model of comprehensive research which 
also provides a range of persuasive arguments for a demonstrably greater role for 
government in protection of the nation's heritage. Significantly, both the findings 
and the recommendations are based on the central premise that the current Australian 
57 Department of Urban and Regional Development, 1973, The National Estate Principles and 
Policies, submission Lo the Comminee or Inquiry into Lhe Nallonal Estate, Chapter 5, p. 5. 
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Government had 
inherited a National Estate which has been downgraded, 
disregarded and neglected. All previous priorities accepted at various 
levels of government and authority had been directed by a concept of 
uncontrolled, economic growth and progress. 58 
This statement was interpreted by the ALP as an indictment of the previous 23 years 
of Liberal-Country Party Government and it naturally made great play of the report 
in the Commonwealth Parliament. The recommendations of the Inquiry were 
extremely comprehensive and covered such issues as land use planning, the 
purchase of key elements of the National Estate by government to ensure their long-
term preservation, and the establishment of new national parks for recreational 
purposes on the outskirts of the major metropolitan centres. Recommendations also 
related to more government supervision of the mining and forestry industries, legal 
and taxation initiatives to encourage private restoration of historic buildings and new 
legislation to protect aboriginal sites. All these recommendations were based on the 
proposition that the Australian Government, within existing constitutional restraints, 
should play a leadership role in the protection of the National Estate and that this 
leadership should be exercised through a new organisation, the National Estate 
Commission. 
The Committee of Inquiry believed that the Commission should support existing 
environmental protection measures adopted by State Governments and community 
conservation bodies. This was to be achieved by providing both expertise and 
financial resources where they were lacking, which was seen as especially relevant 
in the smaller States. The new organisation was also seen as possessing the ability to 
encourage and coordinate measure to protect the National Estate from projects 
initiated by Commonwealth Government departments. 
It was noted that countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom had a 
long tradition of national government involvement in conservation policy making, 
with the day to day administration of historic sites and natural conservation areas left 
to State and Local Government authorities. This pattern was seen as desirable as it 
allowed the principle government conservation body to concentrate on national 
58 Repori of the Commlllee of lnqwry into the National Estate, p. 334. 
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issues and ensure sound and timely advice could be disseminated to government 
agencies and elected officials. 
The report further argued that the Commission should be an independent entity with 
its own legislation and right to recruit staff as required. Establishment of a bureau or 
commission within a Department was rejected primarily on the grounds that such a 
body would lack the independence and 'convincing' image required to 'encourage 
cooperation from other government agehcies.'59 
Significantly, the report states that 'Conservation bodies around Australia would 
prefer and strongly support an independent statutory body'60 The question of 
independence was central to the proposal for, as the Report itself points out, many 
Government agencies provide a considerable threat to the National Estate through 
their development activities. By way of conclusion, the Committee urged speedy 
action by the Government to implement key recommendations. With particular 
foresight, it was predicted that positive action to preserve the National Estate would 
receive broad community suppon particularly among the young. 
Initial planning for the AHC 
Included in the Report on the National Estate was a recommendation that an Interim 
Committee on the National Estate (!CONE) be formed to oversee the preparation of 
legislation and to play a leading role in the distribution of National Estate funds. It 
further suggested that National Estate funding be increased from the initial allocation 
of $2,500,000 in the 1973-74 budget to $20,000,000 in the subsequent financial 
year. When the Report was released, the Whitlam Government was, however, in the 
process of introducing new financial restraints on Government spending. As a 
consequence, only $6,000,000 was allocated to National Estate tasks. 
Despite the changing economic climate, ICONE was to make recommendations on 
the dispersal of funds under three National Estate Grant programs managed by the 
DURD and the Department of Environment totalling some $17,448,000 in 1974-75 
(see Figure 2). This figure shows Commonwealth expenditure on the National Estate 
59 ibid p. 285. 
60 ibid p. 278. 
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Grant Program over a twenty three year period, from 1974 to 1996. 
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The strategic importance of these grant programs was considerable as they allowed 
both specific problems to be resolved and emerging community concerns to be 
identified. Long term research and advocacy projects that could not be funded 
through normal departmental budgets were also made possible. In 1974-75, 
$410,000 was allocated to Conservation bodies and organisations which had 
approximately 500,000 members nationally. 61 The political importance of these 
programs in advancing the cause of the AHC was noted by Tom Uren. 
The public response had strongly reinforced all the other arguments for 
a permanent Commission with adequate powers and resources to 
encourage all the actions necessary for the conservation and 
presentation of Australia's national heritage.62 
61 ibid p. 35. 
62 Australia, House of Reprc~entativc~, Weekly Han~arcl, 9-11 July, 1974, p. 25. 
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On July 9 1974, the Prime Minister formally signalled to Parliament that ' ... my 
government proposes to establish an Australian Heritage Commission' with the role 
ofTCONE to 
... continue the work of the Committee of Inquiry and to carry out the 
preparatory work leading to a fully developed national heritage policy 
under a permanent Commission.63 
The approach taken in establishing ICONE typified the strategy adopted by the two 
relevant Ministers, Uren and Cass, when dealing with National Estate issues. Both 
emphasised planning and operational control should be pluralistic in nature, with a 
focus on consensus, public education and inclusive decision making. These themes 
were to be reflected in the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 but 
dramatically circumscribed by the Fraser Government's review of the Commission 
twelve months later. 
ICONE consisted of eighteen members, with representatives from all States, seven 
government agencies and the majority of scientific and cultural disciplines found in 
the National Estate. The Committee chairman, David Yenken, argued strongly that 
the make-up of this Committee led to balanced decision making and avoided deep 
division of opinion, a characteristic of many environmental conflicts. 
The combination of a variety of public and private skills and interests 
under an independent chairman has, we believe, been a significant 
success. It has avoided the polarisation of views into separate and 
opposed streams of advice, it has brought the opinions of many 
different departments to the Committee's deliberations, and given a 
collective departmental imprint to the Committee's 
recommendations.64 
The principal function of !CONE was to advise the Government on the legislative 
form the AHC should take. It also made significant recommendations in ten areas 
which reflected the conservation philosophy contained in the Hope Inquiry, the 
political thinking of the Government and a deteriorating economic situation. 
63 ibid, p.19. 
64 ibid, p. 8. 
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At this early stage the consensus of political opinion was that the AHC should be an 
advisory body which focused on policy and research outcomes. As such it was 
implied that the Commission could lead the conservation debate and react to 
individual issues in an authoritative and competent manner. Development of a 
bureaucratic structure was seen as an anathema to these goals. It was argued in 
Parliament 
... the Commission should not develop into a large bureaucratic body, 
but should remain if possible a small, highly skilled, and issue-
directed professional group. The Commission should be primarily a 
policy and advisory body, organising and sponsoring research, but 
leaving the detailed administration to other bodies.65 
ICONE saw the AHC as a powerful body exerting authority through timely, top 
level advice. Such advice would not only be directed at Cabinet but Parliament itself. 
The three primary functions were, therefore, to prepare advice for the relevant 
Minister on National Estate issues, maintain a register and commission research. 
ICONE identified three key powers for the Commissioners associated with the 
protection of the National Estate. The first of these was a requirement for 
. , 
Commonwealth Government agencies to advise the Commission of proposed works 
affecting the National Estate with the AHC subsequently able to submit comments as 
appropriate. The second source of authority was for 'Ministers and agencies' to only 
proceed with such controversial projects if they were able to prove there was no 
'feasible or prudent alternative'.66 
ICONE also argued an environmental impact statement (EIS) should automatically 
apply to projects effecting the National Estate and the Commission should have the 
power to request that its Minister hold a public inquiry under the terms of the EIS 
legislation. This range of proposed powers was seen as the 'teeth' of the 
organisation and a concrete means of linking the protection of the National Estate 
with those powers already available to the Commonwealth. 
65jbid, p. 16. 
66 These terms arc used in the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975. 
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Staff operations were to be overseen by a group of Commissioners, the majority of 
whom (including the Chaim1an) would not be employed by the Commonwealth. Up 
to six Government agencies, however, were to be represented. This suggested all 
advice given would have considerable administrative weight although the potential 
for interdepartmental disputes was naturally increased. 
To reinforce the independence of the body, I CONE also saw the AHC as having the 
power to independently recruit its own staff, albeit on terms and conditions 
acceptable to the Public Service Board. This important recommendation was never 
achieved as the AHC was always required to recruit staff through its portfolio 
agency with such staff technically being employed by that agency. 
A general consensus existed between !CONE, Parliament and DURD over the 
majority of recommendations made concerning the proposed role and powers of the 
AHC. Disagreement between ICONE and DURD did exist, however, regarding the 
future level of staffing for the new organisation. Some members of !CONE also 
envisaged the AHC possessing the capacity to make administrative arrangements 
direct with States. This difference of perspective is highlighted by Lloyd and Troy. 
The department wanted the Australian Heritage Commission to be a small 
and expert body with DURD responsible for the negotiation and 
administration of agreements with the states. Some of the members of the 
Interim Committee on the National Estate wanted the Commission to 
have rather more staff than the Department would accept. DURD was 
concerned that additional staff would provoke aspirations within the 
Commission to engage in program administration. At one point the staff 
numbers proposed for the Heritage Commission were comparable with 
the staff of the department.67 
Both issues were to remain unresolved during the life of the second Whitlam 
Government and were to be taken up by the Fraser administration two years later. 
At the conclusion of its work ICONE had successfully argued for a Commission 
67 CJ. Lloyd & P.N.Troy, p. 184 - 185. 
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which would operate essentially in the policy domain. The principal service delivery 
function was restricted to compilation of a Register of the National Estate and 
management of a generous grant program. Power was to be exercised through 
rigorous research, reasoned advocacy and control over grant funds. 
As the following section reveals, the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 
received bi-partisan support in Parliament. Opposition concerns related largely to the 
need to balance Commonwealth and State powers.This lack of conflict must be 
largely credited to the high quality and comprehensive nature of the Hope Inquiry 
Report. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE AUSTRALIAN HERITAGE COMMISSION ACT 1975 
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUTHORITY. 
The Lake Pedder dispute illustrated to both Labor and the Coalition the pressing need 
for new legislation to improve the management of environmental disputes. The 
following chapter argues that both sides of Parliament recognised that the absence of 
a comprehensive listing of the nation's heritage assets was a major stumbling block 
to improved decision making. Bi-partisan support existed for the creation of the 
Australian Heritage Commission which would prepare a Register of the National 
Estate. For Tom Uren, Minister for the Department of Urban and Regional 
Development (DURD), this function was but one element in a wider agenda which 
included empowerment of community-based conservation organisations and the 
creation of an environmental advocate within government. The Australian Heritage 
Commission Act 1975 was the legislative manifestation of these aspirations. 
The Liberal-National Country Party Coalition government which came to power in 
December 1975 had a far more restrictive, prosaic view of the Commission's work. 
This led to the substantial revision of the Commission's original powers within 
twelve months. Furthermore, the commitment of funds to National Estate projects 
instigated by Labor was dramatically scaled back. In this economic and political 
environment, the challenge was to develop a comprehensive and respected Register 
of the National Estate and demonstrate its value as a decision making tool. An early 
commitment to this aspect of the new Commission's work by the Coalition 
Government took the form of an instruction by the Hon K. E. Newman, Minister for 
Environment, Housing and Community Development, to list Fraser Island. As the 
chapter reveals, however, consolidation of the AHC was constrained by persistent 
criticism of the Register by the mining industry. 
The powers and authority of the Commission under the Act 
When introducing the Australian Heritage Commission Bill to Parliament on May 
14, 1975 Mr Tom Uren, Minister for DURD stated: 
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The Bill gives legislative substance to the National Estate, a noble 
concept which has been identified by the Australian Government and 
enshrined in a notable report ... In broad terms the aims of this Bill are 
these: To set up an AHC on a broad and representative basis to advise 
the Government and the Parliament on the condition of the National 
Estate and how it should be protected; to establish and maintain a 
register of the things that make up the National estate; to require that 
the Australian Government,its department and agencies, and those 
acting on its behalf, respect the National Estate and do all they can to 
preserve it. 68 
The subsequent Act passed by Parliament contained forty eight sections consisting of 
nine parts. These parts covered preliminary interpretations, the establishment, 
function and powers of the AHC, the constitution and format of meetings, the 
Register of the National Estate, the protection of the National Estate, the National 
Estate Grant Program, staffing, finance and miscellaneous administrative 
procedures. 
The AHC was given seven broad functions in relation to the National Estate.69 The 
most important of these was to furn_ish advice to the Minister in three key areas either 
upon request or on its own initiative. These areas specifically related to proposed 
Commonwealth actions, the allocation of Commonwealth departmental funds and 
68 Australia, House of Representatives, 1975, Debates, May 4, pp. 2243-4. 
69 Section 7 of the Au<>tralian Heritage Commission Act 1975 states; 
7. The functions of the Commission are-
(a) to furnish advise to the Minister, either of its own motion or upon request made to it by the 
Minister, on matters relating to the national esu1te, including advice relating to-
(i) action to conserve, improve and present the national estate; 
(ii) expenditure by Australia for the conservation, improvement and presentation of the national 
estate; and 
(iii) the of financial or other asmtance by Australia to the States, local governing bodies and other 
organisations or persons for the conservation, improvement or presenu1tion of the national estate; 
(b) to encourage public interest in, ancl unclerstancling of, issues relevant to the national estate; 
(c) to identify places included in the national e<>tate and to prepare a register of those places in 
accordance with Part IV; 
(d) to furnish advice and reports m accordance with Part IV; 
(e) to further training and education in fields related to the conservation, improvement and 
presentation of the national csune; 
(t) to make arrangements for the administration and control of places included in the national estate 
that are given or bequeathed to the Commission; and 
(g) to organise and engage in research and mvesllgation necessary for the performance of its other 
functions. 
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grants made to State and Local Government along with community groups. By 
providing these powers the Commonwealth had placed the AHC in a privileged 
position within Government. The AHC was technically able to provide separate (and 
perhaps conflicting) advice to that given by Departments including DURD and the 
newly formed Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service. The Commission was 
also given authority to comment independently on the actions of major service 
delivery departments such as the Department of Transport and Telecom. Subsequent 
criticism of these large departments for their often poor performance in the heritage 
field by the AHC generated considerable hostility towards the fledgling organisation. 
The Commission was also expected to wield great influence over voluntary 
conservation groups and S rate and Local Government agencies through the provision 
of advice to the Minister on the allocation of National Estate grants. Actual 
responsibility for administering such grants remained with other departments on the 
basis that the Commission should avoid acquiring burdensome accounting duties.70 
Of the six remaining functions, two were directly associated with improving public 
understanding of conservation issues. As such, the AHC was seen as an appropriate 
body to guide public debate on conservation issues through the provision of 
balanced and accurate infom1arion. Identification of the National Estate was also seen 
as pivotal in increasing public support for an expanded role for government in 
protecting the environment. Rapid development of a publicly accessible register was, 
therefore, seen as critical. Improving professional training opportunities for heritage 
practitioners was also seen as an important means of ensuring the effective execution 
of government funded conservation initiatives. 
A Government desire for the AHC to consult widely and be inclusive in decision 
making is reflected in Clauses 8 and 12 of the Australian Heritage Commission Act 
1975. These relate to issues of consultation and Commission membership. To 
ensure wide representation of Government agencies, up to six positions were 
reserved for permanent Heads of Departments and Chairmen of Statutory 
Authorities. Up to twelve other Commissioners were to be drawn from outside the 
Australian Public Service and were to reflect the diversity of the National Estate 
itself. 
70 Commission staff never fully accepted this decision and there were numerous attempts by the 
AHC to reverse the situation. This wa~ eventually achieved in 1988. 
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Sections 8 and 9 of the Act specified that Departments and Authorities should 
provide assistance to the AHC when carrying out its work. The ability of the 
organisation to prevent actions deleterious to the National Estate lies in Sections 28, 
29 and 30. The first two sections link the Commission to the Environmental 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, the centrepiece of the Whitlam 
Government's program to reduce broad acre destmction of significant cultural and 
natural locations. This was to be achieved by enabling the Commission to advise the 
relevant Minister on the likely impact of proposals on the National Estate. As a 
result, environmental impact statements produced by project proponents could be 
balanced by analysis provided by the AHC. 
Section 30 of the Act is central to the Commission's work as it requires all Ministers 
to ensure that work done by Departments and Authorities under their control does 
not 
.... adversely affects, as part of the national estate, a place that is in the 
Register unless he is satisfied that there is no feasible and prudent 
alternative.71 
As the most critical section of the Act, there are several key implications for 
Commonwealth government agencies. Most importantly, the Commission has to be 
made aware of development proposals by government agencies and these same 
agencies are required to fully disclose the nature of planned works. These 
disclosures must also contain a convincing explanation of why damage to the 
National Estate cannot be avoided. Such an explanation is open to critical scrutiny 
and provides an opportunity for the Commission to suggest alternatives if not 
satisfied. 
Central to the concept of the National Estate was the Register which would list those 
locations deemed by the Commission or the Minister to contain National Estate 
values. The Act defines an appropriate general methodology for the operation of the 
Register but is silent on the actual criteria for determining the nature of national estate 
values. In this the Commission was given enormous power, controlling both the 
71 Australian Heritage Comm1ss1on Act 1975 Section 30 
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listing and the protection of National Estate values. 
To summarise, the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 broadly reflected the 
recommendations of the Hope Commission of Inquiry to establish a specialist 
heritage body. The relevant Ministers, Tom Uren and Moss Cass, also accepted the 
need for such a body to be independent of other agencies and made provision for this 
through the number of Commissioners and the powers of the Chairman. The 
Commission was also given adequate powers to identify and protect the National 
Estate from needless Federal Government actions. For the wider community and 
other levels of government, the Act placed emphasis on public education, 
cooperation and the simultaneous operation of the Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 197 4. 
Challenge and continuity 1976 - 1979 
When the Whitlam Government was defeated in the 1975 Federal election only the 
Chairman of the AHC had been appointed. The new Coalition Government came to 
power with an agenda quite different to that of the previous Labor administration. Its 
outlook was summarised by the Governor General's speech at the opening of 
Parliament on February 17, 1976 . 
... my Government believes that the Australian people have given it a 
strong directive to bring under control the highest unemployment for 
forty years and the worst prolonged inflation in the nation's history. 
The Government believes that excessive government intervention in 
the life of the nation is a major factor in economic instability. My 
Government's immediate objective is to bring inflation under control 
so that there can again be jobs for all who want to work. The 
Government's long term objective is to prevent the growth of 
centralised bureaucratic domination in Australia, the increasing 
dependence of individuals on the state.72 
The Governor General then outlined a numher of proposed initiatives to achieve 
these objectives which would have a critical effect on the establishment of the 
72 Australia, House of Representatives, 1977, Debates, 17 Feb, p. 12. 
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fledgling AHC. Growth in the Commonwealth bureaucracy was, for example, to be 
halted by the announcement of new staff ceilings, along with an across the board 
reduction in Commonwealth outlays.73 These efforts were to be spearheaded by an 
Administrative Review Committee which was given the task, among others, of 
eliminating duplication within Departments and between Commonwealth and State 
agencies. 
Emphasis was also placed by the new Government on reversing the trend to 
concentrate political power in Canberra. It was argued that new opportunities should 
be created for problem solving at the state, local and community level through 
'historic reforms'.74 
Based on this general philosophical thrust, the Fraser Government set out to review 
a wide range of government activities including measures to protect the National 
Estate. The spirit of an administrative review of the AHC Act, announced in early 
1976, was captured in the following comments made by the Prime Minister to Tom 
Uren. 
Originally, as was endemic under the previous Administration, there 
were somewhat extravagant proposals concerning the nature of the 
Commission and the way iQ which it might operate. There is no point 
in having a large bureaucracy for bureaucracies sake.75 
This response, combined with a reduction of staff numbers in the new Department of 
Environment, Housing and Community Development, created alarm among 
environmental groups. Concern was further heightened when an assessment of 
National Estate Grant programs was also commenced. This review process delayed 
the establishment of the Commission and prompted a lobbying campaign to 'save' 
the AHC. The Bankstown Conservation Society, for example, submitted a petition 
to Parliament calling urgently on the Government to establish the Commission and to 
provide the new organisation with adequate resources .76 The former Minister Tom 
73 An initial review promised reductions in the order or S360 million. 
74 These initiattvcs became collectively known as 'New Federalism.' For the Commission this 
meant any new national conservation strategics had to gain acceptance first from the States before 
CommonwcalLh support would be forthcoming. 
75 Australia, House of Representatives 1976, Debates, 26 Feb, pp. 310-311. 
76 ibid, 4 June, p. 3028 
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Uren believed the whole concept of a Commission was under threat, stating ' ... the 
decision not to staff the AHC and now its foreshadowed abolition is an attack on our 
people, our birthright, our heritage. '77 
The response of the Government to the review process and the public campaign on 
behalf of the Commission was the Australian Heritage Commission Amendment Bill 
1976. This legislation had two stated objectives: to improve the original Act's 
effectiveness and to ensure the Commission operated within the overall framework 
of the Government's economic objectives. Mr Fraser claimed 
the amendment to the Australian Heritage Commission Act set out 
in the bill are designed to improve its effectiveness. They will 
establish it now as an efficient and meaningful advisory body, within 
the framework of government. ... At the same time, the amendments 
show the Government's desire to ensure that its priority objective of 
responsibility and restraint in economic management is reflected in the 
procedures and working arrangements adopted by the Commission.78 
Mr Fraser's Second Reading speech proposed and oulined three major amendments 
relating to the AHC's membership, consultative powers and status of the Chairman. 
Each of these measures, separately and combined, diminished the overall authority 
of the AHC both within and outside government. Most significantly, they limited the 
capacity of the Commission to negotiate directly with State and Local governments 
without first gaining authorisation from the responsible minister. 
The Hope Inquiry had argued strongly that the AHC should have a large board to 
ensure the broad range of interests contained within the National Estate were 
represented. This approach was accepted by the Whitlam Government which was 
particularly mindful of the need to ensure State bodies were well represented. It is 
also accepted that the strength of any organisation is highly dependent on the quality 
and number of those directing policy, especially with regard to a specialist scientific 
body. In the original Act, the Commission was to consist of up to nineteen part time 
Commissioners. This was subsequently reduced to a maximum of seven with only 
77 ibid, 26 Feb, p. 362. 
78 ibid, 4 June, p. 3066. 
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two being permanent Heads of Department. 
The underlying rationale for such a substantial change was based on management 
efficiency and cost savings. The Government also argued that the question of 
gaining access to a broad range of specialists was met through amendments to 
Section 45 which allowed for the creation of advisory committees. 
It is clear, however, that the reduction in the number of Commissioners would 
reduce the status of the organisation. The change also denied the original intention of 
the Labor Government for the AHC to have an inclusive structure which allowed 
representation of all key stake holders. Tom Uren saw the original Australian 
Heritage Commission Act 1975 as ' ... an example of open government and 
participation in the decision making process on a level unprecedented in Australian 
history.'79 
The Labor Party believed that by reducing the number of Commissioners by at least 
twelve the original concept for the Commission was destroyed. Labor spokesman 
Les Johnson argued that because advice from the Commission would no longer be 
broadly representative of community, scientific and government views, it could be 
more easily ignored by a new Government seeking to reduce government 
expenditure. Johnson summarised his views on the reduction this way . 
... this Act limits the range of expertise available to the Commission 
and increases their workload to such an extent that the program of 
saving the National Estate will be put back many years.so 
For the Labor Party, the link between the reduction in the number of Commissioners 
and financing the National Estate was confirmed by the Government's decision to 
delete Sections 7a(ii) and (iii) which describe the financial advisory powers of the 
Commission. Mr Fraser also put forward the proposition that preservation of the 
National Estate was dependent on a change in community attitudes rather than the 
expenditure of 'vast sums of public moneys'. Improved decision making based on 
sound planning would achieve the desired results especially once the Register of the 
National Estate had been created. 
79 1b1d, 18 Aug, pp. 318-319. 
80ibid, 18 Aug, p. 323. 
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For the Opposition, this proposition signalled a retreat by the Government from a 
financial commitment to the National Estate and a capitulation to Treasury. It was 
noted by Tom Uren that Treasury 
... has been able to influence the Government to take away from the 
Commission the power to make recommendations on expenditure. 
The Government does not want to be embarrassed by such 
recommendations. It wants to spend the money it has on other 
programs and not on the National Estate.81 
These observations fitted the general Government commitment to curbing public 
service expenditure. The existence of numerous National Estate projects still 
requiring multi-million dollar funding to complete would also have provided ample 
evidence to the Coalition that the Commission's financial powers should be trimmed. 
Labor spokesmen conversely stressed the need for the AHC to possess financial 
muscle and partially defined the likely future success or otherwise of the 
Commission in tem1s of its budget allocation. 
Crucial to the Commission's functions was the establishment of a National Estate 
Register and a strong case was put. by the new Government that available resources 
should be concentrated on compiling the Register and establishing its value as a 
planning document. In this sense it could be claimed that the management of a large 
scale funding program was both premature and distracting to the main work of the 
fledgling organisation.8~ Mr Fraser also argued that the AHC still retained the ability 
to advise on the nature and extent of financial assistance to the National Estate even if 
this power was no longer made explicit m the Act. 
In summary, the election of a Coalition Government committed to a reduction in 
government expenditure and regulation led to a substantial change to the Australian 
Heritage Commission Act 1975. These changes, which related to the structure and 
functioning of the organisation, were so substantial that the original intent of the Act 
was severely distorted. A simultaneous halving of the size of the AHC board and 
81 ibid, 19 August, 1976 p. 390. 
82 This point was put by Hon Malcolm Fraser in the second reading speech, House of 
Representatives, Debates, 1976, 4 June, pp. 3066-3067 
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removal of explicit references to its role in providing advice on Commonwealth 
funding of the National Estate broke a pattern established by the Hope Inquiry and 
the Interim Committee of the National Estate (ICONE). Between 1973 and 1975 
Government policy relevant to the National Estate was linked to a dramatic increase 
in the funding of technical research and grant programs. Under the Fraser 
Government there was no increase in grant funding and resources were concentrated 
on improved documentation of National Estate issues. As a consequence, the 
preparation of the National Estate Register gained pre-eminence over more general 
functions in the amended Act. 
Establishment of the organisation 
In reviewing the first five years of the Commission's operation, David Yenken, the 
initial Chairman of the AHC, painted a distressing picture . 
... by the time of the appointment of the first Commissioner in 1976, 
the economy was depressed and the climate of decision making was 
changing. Because it was in these conditions that the AHC had to 
begin its work, the first five years have been a difficult period for the 
Commission. Resources of staff and money have been extremely 
limited.83 
The inability of the Commission to rapidly expand its staff complement reflected a 
general downward pressure on numbers throughout the public service at that time. 
The Commission, although independent in a policy sense, fell within the portfolio 
responsibility of the Department of Environment, Housing and Community 
Development which had also suffered a substantial decrease in staff. Between 1976 
and 1978 the Department's numbers were nearly halved.84 
In these circumstances the Commission concentrated its resources on establishing the 
Register of the National Estate which, by 1980, had some 6,700 listings. The aim of 
this Register is to list 
83 Australian Hernage Comm1-;s1on, 1981, The National Estate in 1981, p. 
84 Department of Environment, Housing and Community Development, 1978, Annual Report 1977 
- 78, AGPS, Canberra. 
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... components of the natural environment of Australia or the cultural 
environment that have aesthetic, historic, scientific or social 
significance or other special value for future generations as well as for 
the present community.SS 
In a symbolic move, the Commission's Minister requested that Fraser Island become 
the first item listed in the new Register. This request followed the adoption by 
Government of the main recommendation of the Fraser Island Inquiry, that export 
permits not be reissued for mineral sands unless mined below the high water mark. 
During the late 1970s, a large number of areas were nominated by the public for 
inclusion on the Register reflected a high degree of interest in heritage conservation. 
The inability of the AHC to process these nominations led to criticism of the 
organisation's performance but conversely strengthened arguments for additional 
staff resources. Over an eight year period, however, staff numbers increased only 
modestly from thirteen (including seconded positions) in 1976 to twenty two (of 
which three were part time) by 1984.86 
A major promotion and resource tool for the Commission did however become 
available to the Commission in 1980 with the launch of Heritage of Australia. This 
comprehensive publication contajned nearly all areas listed in the Register and 
included examples of the most important categories. It subsequently became a 
standard research tool for both private individuals and corporations. This work was 
supported by a range of educational publications, a school kit, a film and a series of 
public lectures designed to promote a clear understanding of the National Estate 
concept and the work of the Commission. 
The importance of these endeavours to enhance public confidence in the AHC and its 
work is best illustrated by the decision of the Fraser Government to request the 
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and Conservation to 
investigate the operation of the AHC and the Environment Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act 1974. This inquiry was sparked by continuing criticism of the 
Register's operation by the mining industry and the inability of the Commission to 
85 AusLralian Heriwge Commi~~1on AcL 1975, SecLion 4(1). 
86 These figures were taken from Lhc Australian HeriLage Commission Annual Reports for 1976 and 
1984 respccuvcly. 
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successfully deflect or blunt these criticisms at a political level. While there was a 
high level of community support for the Commission's work, the nation's political 
and economic circumstances were less supportive. During the late 1970s a 
resurgence in the minmg industry was seen as a key factor in improving the financial 
position of the nation. Thus, criticism of the Commission from this quarter had 
considerable weight within the Fraser Cabinet. 
The decision by the Fraser Government to set up the inquiry effectively acted as a 
temporary circuit breaker for persistent criticism from industry. Five 
recommendations were subsequently made to Government to accommodate areas of 
concern. Fortunately, implementation of these changes did not effect the operational 
integrity of the organisation. With respect to the Register, it was recommended that 
Section 26 of the Act be changed to ensure all persons and organisations with an 
interest in a nominated area be notified in writing once a decision has been taken to 
list the area. It was further suggested that the AHC be required to advertise its 
intention to take action at the same time a property was listed. 
These proposed changes were combined with a recommendation that any objection 
to a listing be dealt with within twelve months which, if not achieved, would lead to 
the nomination being cancelled. Clearly such suggestions were designed to 
overcome strident criticism that the process of listing was too lengthy and created 
uncertainty within the mining industry. By making these recommendations, the 
Committee accepted this line of argument. It did not, however, agree with industry 
criticism of the AHC nominating large areas. It stated 
... the committee considers the listing of broad areas of land consistent 
with the powers of the Commission and its stated aim of listing 
significant areas and does not constitute a departure from the intent, or 
misuse of the legislation 87 
The affirmation of the AHC by the Committee was a considerable blow to 
opponents. This was particularly the case as the report also down played the role of 
the AHC in National Estate areas once listed. The Report noted: 
87 Comments from this report were quoted in the publication, The National Estate in 1981, p. 44 
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Despite the views of some sections of the community, the Australian 
Heritage Commission has a purely advisory role and has no direct 
authority to do anything in relation to a listed place.88 
In comparison with the 1976 review, the Committee's findings were largely 
positive. As a consequence, only one minor amendment was made to the Act in 
1982. The importance of heritage conservation work and associated costs were also 
identified, with the Committee requesting that additional funds be made available to 
government agencies possessing a large portfolio of heritage properties. 
This review was a timely reminder that the AHC regularly interacted with many 
commercial and development orientated organisations which were more than willing 
to attack its work and professionalism. This dilemma was summed up by Yenken in 
1982. 
The need for a National Heritage body such as the Commission, and 
the value of its work would seem to be self evident. And yet during 
the last five years the Commission has been faced with constant 
attacks and the Government has regularly considered amendment to 
and possibly repeal of the Commissions Act.89 
In essence, the Commission emerged from the review both strengthened and more 
robust. While there existed the opportunity for major changes to the Act to be 
initiated at this time, strong support for the AHC from the community, State 
Governments and Commonwealth Departments ensured this did not occur. Indeed, 
the Committee's published report argued there was widespread support for the 
amended Act after four years of operation. The Chairman noted: 
The legislation was described variously by the States as 'vital', 
'essential' and 'of importance'. No State Government put to the 
Committee any suggested amendments to the Act.90 
Clearly, the AHC which had emerged by 1980 was not the National Estate 
88 ibid, p.43 
89 ibid, p. 196. 
90 ibid p. 197. 
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Commission envisaged by the Hope Committee of Inquiry some six years earlier. In 
many respects, the report's mildness could be seen by the Government as an 
indication that the surgery carried out on the Act in 1976 had been successful. 
In the following section, the placement of Fraser Island on the Register of the 
National Estate is discussed. This action by the Minister for the Environment, 
Housing and Community Development in 1977 symbolised a commitment to the 
listing process if not to the organisation which managed it (see Figure 3) The new 
Government clearly accepted that a listing of 'the things we want to keep'91 was a 
reasonable objective. However, it was less comfortable with ·the environmental 
advocacy and funding role proposed by the Hope Inquiry for the AHC. 
The first major listing - Fraser Island 
Following a direction from the Minister for the Environment, Housing and 
Community Development, the Hon. K. Newman, the Commission placed Fraser 
Island on the Register of the National Estate on February 11, 1977. This step was 
the culmination of nearly five years of disputation between the sand mining company 
Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd, Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd and the 
conservation movement. It also followed a recommendation by the Commonwealth's 
Fraser Island Environment Inqui~y that all sand mining above high water mark 
should cease. The importance of this decision is described in the 1976 AHC Annual 
Report in the following tenns. 
This decision of the Commonwealth was one of the most important in 
the history of conservation in Australia and represents a significant 
precedent in Government actions. In the opinion of many scientists, it 
is a decision of world significance.92 
The Fraser Island debate which will be described in this section was thus important 
in establishing a major role for the Commonwealth in resolving those environmental 
disputes in which it became enmeshed. 
91 This phrase was coined by Tasmanian Premier Eric Reece Lo describe areas listed on the Register. 
92 Australian Heritage Commission, 1977, Annual Report 1976-1977, AGPS,Canberra,p. 2 
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Figure 3 
Listing Process for the Register of the National Estate 
Place identified as having prima fade significance by survey work 
or nomination from a person or body 
Australian Heritage Commission asses.5ES place 
(Evaluation panels, independent experts, in-house assessmena 
Decision on place at Commission meeting 
Gazettal and public notice of proposal to list 
(Placed on Interim List of the Re~ster) 
Three month period for objection/ comment 
No oojection 
topropa5ed 
listing 
Ob~ction 
topropa5ed 
listing 
Minister decides 
if independent 
mes.sor neassary 
Reconsideration at Com~ion meeting 
Gazettal and public notice 
Place entered in Re~ster 
Ob~on upheld in part 
· Gazetlal and public notice 
Part place entered in Register 
Part place removed from 
Interim List 
Source: AHC Annual Report 1990- 91 
Place not accepted 
Ministerial appointment 
of independent assessois. 
Ob~on upheld 
Gazetlal and public notire 
Place removed from 
Interim List 
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The Commission of Inquiry into the future of Fraser Island was established under 
the Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 and served as the first 
major test of this legislation. The principal recommendation of the Inquiry, which 
prevented mineral sands mining on the Island, underlined the potential power of the 
Commonwealth to decisively resolve environmental disputes utilising certain 
sections of the Constitution. A subsequent unsuccessful testing by the companies of 
both the Act and the Commonwealth's constitutional powers in the High Court 
confirmed the capacity of the Commonwealth to override State powers. In addition 
to mining industry concerns, the conservative Queensland Liberal-National Party 
Government was also vigorously opposed to Commonwealth intervention in the 
management of Fraser Island. 
The disallowance of mineral exports from Fraser Island was based in Regulation 9 
of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Regulations. These regulations were not 
unusual in themselves but the Commission of Inquiry process led to them being 
tested for the first time in the High Court. In Murphyores Incorporated Pty Ltd v the 
Commonwealth, the High Court ruled that environmental aspects could be taken into 
consideration when the Commonwealth exercised its powers under this regulation. 
As a consequence, the approach by the Commission of Inquiry to assess the 
conservation impact of both exporting and not exporting mineral sands had a firm 
legal basis. 
The Inquiry's finding that Fraser Island had outstanding natural values was also 
integral to its recommendation that mining cease. It found that the island ' .. .is a 
component of the natural environment of Australia having outstanding social, 
aesthetic and scientific significance and other special value for future generations as 
well as for the present community'.93 This finding led to a second important 
recommendation, that Fraser Island ' ... be recorded as part of the National Estate as 
soon as possible'94 
For the Commission, this step was not simply a minor requirement to comply with 
the new Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975, but rather a positive step 
towards preserving the values they had discovered in the course of their research. 
93Fraser Island Environmental Inquiry, Final Report of the Commi~sion of Inquiry, Parliamentary 
Paper No 333 /1976, Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, p. 198. 
94 ibid, p. 206. 
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The entry of Fraser Island on the Register of the National Estate 
would be a pointless and sterile exercise unless it serves as a means to 
the wider end of encouraging the conservation of the Island in the 
national interest.95 
The Fraser Island Commissioners believed that there were two distinct elements to 
the Register of the National Estate. The first of these was the identification of 
locations with outstanding cultural and scientific values. Through their Inquiry, a 
prima facie case had been established that these qualities existed on the Island. 
Consequently, they argued it was their responsibility to advise the Commonwealth 
Government of their findings in terms of subsection 4 (I) of the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act 1975 which defines those qualities which form the National Estate. 
It was also recognised that listing could increase 'the likelihood of the areas protection 
as it 
... facilitates the taking of action and the incurring of expenditure, by 
the Commonwealth Government with a view to conserving, 
improving and presenting that place as part of the National Estate.96 
Thus, the importance of the AHC Act was recognised soon after its passage through 
Parliament by a key government inquiry. The Australian Financial Review and other 
business publications followed the debate with considerable interest. The position of 
the Fraser Government was seen as particularly surprising, as noted by the 
commentator 'Chanticleer'. 
In taking away apparent Dillingham export approvals and then 
suggesting that they were not given, the Fraser Government sends a 
shiver down many a spine'.97 
As discussed in the previous section, it was pressure from the mining industry 
95 ibid, p. 67. 
96 ibid, p. 62. 
97 Article by 'Chanticleer' in Australian Financial Review, 19 July 1977. Quoted in A. Gilpin, The 
Australian Environment, 12 Controversial Issues, Sun Books, Melbourne, 1980, p. 98. 
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which led the Prime Minister to announce a review of the AHC Act in 1979. It 
would be reasonable to suggest that the 'loss' of Fraser Island to mineral exploration 
created this counter reaction. Within the context of the Australian mining industry the 
Fraser Island mineral sands operation was minimal. It was also recognised, 
however, that the concept of National Estate listing had the potential to place new 
and unwelcome restraints on both exploration and mineral extraction projects 
elsewhere. 
The legal and administrative challenge by Dillingham Pty Ltd and the mining 
industry to the Fraser Island Inquiry focused on the operation of the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 and the Australian Heritage Commission 
Act 1975. Ironically, closer attention should have been applied to the implications 
flowing from Australia's ratification of the Convention for the Protection of World 
Cultural and National Herita£e in 1974. Indeed members of the Hope Committee of 
Inquiry drew to the attention of the Fraser Island Commissioners the link between 
National Estate listing and those areas such as Fraser Island which could be 
protected under the Convention through a successful World Heritage Listing. While 
in this case it was not a major factor in the protection of the Island, a significant 
potential Commonwealth power was highlighted. In a few short years Australia's 
membership of the Convention would be critical to resolving the next major 
environmental battleground, the Franklin River. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AHC AND THE FRASER GOVERNMENTS 1976-1982 
A changing climate for conservation organisations 
The Whitlam Government provided generous financial assistance to conservation 
organisations during the full period of its administration. At a philosophical level the 
government argued that such bodies should be encouraged to expand their public 
advocacy role as a means of evening the struggle between community based pro-
conservation forces and pro-development industry groups. A second proposition 
was that conservation organisations were able to carry out a range of research and 
physical conservation tasks in a more cost effective manner than government 
agencies. This was especially the case where organisations including the National 
Trust possessed a wide range of expertise which could be drawn on at little or no 
cost. 
In the context of relations between Commonwealth, State and Local Governments, 
the development of a National Estate program was an important initiative. This was 
because it reinforced the overall Commonwealth objective of linking national policies 
with the expenditure programs of .the second and third tiers of government. In the 
financial years 1974-75 and 1975-76 the Whitlam Government established a 
benchmark for funding voluntary conservation organisations. The National Trust 
received $205,000 in 1974, rising to $240,000 the following year. With respect to 
other voluntary conservation bodies, the figures were $353,000 per annum rising to 
$390,000. More broadly these organisations, along with State and Local 
Government, benefited from a comprehensive National Estate Grants Program 
which specifically funded a mix of research, planning studies and physical 
conservation works totalling some $13.220,000 between I 974 and 1976. 
Over the next seven financial years, the ALP and conservation organisations were to 
be vociferous critics of the Fraser Government with respect to National Estate 
funding. It was noted in the 1978-79 AHC Annual Report that a reduction in funding 
for conservation bodies was posing a threat to their viability. 
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The Commission regards these funds as an essential aid for 
community education and understanding of issues broadly related to 
the protection of the environment. Whilst it is acknowledged that 
commitment of government funds has been generally reduced over 
recent years there is a clear danger that a number of the important 
voluntary bodies are in danger of failing unless support is continued.98 
This criticism was particularly potent as the Fraser Government argued that, through 
its overall reduction in the size of government, there would be an empowerment of 
the community and community organisations. In addition to these arguments 
associated with personal liberation, the Coalition also claimed that community 
organisations could operate in many spheres more cost effectively than government. 
It is ironic, therefore, that the Fraser Government defended its allocation of National 
Estate grant funds largely in terms of expenses associated with the creation of new 
government conservation agencies such as the AHC. In reply to a question from the 
Labor opposition, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment Mr Tom 
McVeigh, noted: 
In addition to the allocations mentioned [National Estate grants and the 
AHC Budgetl, funds are also provided for other heritage activities, 
including for example, the Australian National Parks and Wildlife 
Service, the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority the Supervising 
Scientist and assistance to Tasmania for restoration and conservation 
work at Port Arthur.99 
This argument has some validity in a purely financial sense as, for example, the 
allocation for the AHC rose from an initial $250,000 in 1975 to $714,000 in 1982-
83.100 Funding of conservation projects was also a new area of government 
endeavour and the provision of substantial financial assistance to organisations such 
as the Australian Conservation Foundation had not been fully accepted by the 
incoming government. 
The Fraser Government consist~ntly asserted that the vast majority of powers 
98Austral1an Heritage Commission, 1980, Annual R('port 1978-1979, AGPS, Canberra, p. 18. 
99 Australia, House of Representatives 1982, Debmes, 14-15 Dec, p. 3612. 
100 ibid, 8 Dec 1982, p 3188 
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associated with land management issues resided with the States. Successful national 
conservation programs, therefore, required full State Government agreement and 
support. While correct in a legal sense and valid from a philosophical perspective, a 
number of States during the late 1970s and early 1980s lacked either the political will 
or the financial resources to address conservation issues in a positive manner. The 
National Estate Grant program did, however, provide a perfect opponunity for the 
principles of cooperative 'new federalism' as enunciated by the Fraser Government 
to be implemented. The Fraser Government strongly believed that State authorities 
were in the best position to determine heritage conservation priorities. The principal 
Commonwealth function was to allocate special purpose funds under Section 96 of 
the Constitution. 
The influence of the AHC over State conservation agencies during this period was 
weakened because grants were made through the Urban and Regional Development 
(Financial Assistance) Act 1973 rather than the AHC Act. The program was also 
administered through the Department of Home Affairs and Environment with the 
Commission having a more nebulous advisory role. A consequence of this situation 
was that policy and practice often did not converge. The Commission noted 
Under the 'new federalism' policy of the former Government, the 
Stares have major respons.ibility for program formulation with the 
Commission having responsibility for a 'national component' 
Consultative arrangements were to be set up in each state involving 
Commonwealth, State and Non Government Organisations. These 
arrangements have worked effectively in some States most of the time 
and in other States hardly or not at alJ.101 
These circumstances had major implications for both the Commission and voluntary 
conservation organisations especially in States such as Queensland which had 
governments unsympathetic to conservation issues. Problems cited included the 
exercise of State vetoes over funding for voluntary conservation groups wishing to 
carry out research on controversial areas including old growth forests. There was 
also a lack of balance between funding for the natural, Aboriginal and built 
environments. This situation led to a 'considerable disenchantment' among many 
101 Australian Heritage Comm1ss1on 1983, Annual Report 1982-83, AGPS, Canberra. 
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recipients and a general belief that the National Estate Grants program, during the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, was badly administered. The operation of the grants 
program also underlined the relative inability of the Commission to fulfil its original 
role as environmental advocate and supporter of voluntary conservation groups. 
Despite these limitations, the AHC did exercise its right to criticise government 
policy between 1976 and 1982. Its main avenue was, however, limited to its Annual 
Report to Parliament. In the cut and thrust of public policy development the AHC 
was often left to report the lobbying activities of others. During 1982 the Australian 
Council of National Trusts managed a campaign which called for a dramatic increase 
in National Estate funding. The Commission itself was largely impotent and could 
not carry out a similar strategy as it was cut out of the decision making process 
concerning grants. The Commission noted in its 1982-83 Annual Report that 
As in 1981-82, the Commission was not asked for advice on the 
grants to voluntary conservation bodies. As in last year's report, the 
Commission expresses the hope that this will be remedied in the 
current year.102 
In essence, the Fraser administration believed that a well funded National Estate 
grants program was not appropriat9 during a period of economic restraint nor was it 
acceptable for the AHC to act as advocate within government for a change in this 
approach. As the following section reveals the Commission was relegated to 
developing an administrative classification system for heritage areas, the Register of 
the National Estate. 
Development of a Register of the National Estate for the Nation. 
Lack of staff resources, inexperience and the political requirement for a substantive 
register to be in operation quickly contributed to early miscalculations by the 
Commission in producing the Register of the National Estate. Early listings were 
criticised on a number of grounds including that the Register was a compendium of 
other people's work. This claim alluded to the extensive exchange of information 
between the AHC and the National Trust which already possessed an extensive 
102 ibid,p. 22 
63 
register system. Clearly, however, the acquisition of basic data from the Trust was 
both sensible and cost effective. 
Another related criticism was that insufficient research was carried out before areas 
were listed. This point reflected the Commission's acceptance at face value of 
research carried out in the previous twenty years by other bodies. There was no 
prima facie case to dispute this large body of work and there was a clear 
understanding by staff that when resources become available a process of 
redocumentation would be carried out. During the 1980s, 'old' listings were indeed 
revisited through studies funded under the National Estate Grant Program. 
A third area of external criticism related to Aboriginal sites. Such listings, although 
small in number, were usually large in scale and contained a 'buffer' zone designed 
to protect a much more discrete secret/sacred location. New procedures were 
subsequently developed to overcome this difficulty through the creation of a 
confiden rial register. 
It is ironic that both the general populanty of the Register with the public and the 
criticisms levelled by vested interest groups are based on a central misconception. 
The placement of a location on the Register does not guarantee its protection from the 
actions of private individuals, companies, Local, State or even Federal 
Governments. Large areas of Tasmania, for example, are listed as being on the 
Register of the National Estate but normal economic activity continues in these 
locations. As Yenken points out the National Estate is a protective inventory only 
... in the sense that listing on it is a prerequisite for National Estate 
grant funding, and in the sense that actions of a Commonwealth 
Government Minister or authority that might adversely effect a listed 
place are constrained under the Commissions Act.103 
The real strategic value of the Register was to act as an alerting mechanism 104 for 
would-be developers. As the contents of the Register became more well known, 
detailed and accessible by computer, few organisations could argue successfully they 
103 The Natwnal Estate in 7987, p.26. 
104 ibid. 
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were unaware of the heritage significance of a particular location. 
The review into the AHC by Prime Minister Fraser in late February 1979 was 
triggered by criticism of the Register of the National Estate by the mining industry. 
Newspaper reportage noted that the Government had been receiving considerable 
criticism from the mining industry on the operation of the Act. Central to this 
criticism was the belief that the establishment of the Register was a hindrance to the 
continued well being of the mining industry. The Age newspaper recorded that the 
' ... Chairman of Mount Isa Mines, Sir James Foots, recently claimed that the Act 
reduced the likelihood of approval for mining ventures in registered areas.'105 
In response, the Commission argued that establishment of the Register offered a 
number of benefits to mining companies. It was noted that in future there would be 
no necessity for mining companies to wantonly destroy sensitive areas once 
identified given that there existed vast alternative prospective areas outside National 
Estate zones. In a more pragmatic sense it was also pointed out that company 
interests would be best served if they were aware of heritage zones that could 
involve costly litigation involving conservation and Aboriginal groups opposed to 
mining. The Commission also stressed that many progressive mining companies had 
accepted these arguments by the late 1970s. 
During this period, the Commission actually received strong support from both 
Government and a number of companies which wanted to know the exact 
whereabouts of Aboriginal sites of significance so as to avoid their accidental 
damage during exploration. Indeed, such information was routinely provided subject 
to the agreement of Aborigines associated with the site. The AHC saw this procedure 
as a vindication of their work, noting ' ... of course this is the whole purpose of the 
preparation of the Register of the National Estate.'106 
As the achievements of the Commission in this field became better known criticism 
by the mining industry of the very charter under which the Commission operated 
was muted. Instead the mining industry's concerns increasingly focussed on 
operational issues. By the end of June 1980, while some 6,600 places had been 
105Age, 23 Feb. 1979, p. 12 
106 Australian Heritage Commission 1979,Annual Report 1978-79, p.3. 
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nominated for entry onto the Register, a lack of staff resources meant that many 
nominations were taking a minimum of twelve to eighteen months to process. This 
in turn created a climate of frustration for both those nominating sites and affected 
landowners. 
Approximately five hundred nominations received between 1976 and 1980 had 
objections lodged against them from a total of one thousand individual objectors. 
This level of objection forced the Commission to develop a four stage review 
process which included consultation with objectors, evaluation of objections by an 
independent expert panel, review by the Commissioners and a final provision for 
lodging of objections even after a place had been listed on the Register. This process 
led to the upholding of forty two objections or in other instances the changing of 
boundaries associated with a proposed listing from a total review figure of three 
hundred and fifty.107 
For many with an interest in the development of new facilities in an area listed on the 
Register, or for those operating existing commercial facilities which could cause 
potential harm to the environment, a listing was an unnecessary burden. This was 
due to the scope it gave the Commission to comment on projects under Sections 28, 
29 and 30 of its own Act. These Sections required the Commission to provide advice 
where Commonwealth Departments or agencies were planning to carry out projects 
in listed areas likely to diminish National Estate values. Private projects were also 
subject to the AHC Act if there was Commonwealth Government involvement in the 
provision of infrastructure such as roads and electricity. The AHC could also 
comment on private projects in National Estate areas where the Commonwealth had 
requested an environmental impact statement. 
These wide powers let to a coalition of objections in 1978 opposing the entry of the 
Great Barrier Reef onto the Register. This was due to the proposed listing including 
harbours and islands which were neither controlled by the Commonwealth nor part 
of a National Park. The entry was consequently amended by the Commission 
because it was impracticable and unrealistic to include long standing port zones and 
residential/commercial development areas where 'ham1ful' activities would inevitably 
be undertaken. 
107 Australian Hcrnagc Comm1s<>1on 1980, Annual Rerort/979-80, p. 8. 
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These early criticisms p'1ayed an important role in shaping the work of the 
Commission over the next decade. By 1981, the first stage of the Register had been 
completed with a broad range of significant areas listed. Phase two was to 
redocument the original listings and to fill in information gaps. It was quickly 
acknowledged, however, that a lack of specialist staff in areas ranging from geology 
to rain forest ecology prevented a complete geographic review of individual areas 
being carried out. In these circumstances, the concept of systematic assessment 
emerged which involved the gathering of detailed information on key subjects such 
as rain forest, mangrove swamps or in the historic area 'contact sites'. This approach 
enabled the AHC to respond in an authoritative manner in areas of high public and 
political interest. 
The need for this reassessment of listings and additional research was summarised 
by Professor Julius Fabos 108, an international expert on landscape assessment, who 
argued that a 'new reality' was emerging in landscape assessment. The first new 
trend he identified was an increasing number of objections and a high standard of 
professional challenge to listings. A second change was that more landscape 
architects trained in landscape assessment were now available. These two trends he 
claimed ' ... must force listing agencies into a more sophisticated game - that is to 
move from a simple landscape assessment technique to a parametric approach based 
on explicitly stated values, formal procedures and machine calculation.'109 
These comments came at a time when the Commission itself was reviewing the 
validity of its own Register and seeking to ensure individual listings could withstand 
detailed scrutiny. The difficulty at a political level remained, however, as to how 
much value society placed on the preservation of listed areas. Did conservation 
values outweigh economic factors and whose values were represented by listing? As 
the favourably economic conditions of the 1950s and 1960s failed to reappear in the 
1980s, these questions became more rather than less pressing. Compliance with the 
key sections of the AHC legislation, therefore, became more critical. 
108 A summary of the views or Professor F<ibos and their implicallons for the National Estate are 
contained in The Nauonal Estate in 1981, p. 30 
109 ibid p. 29. 
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The level of compliance by Commonwealth agencies with Section 30 
of the Act. 
The staff and Commissioners of the AI-IC in 1976 had high hopes that Section 30 of 
the Act and the creation of a Register of the National Estate would encourage 
departments and authorities to ' ... increasingly regulate their own actions and 
decisions affecting the National Estate.·110 Indeed, the long term credibility of the 
AHC was dependent on the organisation gaining compliance to the Act from large 
agencies such as Australia Post. It was, therefore, not surprising that the first 
Chairman of the Commission, David Yenken, claimed in 1981 that 
... relationships with departments are now generally very good. The 
Commission is, for example, preparing a memorandum with the 
Department of Defence. There have inevitably been some problems -
eg some departments have not referred proposals to the Commission -
but there 1s increasing co-oreration between departments and 
authorities and the Commission i 11 
This fairly optimistic assessment belied the intense and unsatisfactory struggle 
between the Commission and large, property-controlling departments in the years 
1976 to 1983. This all consuming battle to assert the primacy of conservation 
principles with Government property managers helped turn a bright and optimistic 
Commission into a beleaguered organisation prior to the election of the Hawke 
government. For Commission staff it was a fight to prevent the recurrence of such 
'cause celebres' as Australia Post's defacement of an historic property in Oatlands, 
Tasmania. This case, highlighted in the Committee of Inquiry Report into the 
National Estate, involved the construction of a hideous facade on a colonial 
sandstone cottage in the heart of an historic precinct. A subsequent apology for the 
destmction included the promise of the focade's reconstruction. It was a promise that 
was never kept. In the 1979-80 AHC Annual Report, Parliament was advised that 
the ' ... Commission was aware that Section 30 of the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act 1975 is not yet being implemented by all Commonwealth 
llffAustralian HcriLagc Commission 1977, Annual Report, 7976177, p.13. 
111 The National Estate in 1987, p. 41. 
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Departments in all areas and as a result parts of the National Estate were being 
adversely affected without the benefit of professional conservation advice.'112 
A pressing problem which initially faced the Commission was the gap between the 
rapid professionalisation of conservation practices and routine estate management 
procedures adopted by Government agencies. Middle managers responsible for 
overseeing developments were often not equipped to exercise the sensitive 
judgments necessary when considering the future of a heritage building. An initial 
response by the Commission was to encourage the formulation of effective 
management plans for he1itage properties. Such plans, often prepared by specialist 
consultants, were designed to provide guidelines for 'in house' departmental 
decision makers. 
A lack of staff resources substantially reduced the ability of the AHC to fulfil its 
charter in this particular area. While recognising that a widespread education 
campaign needed to be directed towards Commonwealth departments, its efforts 
remained low key. This decision was based on the premise that the AHC could 
irreversibly damage its professional status through creating a new level of desire for 
advice which it could not then service. It was argued: 
The Commission's ability to persuade development agencies depends 
on the recognised value and professional character of its advice. Hence 
hastily considered or tardy advice is worse than no advice. It would 
bring the Commission into disrepute and defeat its objectives.113 
Such a proposition can either be accepted on face value or seen as self-serving. 
Regardless of which position is closer to the truth, it is clear that during the Fraser 
years the Commission largely discarded the mantle of the Hope Inquiry and its 
presumption that conservation advocacy would be a major role for such an 
organisation. The importance of such advocacy work was highlighted by the Belle 
Vue hotel case. In March 1979, the AI-IC gave notice of intent for this outstanding 
historic structure adjacent to the Queensland Parliament to be placed on the Register. 
An objection was lodged by the Queensland Government but was overruled by the 
112 Australian Hcntagc Commission 1980, Annual Report, 1979 I 80, p. 10. 
113 ibid p.11 
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Commission. Subsequently, in the early hours of April 21 1979 a demolition 
company, at the request of the Queensland Government, demolished the building. 
Commonwealth agencies were unable to take such unilateral action but the AHC 
strongly believed withdrawal of maintenance funds was used as a method to achieve 
the destruction of property by stealth. Although the Commission received advice 
from the Attorney-General's Department that such a policy represented an effective 
breach of Section 30, the organisation lacked the resources and powers to pursue 
individual cases. It was also difficult to successfully criticise organisations such as 
Telecom and Australia Post who had a commercial brief. Government policy was 
firmly directed to reducing expenditure by these agencies and maximising profits. In 
this equation, the maintenance of historic properties did not fit well. 
In light of these circumstances, a largely unsuccessful campaign was launched to 
encourage the Commonwealth to allocate to departments additional funds for 
maintaining heritage properties. This campaign was pursued through such venues as 
the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Environment and 
Conservation. In a submission in October 1979, the AHC suggested: 
The Department of Finance, the Department of Administrative Services 
and the Australian Heritage Commission examine the desirability of 
introducing a separate item into departmental appropriations or any 
other means to allow the independent grouping of all maintenance and 
restoration in costs associated with Commonwealth properties listed 
on the register of the National Estate.114 
This suggestion was not accepted by the Commonwealth. The high cost of 
maintaining heritage properties actually encouraged both State and Federal 
Governments to sell off or lease such properties to developers during the 1980s. 
The former Office of the Premier in Macquarie Street, Sydney is one example. This 
significant and highly visible property was sold to commercial interests to form part 
of an international hotel complex. The Commission was also unsuccessful in 
attempts to encourage the Commonwealth Government to provide taxation incentives 
to private owners maintaining or restoring heritage properties. This lack of sucess 
drew comments from critics in a diverse range of media (see Figure 4). 
114 Quoted in the Australian Heritage Commi<>s1on 1983, Annual Report 7982-83, p. 1. 
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Section ~O of the Australian Heritage Commission Act is based on the premise that 
Commonwealth agencies, either out of goodwill or a desire to comply with the Act, 
would forward proposals for consideration. As a consequence, there was no 
provisions built into the Act which allowed for punitive punishments to be meted out 
to those who did not comply. Similarly, sufficient resources were not provided to 
enable the Commission to determine through investigation whether agencies were 
complying with the Act. It was not until the mid to late 1980s that the AHC was in a 
position to probe the activities of large Departments such as Transport. During the 
Fraser years the Commission was largely alerted to problems by conservation 
groups. The situation to 1983 was summarised this way. 
Section 30 referrals have seldom been received on the National 
Highways program, none for about five years on water resources or 
flood mitigation projects. Following persistent campaigns from 
conservation organisations, two projects under the Australian 
Bicentennial Roads Development program were referred to the 
Commission. No routine procedures in respect of any of these 
programs are as yet agreed, to ensure authorities comply with the 
law.115 
There were a number of cicurnstances which precluded full compliance by major 
departments with the AHC Act. These factors included inertia, lack of understanding 
and political will. In recognition of this situation, the Commission attempted to 
develop individual agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOU) with 
departments. These documents were designed to clarify areas of agreement and a 
proposed procedure for processing heritage issues between agencies. Most progress 
was made with the Department of Defence. However, as late as mid 1983 documents 
had not been finalised due to a lack of staff resources in the Commission. This 
situation symbolised the weakness of the Commission as a whole in asserting the 
Section 30 principle during its first six full years of operation. 
The AHC, states rights and sectional interest groups 
The defeat of the Whitlarn Government and the ascendancy of the Fraser led 
115 ibid p. 14. 
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Coalition Government in December 1975 represented a major change in the climate 
within which the conservation movement operated. For the previous three years a 
sympathetic government in Canberra had developed a broad range of conservation 
policies, initiatives and legislation favourable to those concerned with 'quality of life' 
issues. The advent of public funding for conservation groups facilitated the 
development of the Australian Conservation Foundation, the National Trust and 
similar bodies as sophisticated advocates for the environment. Public policy had also 
decisively swung toward increased restrictions over both public and private 
developments. Urban and regional planning also gained a new status and priority 
within the Commonwealth bureaucracy. 
The change of government in December 1975 was accompanied by a broad 
recognition that the Australian economy was faltering. Economic symptoms of a 
depressed economy included high levels of both unemployment and inflation. For 
the conservation movement these factors led to three fundamental changes to the 
environment within which they operated. These were the re-emergence of 'states' 
rights' as a barrier to national action on conservation issues, greater credence given 
to pro-development arguments from sectional interest groups and the diminution of 
government financial assistance. The personal dynamics in the Cabinet room had 
also changed and were described by Frawley in the following manner,' ... while 
Fraser himself had conservation sympathies, many in his government were 
ideologically opposed to nature conservation, urban planning and infringement of 
'States rights'.116 
Malcolm Fraser was later to point to the record of his Government in conservation 
with some pride. Eight pieces of sigrnficanr environmental legislation were passed 
between 1976 and 1982. They included the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976, the 
Whale Protection Act 1981 , the Antarctic Trearv (Environment Protection) Act 1980 
and the Wildlife Protection (Regulations of Exports and Imports) Act 1982. In 
addition to the banning of sand mining on Fraser Island in 1976, oil exploration on 
the Great Barrier Reef was also prevented. New bodies proposed by the Whitlam 
Government, including the Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service and the 
Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, were also maintained and had their 
116 K. Frawley, An historical perspective on land use in Australia and the development of ethics 
and traditions which guuie these practices, Paper to Symposium: The Role of Social Sciences in 
Natural Resources Management, University of Canberra 6-7 Dec 1990, p. 14. 
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funding increased. 
The Fraser Government accepted the increased importance placed by the community 
, 
on conservation issues. Unlike its predecessor, however, the Fraser Government 
was both unwilling and unable to form a partnership with activist organisations such 
as the Australian Conservation Foundation. This was, in part, due to previous 
strenuous efforts by the ALP to court the support of these bodies and the social 
activism embraced by their membership. 
Progress in protecting the environment under the Fraser Government was to be 
achieved through coordinated policy development and government to government 
negotiation rather than unilateral Commonwealth involvement in individual disputes. 
In 1980, the Prime Minister announced the development of the first National 
Conservation Strategy and in 1982 he launched a National Tree program. Both were 
important initiatives that recognised the need for national leadership in the 
conservation field. In a similar vein, the Fraser Government with little fanfare 
proposed and obtained World Heritage Listing for Lord Howe Island, the Willandra 
Lakes Region, the Great Barrier Reef and Kakadu National Park. In all three areas, 
the Hawke Government was subsequently to trumpet its environmental credentials 
by expanding on these initiatives. 
Open and intractable conflict between the Federal and State Governments, especially 
if they were of the same political party, was an anathema to the Liberal-National 
Country Party Government. This general position restricted the ability of the Prime 
Minister and his conservation Ministers to deal effectively with the Franklin Dam 
project. As this conflict between the Tasmanian Government and environmental 
forces unfolded between I 978 and 198 I, Fraser gradually accepted that the position 
of the Liberal Tasmanian Government was flawed. The option of an open breach 
with the Tasmanian Government and overncling State powers through Section 51 
(xxix), the external affairs power of the Constitution, was not available to Fraser. 
This was because of the commitment by the Coalition Party administration to 
protecting the constitutional position of the States within the Commonwealth. A high 
profile, public program of persuasion, aided and abetted by the conservation 
movement, was also not appropriate for a Government with strong industry links. A 
behind the scenes negotiation strategy and the distribution of Commonwealth 
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largesse was, therefore, adopted by Fraser. Spurred on by electoral considerations in 
1982, the Prime Minister attempted to negotiate an extraordinary $500 million 
compensation deal with Liberal Premier Robin Gray. The refusal of the Gray 
Government to halt the Franklin Dam project, despite this generous offer, 
symbolised the complexity and cost of modern environmental conflicts. It also 
underscored the failure of traditional Commonwealth negotiation techniques in these 
circumstances when faced with an intractable State Government. 
Conservationists during the 1970s and 1980s were also faced with a general hostility 
in the Parliamentary arena. The fear and loathing aroused by environmentalists and 
their government agents among some conservative politicians was symbolised by the 
attitude of Sir Charles Court to the AHC educational kit launched in 1980. Entitled 
Investigating the National Estate, the kit was prepared by the AHC and 
Commonwealth educational authorities for national distribution to schools. In a letter 
written to the Prime Minister, Sir Charles Court rejected the material as unfit for WA 
schools because ' ... the publication contains many inaccuracies, coupled with a 
strong centralist flavour'. The Premier went on to note 
An example of one inaccurate assertion relates to the claim that the 
Constitution can only be amended by referendum. Certain other 
sections of the kit take a negative approach to such matters as mining 
and wood-chipping.117 
In addition to the above, Sir Charles Court saw the educational kit as questioning the 
performance of State Governments in the field of conservation and land 
management. While the kit was eventually distributed throughout Australia, the 
critical position adopted by many conservative State politicians to the AHC made the 
operation of joint projects more difficult. This was a particular problem where co-
operation was critical such as with Register listings, land management studies and 
base line environmental monitoring. 
The views of Sir Charles Court and others toward the AHC were at least partially 
shaped by the consistent criticism of its work by the mining industry, especially in 
Western Australia, the Northern Territory and Queensland. The central argument, 
117 Australian, Oct 16, 1980, p. 4. 
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which was repeated on many occasions, was that listing 'inevitably led to the 
community believing this area had high conservation values which needed to be 
protected'. Because of the combative nature of the conservation debate and the 
suspicion with which the Commission's work was held, the prestigious industry 
publication, the Mining Review, could also confidently state that 'assurances that the 
Commission has no wish to use the Section l30 J against the industry while no doubt 
made in good faith are simply meaningless'.118 
A series of disputes affecting building developers and the mining industry were at 
the core of this campaign. The most important of these concerned attempts by the 
Queensland company Mount Isa Mines (MIM) to prevent the listing of eleven 
locations associated with Aboriginal sites in the Macarthur River region in the 
Northern Territory during January - February 1979. Criticism of the AHC by MIM 
Chairman Sir James Foot were supported by Energy Ministers in both the Northern 
Territory and Queensland. A subsequent review by a Parliamentary Committee of the 
National Estate listing procedures where Abo1iginal sites were located led to a 
dramatic reduction in the size of surrounding buffer zones. This effectively meant 
greater freedom for mining companies operating in sensitive areas. 
Closer to Canberra, the Commission was also embroiled in a damaging conflict 
associated with the proposed listing of inner city suburbs such as Reid and Barton in 
the ACT. It was argued by the Real Estate Institute of the ACT that stricter controls 
over renovations and improvements to houses along with tighter planning 
regulations would depress house prices. Government bodies including the National 
Capital Development Commission and the Department of the Capital Territory also 
made submissions to the AHC on the basis that broad scale listings would inhibit 
future planning measures such as infill housing. A property developer pursued this 
line, arguing 
... the effect of the proposed registrations would be to reinforce 
Canberra's sprawl and to undermine the ability of Civic to regain its 
natural dominance as the economic and cultural heart of the city.119 
118 Age, 'Ease Controls, say miners', 12 March 1979, p. 3. 
119 Canberra Times, 'Challenge planned to Heritage List', 23 Aug. 1980, p. 4 
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Government regulation designed to preserve natural and cultural features were a 
common feature in Europe and the United States by the mid to late 1970s. In 
Australia, it was a new and for some an unwelcome trend. The advent of a 
conservative government clearly provided an opportunity to roll back these initiatives 
of the Whitlam Government. In this climate, it was, therefore, predictable that the 
voice of the conservation movement would be dulled by that of commercial interests. 
In addition, a period of economic restraint also made it more difficult for the 
Commonwealth Government to give form and substance to its new range of 
environmental powers. It is, therefore, not surprising that Malcolm Fraser's focus in 
conservation matters was to consolidate old programs rather than provoke criticism 
by introducing new initiatives. 
Fraser's difficult position was summarised in his statement announcing an inquiry 
into the AHC in February 1979. A press report in the Financial Review recorded that 
... yesterday the Prime Minister was on record as saying that while 
the Act was under review the principles behind the Australian Heritage 
Commission 'would be maintained to the fullest by this 
Government.'120 
Personally sympathetic to conservation issues, Fraser's reluctance to revoke major 
pieces of environmental legislation was also backed by electoral considerations. A 
survey of environmental bodies in 1981 revealed membership of nature conservation 
bodies running at approximately 250,000, with a further 120,000 individuals 
associated with environmental cultural groups such as the National Trust.121 As the 
Chairman of the Australian Heritage Commission noted ' ... the sum total of this 
direct public involvement constitutes an impressive community voice.'122 
On coming to power, Malcolm Fraser promised to 'take politics off the front page.' 
This sentiment was also behind the Prime Minister's approach to conservation 
issues. Wherever possible, environmental conflicts were to be massaged and 
manipulated outside the glare of publicity. By so doing, he hoped not to provide 
120 Financial Review, 'Government to Hcntage Act after mining industry objects', 23 Feb. 1979, 
p. 5. 
121The National Estate in 1981, p. 8. 
122 ibid 
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ammunition for those in conservative ranks opposed to a greater level of 
Commonwealth environmental management. For Fraser, this was more beneficial 
than openly courting the environmental vote. This set of circumstances, however, 
prevented the Prime Minister from successfully addressing a range of key 
environmental issues effectively, including the Franklin Dam dispute. As Chapter 
Five will reveal, the Hawke Labor Government in contrast benefited considerably 
from a robust and public alliance with the green movement. It was also a political 
environment in which the Australian Heritage Commission could exercise more 
freely its statutory responsibilities and expand staff numbers. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE HAWKE GOVERNMENT 1983 - 1986 ... A TIME OF TURBULENCE 
The election of an ALP government foreshadowed a new era for members and staff 
of the Australian Heritage Commission. A pre-election commitment by Labor to save 
the Franklin - Lower Gordon wild rivers suggested that the new Government would 
allow the full potential of the Australian Heritage Commission to be demonstrated. 
Certainly the rapid resolution of the Franklin Dam dispute by the Hawke 
Government gave the environmental movement as a whole reason for confidence that 
environmental policy would be a focus for the new administration.1 23 As the 
following Chapter reveals, however, initial optimism was quickly replaced by an 
acceptance that the primary focus of the new Government was in fact economic 
reform and innovation. 
Environment remained a relatively low status department outside the inner workings 
of Cabinet and presided over by a relatively conservative Minister. Additional 
staffing resources were made available to the Australian Heritage Commission which 
ensured it was better able to perform its statutory functions. A better resourced 
Commission in turn was better positioned to engage in debate with pro -development 
forces both within and without goyernment. This was no more evident than in the 
forestry disputes in Tasmania, NSW and Queensland which dominated conservation 
politics during the mid to late 1980s. Cmcial to these disputes was a contradiction 
between an Australian Heritage Commission which placed large areas of old growth 
forest on the Register of the National Estate and a set of Commonwealth and State 
Government economic policies which encouraged an expansion of the forestry 
industry. 
This set of circumstances created an unfortunate, but not unusual, administrative 
paradigm for the AHC. Success in managing and refining the National Estate 
strengthened the hand of conservation forces. As more scientific data became 
available concerning the high conservation value of old growth forests, pro -
123 This period has been w1clely slucliccl with a broad range or literature produced. Key works 
include Papadakis, E. Politir.1· and the Environme/1/, the Australian Experience, Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, 1993.ancl Marsh,. l. (cd) The Em'iro111nen1al Challen1;e. Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 
1991. 
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development forces increasingly relied on economic and social arguments concerning 
the impact of restricting forestry activity. In this area the Commission had no 
expertise and, moreover, the Government chose not to alter the brief of the AHC to 
reflect these changing circumstances. Instead, the first term of the Hawke 
Government saw the emergence of a new strategy to resolve environmental disputes, 
the creation of new legislative based bodies. The first of these was the Lemonthyme 
and Southern Forests Commission of Inquiry under Justice Helsham. This 
development reflected a growing sophistication in dealing with important but bitter 
debates over the future use of the nation's natural resources. For the AHC it also 
suggested an inevitable displacement of the organisation from the very centre of 
environmental disputes, specifically the resolution process. 
A new government with new priorities 
The 1980s has been recognised by most commentators as a period of intense activity 
in the conservation arena. Direct action campaigns such as the Franklin Dam dispute 
often dominated newspaper headlines and the emergence of a cogent conservation 
philosophy, sustainable development, occupied government policy makers. For the 
ALP, the concept of the 'environmental vote' and the need to cultivate this section of 
the electorate had been established by the early 1970s. The experience of the 
Whitlam Government and the continuing growth of conservation organisations 
during the late 1970s confirmed the need for the ALP to present strong 
environmental credentials. 
In opposition, the ALP developed a new environmental policy which was designed 
to both differentiate the Party's position from the Government on key issues and 
critique the performance of those environmental instrumentalities created under 
Labor between 1972 and 1975. By 1979 the Party was in a position to include in its 
platform an analysis of Fraser Government programs and propose new initiatives 
such as the creation of the Office of Environmental Advocate. The ALP policy 
reiterated the importance of the AHC legislation and claimed that any shortcomings 
in the organisation's operation were primarily caused by lack of resources. 
Consequently a Federal Labor Government will ensure that the 
Australian Heritage Commission is able to clear the backlog of 
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nominations for the Register of the National Estate and assist in 
promotion and education of the Australian Heritage.124 
The policy also linked National Estate listing to the Convention for the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. It stressed that an ALP Government would 
proceed immediately with nominating the Great Barrier Reef, South West Tasmania 
and Kakadu National Park. The work of the Commission in documenting such sites 
and focusing on their significance was seen as an important part of its function. 
The Fraser Government's effective reductions of funding for conservation bodies 
were criticised by the ALP as a calculated program to stifle the voice of 
environmental groups and consequently benefit commercial interests. The ALP 
policy platform noted 
... opposition to environmental groups is widespread in the business 
community, particularly amongst the mining sector. This is reflected in 
the attitudes of the coalition MPs and no more so than amongst 
National - Country Party members who almost without exception are 
opposed to the Government providing funds for conservation and 
environment groups to attack their biggest financial supporters.125 
Figures were provided which suggested that between 1974-75 and 1980-81 the real 
value of grants had declined by 51.8%. This decline was used extensively by the 
Labor Party prior to the 1983 elections to dramatise a supposed lack of commitment 
to conserving the environment by the Fraser Government. In contrast, the 
importance placed by the incoming Labor Government on conservation issues and its 
willingness to exercise national leadership was symbolised by the first major action 
of the new administration, the resolution of the Franklin Dam dispute. This was 
achieved by the Government passing the World Heritage Properties Conservation 
Act 1983. 
By acting decisively and further extending the role of the Commonwealth in 
conservation issues, Labor attempted early on to capture the environmental vote. For 
124 Australian Labor Party, ALP Platform, Adelaide Conference - 1979, ALP, Canberra, 1980, 
Section 2, p. 14. 
125 ibid 
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the AHC, the election of a seemingly activist government promised much for the 
future. Certainly the new Minister Barry Cohen was publicly generous in his praise 
for the Commission's work and optimistic for the future. He claimed ' ... I think it is 
fair to say that [the] Commission has contributed more in its eight years of existence 
to the preservation of our heritage than any other action by any other 
Government. '126 
Certainly the AHC had every reason to be appreciative of the new Government. In 
the 1983-84 budget, the organisation received a 58% increase in funding with a 
further 26% increase in the National Estate grant allocation. Further assistance was 
provided for conservation project<; through the newly established Community 
Employment program. The new Minister did recognise, however, that the issues 
facing the Commission were not simply budgetary but also concerned public 
perception of its work. He believed that a critical role for the AHC was to build 
public support for, and understanding of, Government conservation policies. A 
background of bitter public dispute over individual conservation issues was not seen 
as a positive environment for effective policy development and program 
management. Furthermore, as the pnmary focus of the Government was macro -
economic reform and the stimulation of economic and employment growth, such 
disputes were a distraction. The Franklin Dam conflict and the Daintree Forest 
dispute, for example, occupied considerable media attention and inevitably raised 
questions about the impact of unrestrained economic growth. 
In this climate it was considered important that the AHC make a major contribution 
to promoting a more sympathetic view of conservation issues with the general 
public. This was to be achieved through ' ... a large number of projects in 1984-85 
ranging from films to exhibitions, displays, brochures and other publications.'127 
Barry Cohen implicitly accepted that a great deal of AHC resources were devoted to 
' ... dealing with the seemingly endless controversial heritage issues which seem to 
feature so prominently in our newspapers these days.'128 By becoming a 'front line' 
agency required to respond quickly to emerging conservation and resource based 
126 Departmental speech notes prepared !"or Barry Cohen for an address to the Wyong Histoncal 
Society, 8 April, 1984. 
127 ibid, p. 14. 
128 ibid, p. 13. 
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conflicts, its influence at a policy level consequently diminished. In the critical area 
of World Heritage listing the AHC was effectively cut out the decision making chain 
once it had prepared a 'tentative' list of possible areas for nomination. Initial 
Commission research was to be considered by a specially convened World Heritage 
Committee. Once agreement had been reached on a draft list, discussions were then 
to be held with State and Northern Territory Governments. On that basis a final list 
would be presented by the Minister to Cabinet for endorsement without necessary 
reference to the Commission. 
The new Minister asserted on numerous occasions he did not support a 
confrontationalist, 'crash through' approach to environmental issues. Reconciliation 
of conflicting interests and objectives was seen as the key to a sound environmental 
policy. This was certainly in tune with the theme of national reconciliation pursued 
by the Prime Minister, Mr Hawke. Such a position placed him at odds with many 
environmentalists who were supportive of community based action campaigns such 
as those mobilised to protect the Daintree. In a similar vein to conservative 
politicians, he argued that meaningful progress could only be achieved through 
cooperation with State Governments. As a Labor Minister he was fortunately less 
constrained by entrenched opponents of the conservation movement and more able to 
secure additional funds for both conservation agencies and community groups. The 
Minister's view of priorities and his approach was contained in a 'State of the 
Environment in Australia' speech to Parliament in November 1985. Cohen argued 
that: 
From day one of the Hawke Government I have held the view that the 
protection of Australia's forests will be the major environmental issues 
of the 1980's, but that it can be achieved only by cooperation between 
the states and the Commonwealth. Developing a national rain forest 
policy and implementing it in consultation with the States will 
therefore be a major priority for the Government as it continues to 
tackle the task of conserving our natural resources.129 
In establishing this priority, the Minister did not look to the AHC for leadership but 
rather the Department itself. Indeed the mechanism of a national rain forest 
129 Aus1.ralia, House of Rcprcscnt;1Livcs, 1985,DehatC's, 25 Nov, page 3601. 
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conference organised by the Department involving both government and non 
government expertise was deployed to encourage a general consensus on national 
policy. This approach was supported by the 1984 ALP policy platform which called 
for a Committee of Inquiry into the timber industry to investigate management and 
conservation issues. 
These circumstances posed a dilemma for the conservation lobby during the first 
term of the Hawke Government, a dilemna which prevented their total support for 
the ALP. On the positive side Labor had demonstrated a willingness to generously 
fund both Government bodies such as the AHC and community organisations. The 
Franklin Dam dispute had also been resolved by decisively extending the 
constitutional powers of the Commonwealth. In contrast, Minister Cohen had both 
publicly and privately appeared unwilling to move beyond a consensus mode in 
dealing with conservation issues. This was to be reflected in his later refusal to 
recommend a World Heritage nomination for the North Queensland rain forests as a 
means of protecting the integrity of the Daintree from a proposed road. 
In 1987 the situation was resolved when Cohen was replaced as Minister for the 
Environment by the Hon. Graham Richardson. While there were a number of issues 
associated with this turn of events, including factionalism in the ALP, the perceived 
lack of aggression by the Minister in handling his portfolio was an important 
consideration in his downfall. Commentator Elim Papadakis that noted ' ... his refusal 
to nominate the Queensland rain forests in the face of opposition by the Bjecke-
Petersen Government was seen as 'gutless' by the conservation movement.'130 
The AHC and the Gordon below Franklin dispute 
Tasmanian Government recognition of South West Tasmania as a wilderness reserve 
dates back to 1927 when the Cradle Mountain-Lake St Clair National Park was 
created. Further State reserves were formed in 1939 and 1941 when the Gordon 
River and Frenchman's Cap National Park were gazetted. During the twentieth 
century, the main environmental threats posed to the region related to mining 
activity, forestry and hydro dam construction. Significant and large scale damage 
130 E. Papadakis, Environmental Policy in C. Jennell & R. S tcw::irt,(Ed), l lawke and Australian 
Public Policy, Consensus and Recon.1·1ruc11n~, M:1cmillan, Sydney, 1989, p. 339. 
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was caused to the hills surrounding Queenstown and the waters of Macquarie 
Harbour from pollution associated with mining and smelting. The inundation of 
Lake Pedder in 1972 was a third major visible change to the South West landscape. 
These events had occurred prior to the formation of an effective national 
conservation lobby and the passage of key Federal legislation including the 
Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 and the Australian 
Heritage Commission Act 1975. This new legislation held out the promise that areas 
of outstanding natural and cultural heritage including South West Tasmania would be 
protected. 
In October 1979, the Tasmanian Government's independent statutory authority, the 
Hydro Electricity Commission (HEC), tested this new legislative climate by 
recommending that a new Gordon-below Franklin Dam be constructed. This action, 
if successful, would have destroyed Australia's last significant wild river in the heart 
of the South West wilderness area. The proposal also represented a second attempt 
to repeat the HEC development strategy of bulldozing aside community opposition 
and alternative strategies proposed by other Government agencies and State 
Parliament itself, an approach successfully deployed during the Lake Pedder 
campaign. In response, a seven year campaign to save the Franklin was launched, 
which was to involve an extraordinary interaction between organisations, policies, 
reports and individuals. 
Regardless of the threat posed by renewed dam construction following Lake Pedder, 
by mid 1975 the future long term management of South West Tasmania had become 
an important concern for the Tasmanian Government. Between 1975 and 1978, a 
State Government Committee of Inquiry into South West Tasmania produced a 
comprehensive review of land management and heritage issues associated with the 
region. Despite criticism of the final report by conservation bodies, the report led to a 
State Government announcement in July 1980 that the South West Conservation area 
would be created. The area so gazetted became the Wild Rivers National Park which 
included the Franklin River. It was an event which could easily have been predicted 
by HEC planners but they chose to press ahead, relying on the strength of the 
organisation and a possible change of State Government to see the project through. 
Opposition to the HEC proposal was manifested early within the State bureaucracy 
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and community, with a Government inspired Coordinating Committee on Future 
Power Development rejecting the HEC report and recommending the construction of 
a coal-fired thermal station with a second stage hydro scheme at an alternative 
location. Caught between these opposing views, the Tasmanian Government opted 
for a third alternative, a Gordon above Olga electricity scheme and the creation of the 
Wild River National Park. 
A subsequent Bill implementing these recommendations was passed by the Lower 
House but rejected by the Tasmanian Upper House. This deadlock was seemingly 
resolved by a State election in May 1982 which saw the defeat of the Labor 
administration. A new Bill authorising a Gordon below Franklin scheme was then 
passed in June 1982 by a new Liberal administration. The strength of community 
support for a 'no dams' option was, however, reflected in a December State 
referendum where 32.5 percent of votes cast explicitly rejected both the Gordon 
above Olga and the Gordon below Franklin schemes. A decision by the Labor State 
Government in late 1981 to recommend to the Commonwealth that the Western 
Tasmanian Wilderness National Park be nominated to the World Heritage List 
overshadowed the impact of these loc:i.l political events. This action placed the 
Franklin Dam issue clearly in the Federal arena and would lead ultimately to a 
resolution of the conflict. 
In September 23, 1981 a Senate Select Committee on South West Tasmania was 
established. Its tem1s of reference were to inquire into: 
(a) the natural values of South West Tasmania to Australia and the 
World and; 
(b) Federal responsibility in assisting Tasmania to preserve its 
wilderness areas of national and international importance, 
consistent with the states development needs and options for the States 
energy requirements131 
Such terms of reference provided an opportunity for the wealth of ecological and 
archaeological data available concerning South West Tasmania to be restated. The 
131 Senate Select Committee on South West Tasmania,1983, Future Demand and supply of 
Electricity for Tasmama and Other Matters, AGPS, Canberra p. 4 
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energy requirement arguments put forward by the Hydro Electric Commission could 
also be tested. These tenns of reference also reflected an implicit recognition that the 
Commonwealth could intervene to protect the South West and override state powers 
perhaps through the mechanism of a World Heritage listing. 
The majority report submitted to the Senate in November 1982 made several key 
findings. These included that regardless of any international obligations a variety of 
other powers were available to the 'Commonwealth to prevent the damming of the 
Franklin. Among these was the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975. The 
Committee pointed out that Section 30 of the Act would be activated when the HEC 
sought approval to borrow funds overseas for a scheme likely to hann the National 
Estate values of the South West. In the~e circumstances, the relevant Commonwealth 
Minister would need to be satisfied that no 'prudent or feasible alternative' to the 
scheme existed, a difficult case for the HEC to argue. More importantly, the report 
confirmed that by proceeding with World Heritage nomination the Franklin would be 
saved. Although recognising that the issue of World Heritage nomination was not 
central to the report, the document noted 
... the Committee must say that nothing has emerged from the inquiry 
which should persuade the Commonwealth Government from 
proceeding with the listing which involves the Government in fulfilling 
its obligations and responsibilities under the provision of the 
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage.132 
These findings undoubtedly paved the way for an incoming Labor administration to 
immediately prevent the dam proceeding through legislative fiat. 
The Commission believed it played a crucial role in this chain of events and Mr 
Vincent Serventy, conservation advocate and AHC Commissioner, supports this 
proposition. He claims this was achieved by the AHC convincing the Tasmanian and 
Commonwealth Governments to propose South West Tasmania and other areas for 
World Heritage listing. He noted: 
132 ibid p. 223. 
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In the Franklin River decisions the Commission played a vital role 
negotiating for over four years in order to convince the State 
Governments concerned that the first five items should go forward for 
nomination to the World Heritage List. And it was its presence on the 
list that eventually saved the Franklin River from destruction.133 
By stressing the importance of World Heritage listing in saving the Franklin, 
Seventy concedes that the provisions rn the Australian Heritage Commission Act 
1975 alone could not prevent the damming of the Franklin. The organisation's 
strength lay in its capacity to instigate and highlight research material on critical 
conservation issues for both the relevant Minister and the World Heritage 
Committee. Added to this was a general acceptance within government that the AHC 
had a legitimate role to play in environmental advocacy, whatever the political 
circumstances. Its effectiveness in this role was, however, largely dependent on the 
willingness of the Mini:-.ter and Cabinet to accept submissions from the Commission 
at any given time. In the final analysis, the incoming Labor administration was 
unable to rely on existing laws and was forced to create the World Heritage 
(Properties Conservation) Act 1983 to save the Franklin from damming. 
One perceived strength of the AHC was its relative independence and that its 
Commissioners could speak out, free of overtly 'political considerations'. A lack of 
resources and the administrative structure within which it operated between 1975 and 
1983 placed considerable restraint on the effectiveness of the Commission and hence 
its ability provide to unfettered, measured advice. A former Chairman of the AHC, 
Associate Professor Bruce Davis, observed in 1987 that 
... conservation is low in the pecking order of public issues and often 
a junior mmistry within cabinet portfolios. Not only does this render it 
difficult for the Commission's voice to be heard but there is always the 
prospect of being a minor part of a larger and generally diverse 
constellation of agencies making up a conglomerate department.134 
133 V. Scrvcnty, Saving Australia, a blrieprtnt for our survival, Child and Associates Publishing 
Pty Ltd, Sydney, 1988, p. 130. 
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The Commission is also required to work closely with its own Department on 
administrative matters. Any approach taken in correspondence to the Minister can be 
shaped by staff knowledge of prevailing Department views. Wayward opinions 
could be punished by reducing available resources at budget time. In these 
circumstances, the AHC exercised greatest authority in its early years through 
meetings between Commissioners and senior political figures. In 1982, a discussion 
was held between Prime Minister l'vlalcolm Fraser and the Commission because of 
the significance of South West Tasmania and the Franklin Dam proposal. By that 
time, the Commission was irrevocably and totally committed to preventing the 
construction of the dam and this position was strenuously put forward by individual 
Commissioners. While hard to determine the impact of such meetings, the size of the 
proposed compensation package ($500 million) offered the Tasmanian Government 
to halt the dam, surprised all observers. It would appear the Liberal-Country Party 
Government did nor seriously consider creating new legislation, an option pursued 
with vigour by Labor. 
In their Annual Report the AHC stressed that the Franklin Dam dispute and the 
future of SW Tasmania was their highest priority. 
Over the previous five years, the Australian Heritage Commission had 
consistently drawn attention to the significance of the natural and 
cultural values of the South West.135 
Despite this sentiment, South West Tasmania was not listed on the Register until 
July 1980. This was most surprising as 12 months earlier the Commission 
recognised the region was under threat. Similarly, the Commission did not argue for 
the World Heritage listing of South West Tasmania in its 1979-80 Annual Report. 
This was despite the organisation commending the nomination of Kakadu and 
supporting similar action for the Great Barrier Reef. The establishment of a separate 
World Heritage Committee for processing such nominations by the Fraser 
Government limited AHC influence in a new and important policy area. Thus, while 
represented on the Committee, the AHC had no administrative role in listing and was 
bound publicly to adopt the general positions of the Committee. At an operational 
135 Australian Hcnla.gc Comm1~s1on, 1984, An1111al Rerwrt 1983-84, AGPS, Canberra, p.1. 
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level, the AHC did orchestrate and fund further archaeological research in the South 
West during 1980-81. This action was important in the subsequent findings of 
Aboriginal remains m the Kakadu and Deena Reena caves. Promotion of these finds 
added further weight to the World Heritage nomination case and sharpened public 
debate. 
Effective resolution of the Franklin Dam dispute required the passing of the World 
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 which drew on Sections 51 (xx), 
51(xxvi) and S 1 (xxxix) of the Constitution. Labor Environment Minister Barry 
Cohenl36 argued that ultimately new legislation was required because existing Acts 
could not guarantee to give effect to the 'no darns' position of the new Government. 
In this sense the Commission was never in a position to save the Franklin under its 
own Act nor did it control the World Heritage listing process. Clearly, community 
based conservation groups such as the Wilderness Society were also better funded 
and equipped than the Commission to mount the necessary political campaign to 
overcome the strength of an entrenched and determined bureaucracy like the HEC. 
The struggle for the forests and the role of the Commission 
In 1988, it was estimated that the forestry industry was worth over $3.7 billion 
annually with 108,000 Australians directly employed in forest production. During 
the 1980s, however, this sector of the economy suffered from unprecedented 
disruption as government policy towards Australia's forests and forest management 
practices underwent a far reaching review. 
The Hope Committee of Inquiry recognised in the mid 1970s that there existed a 
pressing responsibility on both government and industry to assess the management 
of Australia's forests, in particular, tropical and temperate rain forests. Ten years 
latter Barry Cohen was to make the same observation. 
[There exists an ] ... urgent need to manage in the most conservative 
manner the remaining rain forest areas of the world, including 
Australia, as natural or near- natural systems and to concentrate 
136 Hon. Barry Cohen, 'The Franklin Saga', Speech to World Heritage Congress, Departmental 
Papers, Canberra, 1983, J1. 12. 
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intensive food and wood production on land already cleared.137 
By 1980, two main arguments were advanced by conservation groups concerned 
with the long term protection of forested areas from wood chipping and logging. The 
first centred around the need to preserve unique but poorly understood bio systems. 
It was claimed the interdependence of climate, soil, water quality and habitat was no 
better illustrated than in rain forests and 'old growth' forests. Public awareness of 
forestry issues was also raised during the late 1970s and early 1980s by international 
campaigns to halt the destruction of South American and Asian rain forests. A 
second line of argument which influenced Australian conservationists was the North 
American wilderness tradition where large, heavily forested areas were seen as 
essential havens from the debilitating and dehumanising products of the industrial 
revolution. 
In this climate it was no surprise that Barry Cohen could predict correctly in 1983 
that forests would dominate the conservation agenda for the remainder of the decade. 
From its inception, the AHC had also identified improved forestry management as a 
key policy issue and had expressed its concerns at two levels. Through debate and 
discussion the organisation encouraged community and scientific bodies to nominate 
large forested areas for National Estate listing. Commission Chaim1an David Yenken 
argued in 1981 that rain forests could best be preserved by their inclusion on the 
Register. 
Unlike some other forest types, the rain forests are irreplaceable once 
destroyed. So important and fragile are they, that there is a strong case 
for including all the remaining rain forests in Australia in the Register 
of the National Estate.138 
The Commission, along with other scientific bodies, believed there existed a 
pressing need for a national survey of forest resources which would define areas of 
high conservation value. Inforn1ation gathered could then form the basis of a national 
debate on the future management of Australia's native forests. The Commission 
correctly argued there was a vast gap between its own views, those of other 
137 Quoted in a speech by the Hon. Barry Cohen on Ram forest Conservation at Cairns, 2-3 Feb, 
1984. 
138 The National Estate in 1981, p. 54. 
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conservation bodies, and industry. Yenken pointed out that the Tasmanian Forestry 
Commission believed as late as 1979 that the future of temperate rain forest in north 
west Tasmania lay in logging. 
Present use of these forests is restricted to small quantities ... It is 
likely that these ram forests will in the future contribute significantly 
as sources of pulp wood for local use.139 
Despite these initial warnings, changes to Commonwealth forestry policy were not 
driven by AHC concerns but rather a series of major resource disputes. The most 
well known concerned Oaintree-Cape Tribulation in Queensland and Terania Creek 
in New South Wales.These disputes severely tested the resources of the AHC and 
the framework within which the organisation operated. Whilst some areas under 
threat were National Estate listed, comprehensive data on individual locations was 
often lacking. ln other areas which had only been recently nominated almost no 
information was available. As a consequence of this situation it was possible for the 
Commission to be out-manoeuvred by forestry groups, with the organisation only 
able to call for further research. This position was highlighted in the 1986-87 AHC 
Annual Report. 
The conflict which arose over these plnces highlights a constant 
problem faced by the Commission. Although the Austrnlian Heritage 
Commission Act was aimed at identifying the national estate values of 
places before their allocation for particular land uses, the Commission 
is frequently unable to do so because of its lack of resources.140 
In addition to involvement with high profile disputes, the Commission was routinely 
required to provide advice on the annual approval by the Commonwealth of wood 
chip export licenses. Unfortunately, despite the major deleterious impact of the 
industry on National Estate forests, the Commission's powers to regulate or modify 
the industry were nearly non existent. It was noted 
.. the Commission has no brief or view about the wood chipping 
139 ibid, p. 54 
140 Australian Hcntagc Comm i'lsion, 1987, A111111af Report 7986-87, AGPS, Canberra, p. 18. 
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industry per se, but it does have a view about the loss of National 
Estate values which may be caused by intensive forest harvesting 
(clear felling). For the most part, the Commission has no role in 
decision making on these issues, which are the responsibility of the 
states.141 
These limitations were compounded by a divergence of opinion between Minister 
Cohen and AHC Commissioners on several significant issues, most particularly the 
proposal by the Douglas Shire Council to create a road between Cape Tribulation and 
the town of Bloomfield. In this dispute, the Commission was totally opposed to the 
works under any circumstances. In contrast, Minister Cohen failed to prevent the 
construction of the road despite being placed under extreme pressure by elements of 
the conservation movement. Based on legal advice from the Attorney-General's 
Department, Cohen argued that the area could not be protected on the same basis as 
the Franklin River. It was claimed that use of the World Heritage legislation would 
lead to a successful challenge in the High Court from the Queensland Government. 
Cohen also ruled out the payment of compensation to the Council for agreeing to 
abandon the proposal. 
A more determined and senior Minister may have been prepared to pursue the 
dispute in the High Court and further rest the extent of Federal power over State and 
Local authority in the environmental arena. This approach would undoubtedly have 
plunged the Government into a prolonged State's rights dispute with Queensland and 
other conservative States when memories of the Franklin Darn dispute were still 
fresh. Cohen believed the accompanying odium would have killed any hope of 
successfully negotiating the implementation of government to government forestry 
management plans and other environmental agreements with conservative States. 
This decision not to intervene ultimately proved politically fatal to Cohen and failed 
to engender the cooperation he sought from Queensland and Tasmania. 
Commission staff during the mid 1980s believed an expansion and upgrading of the 
National Estate listing system offered the best protection for Australia forests. 
Additional funding and staff were successfully sought to expand the Commission's 
native forest data base. Grant funds were also increasingly used to fund scientific 
141 ibid, p. 16. 
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studies which would assist in building support for reservation style proposals. In 
January 1984, funds were allocated to the Rainforest Conservation Society of 
Queensland to define the conservation values of North East Queensland rain forests 
following World Heritage criteria. This strategic use of scientific research funds to 
achieve a policy objective represented an emerging trend in the Commission's work. 
This f projecrl was essential because although a certain amount of 
research had been caITied out on the region, the information had not 
been sifted and collared into a single study or matched against the 
specific criteria for World Heritage listing.142 
In a major speech to Parliament in November 1985 Barry Cohen confirmed his belief 
that development of a national rain forest policy in cooperation with the States was 
the best method of protecting the long te1111 future of the resource. In this context, the 
AHC was playing a central role in clarifying the scientific if not the political issues 
for the Minister. 
For Cohen the challenge was ro balance economic objectives, conservation values 
and State's rights rather than to act as an aggressive environmental advocate. Much 
of his policy was drawn from a national seminar involving Government agencies and 
rainforest experts held in Cairns during February 1984. This process, in which the 
Commission did not play a leading role, led to a range of financial and policy 
initiatives being drawn up to assist State and Local authorities in their forest 
management practices. These incentives included financial assistance to assess areas, 
funds to purchase properties and projects to interpret rainforest features for the 
benefit of regional tou1ism. 
A subsequent outright rejection by Queensland and Tasmania of many compensation 
proposals put forward by the Commonwealth Minister underscored the inability of 
resource conflicts to be resolved through negotiation in the absence of common 
aspirations. For the Commission, which had experience with both Governments, the 
subsequent failure of Cohen's initiatives in 1986-87 were frustratingly predictable. 
Furthermore, this strategy allowed unique rain forest areas to remain without 
significant protection. Valuable resources were also diverted to State authorities 
142 Australian Heritage Comm1s~1on. I 984, Annual Report. 1983-84, AGPS, Canberra, p. 3. 
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where adequate protection was already in place. Thus, in a considered but damning 
commentary on the Minister's strategy as of June 1987, the Commission claimed 
... those States which had already taken significant action to protect 
rain forests participated with well formulated and well targeted 
programs. Those States with the greatest need to take conservation 
action, however, were the most reluctant to participate. Tasmania 
rejected Commonwealth funding outright and Queensland was 
unwilling to modify plans to alienate un-logged areas. Thus, it is of 
concern to the Commission that the States with 90 percent of 
Australia's nun forests are not currently participating in the 
program.143 
The failure of Cohen's overtures to the Queensland and Tasmanian Governments 
created a policy hiatus for the Labor Government. The traditional politics of 
accommodation which had failed the new Environment Minister (as they had the 
Fraser government before him) are neatly descnbed by Papadakis. 
The approach taken by Senior Cabinet members (the Prime Minister, 
the Treasurer and senior economic ministers) was one of avoidance, 
of defusing the issues. Cohen adopted a similar approach and was 
largely preoccupied with striking deals to appease established 
institutions, notably the Queen -;land Govern men t.144 
Intense and sustained pressure from environmental groups between 1984 and 198-7 
concerning forestry issues did force the first Hawke Government to tum away from 
a policy of appeasing State governments and other vested interest groups by the end 
of its term. For the Commission a policy of appeasement had never been 
comfortable, appropriate or tenable. Relatively free of overt political considerations, 
the organisation had always been able to focus on what it believed were the best 
means of protecting key conservation areas. In the case of old growth rainforests, 
World Heritage listing was increasingly seen as the only means by which the logging 
industry could be kept at bay. 
143 Australian Heritage Commi-;1aon, 1987,Annual Report 1986-87, AGPS, Canberra, p. 15. 
144 E. Papadaki<;, Pol111cs and the E111 1tro11ment, the Australian exwnenr:e, p. 190. 
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Whilst initially sidelined in developing a National Rainforest Strategy, the work of 
the AHC in establishing the World Heritage value of the Queensland rain forest 
eventually bore fruit. By confirming beyond doubt the extremely high conservation 
values of the remaining Queensland rain forests, Cohen's position, as Papadakisl45 
also argues, was largely undermined. With little or no cooperation from Queensland 
and continuing logging disputes focused on the Daintree, the Federal Minister was 
forced to announce the nomination for World Heritage listing of the State's northern 
rain forests on World Environmental Day, June 5 1987. 
The relative political weakness of the Commission during the Cohen years was 
clearly symbolised by the divergent strategies adopted by the Minister. Cohen's 
ultimate acceptance of the World Heritage route for protecting areas, through force of 
circumstances, marked the beginning of a renewed engagement with conservation 
issues by the ALP Government Labor was to explore new methods for coping with 
complex environmental issues during the late 1980s. As senior ALP Ministers 
became more conversant with conservation issue<> the status of the Commission as 
an experienced research, planning and public education body was to reach a new 
height. 
The Helsham Inquiry and its significance for the Australian Heritage 
Commission. 
On May 7, 1987, the Minister for Arts, Heritage and Environment announced the 
proclamation of the Lemonthvme and Southern Forests (Commission of Inquiry) Act 
1987. The new commission was established in the last days of the second Hawke 
Government to help dete1111ine what elements of the Tasmanian Lemonthyme and 
Southern Forests should be proposed for World Heritage listing. It was widely seen 
at the time as an attempt to defer decisions associated with the future management of 
a huge area of Tasmania's old growth forest. Such a deferment ensured the 
Government could enter the 1987 Federal election without any serious question 
marks over its environmental credentials. 
The seeds of this drama lay in the December 1985 Commonwealth decision to 
145 ibid p.192. 
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increase the volume of wood chips which could be exported from Tasmania, a 
decision which reflected the strong support in Cabinet and the ACTU for the forestry 
industry. This reflected a belief that a pro-environmental position would jeopardise 
one in seven forestry based jobs in Tasmania. Because of this, the Tasmanian 
Government had some justification for believing a strong pro-logging position could 
be successfully defended. The Tasmanian Government was also aware that, as time 
passed, the environmental position of the Commonwealth was likely to harden. 
Throughout 1986 the Australian Heritage Commission had been involved with 
providing advice to Commonwealth agencies concerned with the impact of 
Tasmanian Forestry Commission proposals for utilising Crown Forests adjacent to 
the World Heritage Area. The AHC had developed a comprehensive critique of the 
'Forests Management Plan for the part of Crown Forests in the APM Concession 
within the south west Conservation Area 1986-87' for the Commonwealth 
Department of Primary Industry. These comments stressed that if the management 
plan was implemented it would lead to the loss of wilderness status for the Picton 
Valley along with National Estate values. 
As it became clear that the agenda of the Tasmanian Government was to maximise 
access to forestry resources adjacent to the South West National Park, two central 
policy issues emerged for the Commonwealth. These were the likely impact of new 
forestry operations on the edge of the existing World Heritage areas and whether 
these so called 'forestry zones' and 'conservation reserves' should actually become 
part of an expanded World Heritage Park. In considering these issues, it became the 
judgment of Cabinet that no existing environmental agency had both the scientific 
credibility and independent status to effectively adjudicate between the conflicting 
claims of the Tasmanian Government and conservation organisations such as the 
ACF. The creation of a Commission of Inquiry by legislation was thus a studied 
attempt to distance the Commonwealth from a decision making process which would 
lead to an ir;icrease in Tasmanian forests under World Heritage Listing. It also 
delayed the outcome of that same process to well into the second tem1 of the Labor 
Government. 
By early 1986, Commonwealth agencies had agreed that only World Heritage 
Listing would protect key old growth forests and the boundaries of existing 
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conservation areas. The real question was - how much? In December 1986, at the 
height of conflict between the Commonwealth and Tasmanian State Governments, 
the Department of Arts, Heritage and Environment had requested the Commission 
provide advice on areas of World Heritage significance in the South West. In a 
subsequent document, the AHC noted that 
in this report, this Commission[ of Inquiry] stated that 'three 
groups of places possess outstanding universal value and are therefore 
suitable for inclusion in the World Heritage List'. The three groups of 
places together consisted of the Lemonthyme and Southern Forests, 
Maxwell-Denison area, Central Plateau - Walls of Jerusalem area and 
an area called the 'Western Extension' which lies west of the 
Tasmanian Wilderness National Parks and existing World Heritage 
area.146 
In deciding to establish the Helsharn Inquiry as a separate legal and legislative 
identity to adjudicate on this issue, Cohen recognised that existing Commonwealth 
policies, specifically listing large areas of South West Tasmania on the Register of 
the National Estate, had provoked the Tasmanian Government. As more of 
Australia's forests were listed by the AHC on the Register as worthy of 
Commonwealth protection, the opportunity for conflict with logging and wood chip 
interests expanded exponentially. Initially, there were significant problems 
associated with defining and justifying listing decisions. As Mercer147 points out, 
industry critiques of National Estate listings centred on the inclusion of previously 
logged areas, the sheer size of areas listed and the use of terms such as 'unique' and 
'representative'. While a series of criteria reviews and continuing research during the 
early 1980s resolved the majority of these technical problems, the opportunity for 
conflict remained. As traditional low conservation value wood production zones 
became less available, wood chipping companies made a greater number of 
applications to State authorities to utilise higher quality forested areas. 
Commonwealth involvement in the timber industry was focused on the approval of 
146 Australian Heritage Commi<>s1on, 1986, A Rc'f?Ort 10 lhf Mims/er for 1/ze Aris, Sport, the 
Environment, Tourtsm and Terrllories 011 the Cultural and Natural !leritage of South-Western 
Tasmania and on the Reporl of the Comm1sswn of" lnqlllry into the Lemonthyme and Sou1hern 
Forests, internal AHC report, June p. I. 
147 D. Mercer, A Question ol Balance, Federation Prcs'i, Sydney, 1992, p.84 
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annual wood chip export licences. In this context, the AHC was increasingly 
required to advise the Department of Primary Industry that wood chipping and the 
preservation of National Estate values were simply not compatible. The scale of the 
emerging problem is best illustrated in the 1985 AHC Annual Report which 
commented on a draft industry Environmental Impact Statement covering proposed 
wood chipping in Tasmania. 
The proponents proposal, if implemented, would result in a 
significant loss of the wilderness areas remaining in Tasmania. The 
south-west wilderness area, the largest in south-eastern Australia, 
could be reduced in extent by approximately 30 percent. 148 
These circumstances required the Commi~sion to focus on a large number of wood 
chipping proposals in Tasmania and New South Wales, at the expense of continuing 
work on the National Estate Register itself. New doubts were also thrown on the 
actual level of protection offered by such listing and the Commission itself was 
alarmed at the pace and scale of new resource proposals. Associate Professor Bruce 
Davis, then Chairman of the Commiss1on, expressed the organisation's fears in the 
following manner. 
Some of the hard earned g<\ins for conservation are not assured. New 
pressures, quite unforeseeable ten years ago, are emerging. We are 
not just looking at threats to places so far officially unidentified, but a 
range of threats to National Estate places whose integrity we had 
assumed was secured for po'>tenty. The Commission 1s becoming 
more conscious of the fact that 'wins' are hut temporary and losses to 
the National Estate are forever.149 
By adopting such language and placing itself in direct opposition to logging and 
wood chipping operations in old growth forests, opponents of the Heritage 
Commission were able to question its ability to operate in an 'even handed' manner 
when assisting with the license review process. In 1984 - 85, the Commission 
identified in Tasmania twenty two National E<;tate listed locations which should be 
148 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report, 7984 - 85, p. 4. 
149 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual RC'port 1985- 86, Chairman's letter Lo the Minister. 
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protected from proposed wood chipping. In so doing the AHC was increasingly 
questioning the meaning of Commonwealth protection for National Estate listed 
areas. Continued claim and counterclaim over the impact of wood chipping in 
Tasmania dominated the airwaves during this period ensuring that any decision taken 
would be in the full glare of publicity. 
In June 1986, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the 
Commonwealth and the Tasmanian Government was signed which set out 
procedures for decision making over individual forestry coups, dispute resolution, 
and defining a central role for the Commission itself in preparing advice. This 
agreement was strengthened by a statement made by the Prime Minister concerning 
Commonwealth protection for listecl fore'lts. 
No logging in National Estate areas will be permitted before the formal 
process of consultation, as set out in the Memorandum has been 
completed and the Commonwealth is satisfied that the National Estate 
values will be protectedY'iO 
Due to the scale of the issue and its importance, the Commonwealth established a 
Con.sultative Committee to advise on Tasmanian wood chip issues. A range of 
Commonwealth agencies and spe9ialists with expertise in land use management, 
resource economics and the impact of forestry operations formed part of this 
Committee. Participation in this process and additional demands on AHC resources 
due to wood chipping proposals in South East NSW forced the organisation to 
review its performance. A decision vlas made during 1985-86 to concentrate 
research endeavours primarily on nominated or registered National Estate areas. 
Resources were also to be focused on replacing loosely defined National Estate 
terms with 'closely reasoned arguments' and development thresholds which defined 
the likely impact of proposals in forested areas. 
This internal reorganisation was particularly appropriate as the process of 
consultation set out in the MOU between the Commonwealth and Tasmania 
collapsed in late 1986, in part caused by the expeditious processing of several key 
National Estate nominations. Conservation organisations, fearing the destruction of 
150 Pnme ministerial Statement, 12 June 1986, quoted in Australian Heritage Commission Annual 
Report 1985 - 86, p. 26. 
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temperate rain forest in the lackey's Marsh and Quamby Bluff regions of North 
West Tasmania, nominated both areas for inclusion on the Register. On 21 October 
1986, the Commission agreed to list both areas. Implicit in this decision was the 
requirement that the Tasmanian Forestry Commission would carefully consider 
measures proposed by the Commonwealth to protect the environmental values of 
both areas as required by the new MOU. A first stage in improved cooperation was 
for the Tasmanian Forestry Commission to seek infom1ation on the new listing and 
the basis upon which it had been made. On November 11, however, Mr Cohen 
advised Parliament that the Tasmanian Government had failed to honour the new 
agreement. 
The fact is that the Tasmanian Forestry Commission did not seek that 
information until logging, and the possible destruction of National 
Estate values, before the process of discussion on how these values 
might be protected had had a ch:1nce to run its course. The Tasmanian 
Governments action is preemptive and highly provocative, and shows 
a blatant disregard for the environment.151 
The subsequent creation of the Commission of Inquiry was a final recognition by 
Cohen and Cabinet that Commonwealth conservation objectives and the position of 
the Tasmanian Government could not be resolved simply by negotiation and the 
deployment of existing strategies. It was also a reflection that the AHC was seen by 
all parties as primarily a Commonwealth advocate for the environment which did not 
posses the capacity to resolve conflicting economic, political, social and 
environmental imperatives. Thus the very success of the AHC in defending the 
forests and rebuffing industry claims ensured its temporary displacement from the 
very centre of decision rnakmg on this issue. 
The Lemonthyme and Southern Forests Commission of Inquiry subsequently took 
one year to carry out, involved the engagement of eleven professional consultants, a 
wide range of public hearings and many submissions from numerous interest 
groups. Lawyers were used to present evidence by both conservation and forest 
industry groups giving the whole proceedings a legalistic flavour. 
151 Austraila, House ol' Rcprcscntal!vc-;, 1986, Deba1e.1, Nov 11, p. 2797. 
101 
From the start the Inquiry was engulfed by controversy as the Tasmanian 
Government tested those provisions in the Act which called for the 'interim 
protection' of the Inquiry area from a range of activities. Continued logging, road 
construction and other hostile acts forced Minister Cohen to apply for an injunction 
against the Tasmanian Forestry Commission and a private company for breaching 
the Act. Evidence was secured by means of aerial surveillance, dubbed at the time as 
the so called 'spy flights'. In response, the Tasmanian Government asked the High 
Court to rule on the validity of provisions within the Lemonthyme and Southern 
Forests (Commission of Inquiry) Act 1987. It also questioned whether the related 
World Heritae:e Properties Conservation Act 1983 itself gave power to the 
Commonwealth to protect areas nominated but not listed. This challenge was 
subsequently defeated in the High Court which further strengthened Commonwealth 
power to protect the environment on a national basis. Nevertheless, the Tasmanian 
Government officially boycotted the Inquiry for four months. 
The region in question represented some five percent of Tasmania's total land 
resource with the Lemonthyme encompassing some 14,300 hectares and the 
Southern Forests, a further 270,000. An interim inquiry report produced in 
December 1987 released only 226 hectares for logging. The final report submitted to 
Cabinet in May 1988, however, presented a major conundrum for the Government, 
with a majority recommendation <~rguing only between 8 % and 10 % of the area 
under consideration was suitable for World Heritage listing. In contrast, a minority 
report recommended the reverse, namely that the whole area should be listed along 
with an adjoining area. 
The position of the Commission throughout the Inquiry was that the whole region 
qualified for World Heritage listing. Such an approach perhaps contributed to a 
greater than normal level of antagonism in the Inquiry process. This ill feeling was 
manifested in a letter released with the Report which was highly critical of the AHC. 
In a reply to their Minister, the Commission could only refute the suggestion. 
The comments made of the Australian Heritage Commission were 
generally ill-chosen and did not correctly reflect the considerable 
efforts made by our staff to assist Mr Helsham, his Commissioners, 
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his staff and his counsel assisting in their very difficult rask.152 
The Commission further asserted that, regardless of the Commission of Inquiry's 
findings, the Commonwealth was required to protect much of the Lemon thyme and 
Southern Forest as it was listed in the Register of the National Estate.The following 
six months was a study in decision making 'on the run' by Cabinet. The report by 
the AHC confirmed that the scientific position was unassailable and had been 
documented in a manner digestible by the bureaucracy. In contrast, the political 
process had disintegrated into adhoc decision making in which the AHC had been 
relegated to the sideline. 
In August 1988, the Cabinet position was that 80 % of the inquiry area was to be 
saved from logging but it was not to be nominated for World Heritage listing. 
Continued pressure from the environmental movement and the need to reach an 
agreed position with the Tasmanian Government led to a new announcement in 
November. Under revised arrangements, it was agreed that up to 80 % of the 
Helsham Inquiry area would actually be nominated for World Heritage with a 
$50,000,000 compensation package for the timber industry. This agreement did not, 
however, protect approximately one third of Tasmania's 'rail trees' in the Southern 
Forest and a new national conservation campaign was launched. 
During this period of intense political activity, the AHC commissioned further 
research on archaeological sites discovered in the Southern Forests. These 
investigations revealed Aboriginal art dating back to the Pleistocene era making them 
some of the oldest in Australia. Consequently, the Commission was able to argue 
that on this basis alone the Southern Forests would meet World Heritage criteria. 
Increasing numbers of occupation sites are being found in limestone 
caves within Karst systems in south-west Tasmania. These sites, with 
their extremely well-preserved deposits, form a unique testimony to 
the earliest, southern most human adaption to glacial conditions, and 
in the Commission's vie'vv, are of World Heritage significance.153 
152 Australian Heritage Comm1ssion, Annual Report 7987-88, p. 11. 
153 ibid p. 19. 
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These findings and their wide dissemination intensified the campaign to maximise 
protection of South West Tasmania. In 1989, five 'Green Independents' were 
elected to the State Parliament. They then formed an 'accord' with the Australian 
Labor Party to allow the creation of a minority Labor administration. Central to this 
agreement was State support for extending the World Heritage boundaries. This was 
' achieved in September 1989 when a further 40,000 hectares of temperate forest was 
added to the South West World Heritage nomination. 
The events leading up to the Helsham Inquiry and the controversy following the 
release of its report became a turning point in Commonwealth management of 
environment policy. Disputation between the Commonwealth Government and 
Tasmania over exploitation of the National Estate listed Lemon thyme and Southern 
Forests was the nadir of Minister Cohen's policy of maximum cooperation between 
Commonwealth and State Governments in the environmental arena. It underlined the 
need for new mechanisms to manage resource-based conflict. An initial recourse to 
legal techniques by the Commission of Inquiry Chairman, the Hon. Michael 
Helsham, QC, AO, a NSW Chief Judge in Equity, proved demonstrably 
insufficient. 
The AHC played a significant role in the 'Helsham affair' by firstly alerting the 
Commonwealth to the threat posed by logging of old growth forest adjacent to 
Tasmania's World Heritage Wilderness areas. Its subsequent unchallenged 
demolition of the Helsham Inquiry majority findings was a defining moment in the 
organisation's development. A review of its operation in the conclusion of the 
Helsham Inquiry led to an expansion of its budget, authority and status. This change 
in circumstances can be directly related to the pivotal role scientific data and its 
interpretation, (much of it gathered by the Commission or its consultants), played in 
the rejection of Helsham's findings. Although it may have been politically opportune 
for the new Environment Minister Senator Graham Richardson to repudiate the 
findings, without the authority of the Commission behind him such a stance would 
have been difficult if not impossible. 
While the overturning of the Helsham findings can be construed as a 'win' for the 
environment and the AHC, the process of government decision making embodied by 
the inquiry was unedifying, inefficient and divisive. A major premise in appointing 
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Mr Helsham to adjudicate the competing environmental and economic claims 
associated with logging the Southern Forests was a belief that fairness and equity 
were both lacking in existing procedures. Indeed, a Ministerial press statement 
announcing the establishment of the Committee of Inquiry noted that Mr Cohen 
' ... was delighted that Mr Helsham had accepted the appointment as he was a person 
of high public standing and recognised objectivity. '154 
It is, therefore, no coincidence that a second impact of the Helsham Inquiry, apart 
from strengthening the AHC, was the fom1ation of a new pennanent scientific body, 
the Resource Assessment Commission (RAC). It was to be the role of this body to 
consider on an industry-wide basis those economic, social and political elements of 
environmental disputes which were outside the responsibility of the AHC. 
In retros·pect, the Helsham Inquiry was the first attempt by the Commonwealth to 
deliberately move from ad hoe decision making on environmental issues, to a 
process where legal, scientific, political and economic factors formed part of the 
assessment process. The failure of this experiment was profound and hastened the 
emergence of the RAC. Tll!S new body was to address similar complex issues but 
utilise different personnel and replace the quasi judicial inquiry process with a more 
scientific, non adversarial approach. 
For the Australian Heritage Commission, the Helsham Inquiry substantially 
increased its profile and status. Additional resources were sought and obtained to 
carry out intensive research. The value of the Register of the National Estate as a 
conservation benchmark gained further recognition within Government. The 
Commission also emerged as the unquestioned advocate for conservation groups and 
issues in Canberra. By this fact alone it was also recognised by Government that the 
AHC was an unsuitable vehicle for the difficult task of balancing conservation and 
development consideration in major public disputes. 
154 B. Cohen, 'The Lemonthyme and Southern Forest Commission of Inquiry', News Release, 
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CHAPTER VI 
CHALLENGES FOR THE AHC: A CHANGE OF APPROACH BY THE THIRD 
HAWKE GOVERI\TMENT 
The third Hawke Government (1987-1990) saw criticism of the AHC reach the 
highest level of Government with the Minister for Resources, Senator Cook, 
attacking both the professional mtegrity of staff and Commissioners and accusing the 
organisation of being hostage to the environmental movement. The basis of this 
criticism was a perception that the Commission was frustrating a range of major new 
' 
resource projects and measures designed to restructure the forestry industry. Senator 
Cook, John Kerin and other Economic Ministers were also highly critical of the 
political alliance struck between some elements of the ALP headed by Environment 
Minister, Graham Richardson and the environment movement. 
A review of the Commission initiated by Barry Cohen, the creation of the Resource 
Assessment Commission, amendments to the Australian Herita!!e Commission Act 
1975 and increased funding for the AHC during these years were part of a wider 
struggle over the future shape of resource policy and the most effective means of 
ensuring the re-election of a fourth Labor Government. For the Commission it was 
an extremely bitter pe1iod of conflict with industry groups, a period which also saw 
the commencement of a new bureaucratic competitor in the environmental 
management arena. It was also a time when staff numbers almost doubled to reflect 
an ever increasing workload. By its very survival, it can be argued that the AHC 
emerged as an even stronger instrumentality. 
A deteriorating economy increases criticism of the Commission 
On the 14 May 1986, Paul Keating summarised his views on the Australian 
economy and dramatised the economic roller coaster the nation experienced 
throughout the 1980s. 
We must let Australians know truthfully, honestly, earnestly, just 
what sort of international hole Australia is in ... if this government 
cannot get the adjustment, get manufacturing going again and keep 
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moderate wage outcomes and a sensible economic policy then 
Australia is basically done for. We will just end up being a third rate 
economy ... a banana republic.155 
The advent of a new Labor administration in 1983 heralded an unprecedented series 
of structural changes to the management of Australia's economy and to public 
administration.156 Those changes included floating the Australian dollar, opening up 
the banking sector to foreign competition and other measures which reduced the level 
of direct government control over the economy. The disposal of government assets 
and the corporatisation of some government instrnmentalities also formed part of the 
'economic rationalist' agenda which dominated Treasury thinking from the mid 
1980s. This series of decisions formed part of a general drive to open up the 
Australian market place to international forces with the aim of producing a more 
competitive economy. In this climate, calls for increased environmental legislation or 
'green tape' met with stiff resistance both from the business community and those 
ministers with primarily economic lx1sed portfolios. The 1987 stock market collapse 
and a substantial increase in unemployment levels during 1989-90 further sharpened 
this debate. 
In a similar manner to the Fraser government, the Hawke government saw new large 
scale resource development projects as critical to reversing the nation's negative 
balance of payments position. Projects such as a massive mining proposal at 
Coronation Hill in the Northern Territory and a billion dollar pulp mill at Wesley 
Vale in Northern Tasmania were strongly supported by senior economic ministers. 
Commentators such as John Hyde also argued that: 
Only rich nations could afford real environmental protection and that 
Australia needed the equivalent of a major resource project each year 
just to pay the interest on its record net $108 billion external debt.157 
155 P.Kelly,p. 196. 
156 An overview of Lhe political issues associated wiLh deregulation during Lhe 1980s is provided in 
chapter one of H. Emy & 0. Hughes, Australian Politics: Realities in Conflict, 2nd ed Macmillan 
Education Australia, Sydney, 1993. 
157 P. Kelly, pp. 539 - 540. 
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The condition of the Australian economy was also of concern to environmental 
organisations. This reflected overseas evidence that governments managing poorly 
performing industrial economies were less willing to adopt sound environmental 
policies. Eastern Europe was a much quoted example. The ACF and others argued, 
however, that major resource projects were not the solution to Australia's economic 
difficulties. An expansion of non-polluting service industries such as tourism and 
new energy and waste efficient technologies were seen as a more appropriate 
strategy. 
Against this background of rariclly changing economic policy, voter polling between 
1987 and 1989 revealed declining support for the ALP and potential electoral defeat 
for the Commonwealth Government. Into this confluence of events stepped Senator 
Graham Richardson who was appointed the new Minister for the Environment 
following the re-election of the second Hawke Ministry. His appointment was in 
turn pivotal to the emergence of a 'green electoral strategy' in ALP political circles. 
Richardson claimed that because of the Government's unpopularity, in part caused 
by the performance of the economy, the 'green vote' was critical to Labor remaining 
in office. 158 
Richardson believed a successful green strategy required a strong relationship 
between the Government and the .conservation movement. In practical terms this 
meant an inter-meshing of funding, personalities and policies. Success also required 
the Government to reassert its environmental credentials on several major issues, on 
the scale of the Franklin River saga. Support for this strategy was, however, always 
limited. Senator Peter Walsh and the Hon. John Kerin among others saw 
Richardson as attempting to prostitute Cabinet and the decision making process for 
the benefit of a sectional interest group. 
This intellectual and political fem1ent encouraged Hawke and Keating to move the 
government to a new policy position that attempted to bridge the anti - pro 
development paradigm that threatened to engulf government decision making. Thus 
political necessity drove them to argue that environmental considerations should, as a 
matter of principle, form part of the assessment process for major resource projects. 
Kelly claims that the decision by the Hawke Cabinet to disregard the findings of the 
158 A discu<>sion or these issues occur<> m P. Kelly, pp. 526 - 533. 
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Helsham Inquiry was the first reflection of this new strntegy. He described the new 
'highwire' act this way: 
Hawke and Keating had dual objectives, they wanted to retain 
economic credibility but also to wm the green vote. They believed that 
Labor could not allow itself to fall mto a mutually exclusive position in 
the environment/economic debate and,in the end, their judgment was 
vindicated.159 
These circumstances led to a number of major developments which impacted on all 
Government agencies concerned with environmental issues in the late 1980s. The 
first was the incorporation of the 'sustainabk development' model in project 
assessment. This approach, at least in theory, required resource development 
proponents to demonstrate that natural assets would not be exploited at such a rate as 
to significantly reduce the long term availability of that asset. In the case of timber, 
greater use of plantations and value adding technology such as veneer production 
was seen as cntical to both the future of the industry and the community as a whole. 
As a consequence, the Federal Governmenr encouraged considerable research into 
determining the economic value of naturally occurring assets such as clean water 
along with the cost of repairing e_nvironmental damage. Implicit within this new 
decision making model was a more inclusive approach to all sectors of the 
community and more intellectual rigour. Prime Minister Hawke predicted in October 
1990 ' .. .I believe that it will be even harder in the future than it has been over the 
past seven years to integrate effectively environmental and economic decision 
making.'160 
This statement implicitly recognised that the tradit10nal tools of the· economist could 
not provide all the answers to balancing the community's aspirations for the 
environment and the needs of the Australian economy. As a corollary, those 
environmental agencies created in the 1970s such as the AHC and the Australian 
National Parks and Wildlife Service were also seen to be inadequate. The creation of 
two new statutory bodies, the Resource Assessment Commission and the 
159 P. Kelly, p. 530. 
160 P. Keating, TexL or speech given by Lhe Prime Minister Lo Lhe RAC I CEPR Conference 
Dinner. '"The Economics of Environmental Policy', Canberra, 11 October 1990. p. 1. 
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Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency in the late 1980s was, thus, an 
attempt by Government to respond to a new agenda outside the scope of existing 
bodies. 
Simultaneously, peak environmental groups gained unparalleled access to the 
machinery of government, in particular, the offices of the Minister for the 
Environment and the Prime Minister. Green leaders including Dr Bob Brown and Mr 
Philip Toyne also enjoyed close personal relations with Senator Richardson and 
Prime Minister Hawke. Advice was regularly sought from both Brown and Toyne, 
most notably over Kakadu. Government funding for conservation groups also 
increased dramatically dunng the late I 980s.161 This level of support reflected not 
only the new status of such bodies as the Australian Conservation Foundation but 
the desire by the Hawke Government to ensure they were in a position to participate 
in the policy making process. 
For the AHC the simultaneous slump in the Australian economy and the rise of green 
politics during the late 1980s did, however, create a set of circumstances which 
entrenched its position in Government. As issues became more complex, public 
scrutiny greater and the economic stakes higher, the provision of soundly based 
advice on National Estate issues to Cabinet became more critical. Because the ACF, 
the Wilderness Society and othe_r key conservation bodies had become totally 
enmeshed in the public policy process during this period, their technical and research 
capacity was partially compromised.162 From being recognised as environmental 
advocates and sources of alternate technical advice, Senator Richardson and others 
increasingly saw these organisations solely as political barometers of community 
concern on issues such as proposed World Heritage listings. In this context, a 
strong, adequately resourced and independent AHC was seen as a vital 
counterweight to the 'agenda-driven' claims of both industry and conservation 
groups. A healthy Commission was also a rebuff to those who argued vital resource 
decisions were dominated by party political considerations rather than scientific and 
economic evidence. 
161 Two organisauon<;, the World Wide Fund for Nature and Lhe ACF between them gained the 
unprecedented sum of S800,000 to participate m the Ecolog1cal Sustainable Working Groups. 
Figures quoted in an article by P. McGuincs~. 'Funds, games and green propaganda', Australian, 
Aug 16, 1991, p.13. 
162 The Wilderness Society cl1cl however withdr:1w froin the ESD forestry workin.g party. 
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A further review of the AHC 
In February 1979, a review of the AHC was announced by the then Prime Minister, 
Malcolm Fraser. The review had rwo main elements: 
To ascertain whether 1t would be desirable to amend the Act to prevent 
any duplication of existing environment protection measures. 
To consider the argument that the commission has strong legal powers 
to prevent and impede mining developments.163 
At that time it was widely believed this review was the result of extensive lobbying 
by a mining industry increasingly concerned that National Estate listings would 
reduce those areas available for exploration. Industry also claimed that National 
Estate listings would lead to greater environmental regulation of those projects 
already approved, particularly in the Northern Territory. The outcome of this review 
was never published and for the following five years both the mining and forestry 
industries sniped at the Commission's work, especially the National Estate listing 
process. During this same period Commission staff and board members were 
themselves critical of the Government for the scant resources allocated to the AHC to 
carry out its work. This situation. created two inter linked problems. Staff were 
overworked and unable to respond appropriately to a high level of public interest in 
the Commission. As a consequence, the organisation then became open to public 
criticism that it was not performing its functions effectively, either as a result of 
inefficiency or wilful neglect. 
Continuing internal pressure prompted a Public Service Board Review of the AHC 
in 1983, focusing on operational systems, standards of service to the public and 
staffing. This culminated in an agreement to create four new posts which included a 
Deputy Directorship and three clerical positions in the technical sections. The latter 
were aimed specifically at helping to overcome a backlog in the Register of the 
National Estate. Whilst internally significant these changes could be dismissed by 
critics of the Commission as 'too little to late' and not addressing significant 
limitations within the Act itself. 
163 Financial Review, 'Govt' to review Heritage Act after mmmg industry ob1ects,', 23 Feb, 1979, 
p. 5. 
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From its inception, external criticism focused on Section 23 which deals with placing 
areas of heritage significance onto the Register and Section 30 which outlines the 
responsibilities of the Minister and the Commonwealth to protect the National Estate. 
With respect to Section 23, the critical issue for the mining and forestry industries 
was the 'narrow' focus of cnteria under which properties could be listed, namely 
'aesthetic, historic, scientific or social significance'. As Whitrow points out 
... the Commission is not required to take into account other factors 
such as the use to which the place is being put, its economic value or 
the existence of a mining or exploration title over the property. Nor 
does it do so in practice.164 
For the Commission, this criticism could easily be deflected by stating the obvious; 
that considerations other than heritage concerns did not fall within its 
responsibilities. Determination of the supposed economic or social impact of 
National Estate listings had always been the responsibility of other agencies, 
including its own Department and Cabinet itself. Certainly, as originally conceived, 
the Commission was to provide technical advice only, a proposition which was 
largely accepted by both the Commission and the Government of the day. 
A more difficult debate for the AHC and the Commonwealth Government to deflect 
was the argument that the placement of an area on the Register was a defacto land 
use decision. Industry claimed that, by the Commission publicly identifying a 
location as possessing significant heritage values, it mevitably made development 
proposals more likely to be questioned by conservation groups than if no such action 
had been taken. For industry, the Register was one part of a broader Government 
agenda to tighten environmental legislation. This new climate of 'green tape' was 
identified in the early 1980s as an emerging cost to business and something which 
should be opposed. By 1990 environmental assessment procedures were rated 
number four of eight main impediments to development. 165 A survey prepared by 
the Business Council of Au<>tralia and the Bureau of Industry economics noted that 
... duplication of laws and procedures, a lack of technical expertise 
164 D. Whitrow, 'The Australian Heritage Commission Act: Some Serious Shortcomings', 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal, Vo! 2, The Law Book Company, Vol 2, 1986 p. 90 
165 Sydney Morning llera/d, 'Environment laws costly - report', Dec 9, 1990, p. 2 
112 
among regulatory authorities, and uncertainty about governments' 
political attitudes to the environment were creating serious delays to 
major projects.166 
These concerns were also shared by unions directly involved in the forestry and 
mining industries. In mid 1987, for example, a joint Forest Industries Campaign 
Association and ACTU report entitled 'Reform of the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act' was launched at the height of the Tasmanian logging dispute.167 
Opposition to the AHC from conservative states also intensified with the advent of 
the First Hawke Government. The Queensland Government in particular questioned 
the integrity of the organisation as a whole and the operation of the Register 
specifically. This antagonistic approach was based on the belief that the AHC was 
captive to the conservation lobby and did not demonstrate a high level of 
professionalism when carrying out its work. In a letter to the Courier Mail, the 
Queensland Minister for Tourism, National Parks, Sport and the Arts, the Hon. 
Peter McKechnie claimed that 
... the problem with the AHC, under fChairmanl Dr Wiltshire's one-
term administration, was its willingness to be the ready tool of single-
issue groups. His complaints of secrecy are laughable, a Commission 
that used secret nominntiqns hy anonymous persons and groups, 
secret consultants - often drawn from the groups making the 
nominations - and which rushed items on to the National Estate for 
political reasons. A bitter joke in Queensland was that the best way to 
get an item onto the National Register fast was to object to it. Another 
joke was that so much of Australia was on the National Register that it 
would be simpler just to list the odd exceptions. The result has been a 
demeaning of the entire Register to the point where the Federal 
Minister, tvlr Cohen, 1r1 re~ponse to widespread criticism, is reviewing 
the activities and role of the AHC.16~ 
This antagonism to the Commission was partially echoed by the Commonwealth 
166 ibid 
167 Forest lndustnes Association, 'Forc<>t lnclustncs call for Heritage Commission Act Reform', 
Media Release, May 1987. 
168 P. McKecknic,' 'RCl!;l'>lCr IS not ror Pel Pro1ccL~'. Courter Mat!, IS Aug, 1985 
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Government decision to establish a review of the AHC at this time. By mid 1984, in 
response to continuing criticism, Environment Minister Cohen had reached the 
conclusion that a reassessment of Commission procedures was both inevitable and 
desirable. Cohen announced in an address to the National Conference of the 
Australian Institute of Landscape Architects that a key problem facing the 
Commission was 'concern in some circles' that the Register of the National Estate 
nomination process was being manipulated by pressure groups. 169 He went on to 
identify several common criticisms including the claim that nominations were being 
brought forward by conservation groups when a development project was proposed. 
In so doing, he implicitly supported the argument that areas should be nominated 
independently of any real or possible threat from development proposals. Such a 
proposition was of course clearly specious given the limited resources available to 
conservation organisations and the natural desire to respond to threats only as they 
emerged. Some twelve months later these vague generalisations were used by Cohen 
to justify the commissioning a major inquiry into the AHC to determine ' ... the scope 
of the Commonwealth's role in the conservation of the National Estate'.170 
In June 1985, Minister Cohen announced that the AHC review would take the form 
of a departmental assessment, a process which would ensure a potentially explosive 
process was fim1ly in his control. This essentially closed assessment process limited 
the involvement of external bodie~ and, unlike a Parliamentary inquiry, individual 
committee members are not free to articulate the interests of a particular group. This 
restrictive approach reflected the official rationale for the review which eschewed all 
suggestion of a 'turbulent Commission history and continued industry agitation. The 
foreword of the completed review document recorded that Mr Cohen had asked his 
Department to 
... review the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 and the 
relationship of the Act to other relevant Commonwealth legislative and 
administrative procedures for the conservation of the national estate. 
The purpose was to assess, after 10 years, whether these mechanisms 
were still adequate and appropriate, and to recommend changes where 
169 Hon. Barry Cohen, Speech at the OIT1cial Opening or the Nnuonnl Conrerence of the Australian 
Institute of Landscape Architects, 25-27 Augu~t. 1984 pp. 44-45. 
170 Australia, Hou<;e of Rcprcs~nt:it1ves, 1985, Dc/J(l/C'.1, 25 Nov, fl. 3599. 
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they may be necessary.171 
There were four terms of reference. These related to the scope of the 
Commonwealth's role in relation to the National Estate, the concept of the Register 
itself and the level of resources made available through government grants. An 
assessment of the Commission's difficult relationship with various industry bodies 
and the interplay with conservation groups was described as a review of the ' ... 
relations between Commonwealth, State and Local Governments and with the 
private sector, including business organisations and voluntary conservation 
bodies'.172 
While there was clear pressure on the Government to undertake a thorough review of 
the Commission, it 1s also obvious from rhe completed review documents that major 
surgery of the AHC was never contemplated. The tentative approach adopted is best 
summarised by the rider placed on recommendations made in the report 
... the report indicates in general terms the current thinking of the 
Department on some ... issues, this thinking is not prescriptive nor has 
it been endorsed or ratified in any way by the Commonwealth 
Government or the Mimster. I 73 
The document, after initially establishing the legitimacy of the Comonwealth role in 
conservation, focused its recommendations on increasing the 'transparency' of 
Commission decision making and improving the accountability of the Register. 
These recommendations translated into a number of proposals to amend the Act, in 
particular Section 26. They included mandatory notification of affected property 
owners and a time limit on the hearing of objections. Should this limit be passed, it 
was suggested a proposal to nominate a location would lapse. It was also 
recommended that owners be notified when a proposal was placed on the 'Interim 
List' and that this tem1 be given formal recognition. Other suggestions included the 
creation of a systematic review process for the Register as a means of prompting the 
removal of areas which had become degraded. Perhaps the most far reaching matter 
171 Department of Arts, Her 1tage and Environment, 1986, Re{Jort of the Review of the 
Commonwealth Governments role 111 the conservcuwn of tlze Notwnol Estate, Canberra, p. 1. 
172 ibid 
173 ibid, part XI. 
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for consideration by Government was the suggesr10n that the AHC fall within the 
sphere of the Administrative Appe!als Tribunal. This was seen as a means of 
addressing the problem that those expert staff who reviewed National Estate listings 
subject to complaint, had often been involved in placing the same areas on the 
Register in the first place. 
Many of these measures were subsequently adopted in legislative amendments 
passed in 1988. All without exception were designed to improve the appearance of 
fairness in the operation of the Register. They did not, however, address the more 
pressing concern ·of industry that the whole basis upon which the AHC operated was 
flawed. Numerous industry submissions argued the Commission should be brought 
under tighter political control and have less independence. As the Review document 
noted: 
The case for degrees of political control has been made at different 
levels; 
that the consent of the Commonwealth heritage Minister 
should be required to the entry of all places on the Register or 
at least of those places where land use considerations are 
prominent; 
that State Governments should he given the power to veto 
proposed listings, or even proposed nominations; 
and that relevant local government approval should also be 
required.174 
These arguments were based on the premise that 1f Federal and State Ministers were 
more involved with the Comm1~s1on, economic, social and technical considerations 
would be taken into account when the organisation provided advice on conservation 
issues. This was the reverse of the current arrangement where these issues were put 
forward by competing government agencies as part of the pool of advice drawn on 
by Cabinet in its deliberations. 
174 ibid p. 41. 
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The review team fim1ly rejected this concept arguing that if implemented the integrity 
of the AHC would be irreversibly compromised. For example, it believed the impact 
of introducing non-conservation issues in drawing up the National Estate Register 
... would be to abort the Register's most useful functions as a 
database for education, research and planning, and to severely limit 
the scope, quality and value of advice to the Government. It would 
entirely trnnsfom1 the concept of the Register envisaged by the Hope 
Committee and by all political parties in the Parliamentary debates 
leading up to the enactment of the BilJ.175 
It is unfortunate that this defence of the Commission did not extend to 
recommending a substantial increase in funding or an expansion of its 
responsibilities. Numerous suggestions were made by interested parties that the 
AHC assume responsibility for both the National Estate Grant program and the 
World Heritage Convention. The Review did not however recommend any 
expansion in the organisation's responsibilities and was largely silent on the issue of 
increased long-term funding 
In summary, it appears inescapable that the Review was commissioned in response 
to concerted pressure from indust.ry to reform the organisation. No Government 
political will existed, however, to make substantial changes to the AHC and its 
charter. The amendments which were eventually made to the AHC Act were minor in 
nature but provided an opportunity for both Cohen and his successor to claim that 
the Government had responded to the call for a more flexible and responsive 
Commission. 
A new rival for the AHC - the Resource Assessment Commission? 
The Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989 created a new instrumentality 
which, in the view of its first Chairman, Mr Justice Stewart, sought 'to advance 
environmental decision making by government, raising it to a new level of rigour 
and sophistication.'176 This was to be achieved through the collection and analysis 
175 ibid, p. 45. 
176 J Stewart, speech Lo the Univcrsny ol NS\V Law Society, Sept 24, 1991. 
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of comprehensive information on resource use issues referred to the RAC by the 
Commonwealth. The process was· to be open and transparent with public inquiries 
the main method of gathering information. Terms of reference for individual 
inquiries were to be determined by the Prime Minister and the RAC was to report 
directly to him. This innovation in managing complex resource management issues 
was promoted as part of a larger package announced by the Prime Minister (Mr 
Hawke) in November of the previous year. 
Other elements included legislative changes to the Australian Heritage Commission 
Act 1975 to 'streamline its operarion' and the Tasmanian Forest Accord, or 
Salamanca Agreement. Developmenr of a national forest inventory and greater 
resources for improvemenrs ro environmental data bases were also announced at this 
time. The Act sets out in Schedule 1 three policy principles to guide the 
organisation.177 These principles contain an amalgam of ideas drawn from the 
National Conservation Strategy and the new philosophy of sustainable development 
as articulated in the Brundtlrtnd Commis'>ion. 178 These principles had gained formal 
agreement from the Hawke Cabinet in November 1988 and were to guide not only 
the RAC but the Commonwealth as a whole when dealing with environmental 
matters. Schedule 1 stresses that an integrated approach to environmental and 
development issues should be adopted by government when evaluating all nationally 
significant resource development. projects. The schedule states it is particularly 
important to ensure that benefits to the community are maximised, taking into 
consideration 'quantifiable and unquanrifiable factors'. Within this context it was 
177 Schedule I of the Re'>ource A '>'>e~<;menl Comm 1<;c;1on Act 1989 reacls as follows:-
Policy Principles for Re<;olving compning cla11m for the use of re.,ourcec; 
I. There should be an integrated apprciach to conservauon (including all environmental and 
ecological considerations) and development by taking back conservation (including all 
environmental and ecological conc;1derauons) ancl clevelopment a'>pecLc; into account at an early stage. 
2. Resource use decisions should seek to optimise the net benefits to the community from the 
nation's resources, having regard to efficiency of resource use, environmental consideration, 
ecological sustamabiltty, the suc;tainability of any development, and an equiLable distribution of the 
return on resources. 
3. CommonwealLh clcc1~1on, policies and management regimes may provide for additional uses that 
are compal!ble wllh the rrimary rurpo~c value<> ror the area, rccogni~ing that in some cases both 
conservation (including all env1ronmcnwl and ecological cons1derauons) and development interests 
can be accommoclatecl concurrently or sequentially, and, in other cases, choices must be made 
between alternat.ive uses or comhination or uses. 
178 G. Brundtland, 011r Common Fw11rC', Report of the World Conferenr:e on Environment and 
Development, 1987. 
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clearly asserted that preserving the integrity of ecosystems and consideration of the 
long term sustainability of natural resource exploitation were factors which the 
Commission had to consider. Conversely, it was noted that on occasions a 
reasonable compromise between environmental considerations and development 
objectives would be necessary to secure resource development projects. The 
Schedule recognised 
... that in some cases both conservation (including all environmental 
and ecological considerations) and development interests can be 
accommodated concurrently or sequentially, and in other cases, 
choices must be made between alternative uses or combinations of 
uses.179 
Debate over the RAC legislation reflected widespread support for such a process. 
Speakers such as the Minister for Primary Industries and Energy, John Kerin, 
stressed that the RAC represented a quantum leap in resolving environmental 
disputes.ISO Supporters of the legislation emphasised that not to support the Bill 
would prevent a move away from ad hoe decision making. Furthermore it would 
forestall the introduction of a process whereby the Government could weigh up the 
competing and conflicting conservation and resource development aspects drawn up 
by an independent Commission. 
Debates surrounding the Resource Assessment Commission Bill 1989 also 
highlighted increasing recognition that both State and Commonwealth Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedures were inadequate. In particular, these processes had 
been seen to have failed during the assessment of the controversial pulp mill 
proposal at Wesley Vale, Tasmania. Opposition member Warwick Smith argued that 
the preparation of the Resource Assessment Commission Bill 1989 was a 
recognition by Cabinet that they had failed to adequately research appropriate 
179 Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989,Schedule I, p. 20. 
180 The RAC has attracted considerable attention from academics. Key sources include Economou, 
N., 'Reconciling the Irreconcilable? The Resource Assessment Commission, Resource Policy and 
the Environment', Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol 51. no.4, 1992,pp.461 -
475.and Galligan, B., Lynch, G. 'Integrating Conservation and Development, Australia's Resource 
Assessment Commission and the Testing Case of Coronation Hill'. Federalism Research Centre, 
Australian National University, Canberra, 1992. 
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guidelines for pulp mills prior to the proposal gathering momentum. 'It recognises 
that people were going in a hundred different directions. The Bill may be an advance 
- it recognises a glaring gap in the development of balanced resources of the 
nation'.181 Mr Kerin also saw in the RAC an opportunity to identify both 
conservation and economic opportunities in a given resource area. He claimed in-
depth investigation was necessary to ensure resources were optimised in economic 
activity. Greater understanding of scientific resource management principles by all 
parties would enable the emergence of positive programs which balanced 
conservation and resource use considerations. In forestry, for example, increased 
use of tree farming techniques would improve efficiency and substantially reduce 
pressure on native forests. 
While it was the intention of the Government for the Bill to be bi-partisan, there was 
considerable Opposition criticism. A focus for this criticism was the belief that the 
Government was simply creating a bureaucratic 'lightning rod' to draw out criticism 
of a given project. By this process the Government would then be in a position to 
stall proposals and avoid taking responsibility for controversial decisions. 
Furthermore, it was claimed by Opposition spokesman Warwick Smith that the 
origins of the RAC lay in a desire by Cabinet to minimise internal conflict within the 
ALP. 
More and more the radical greenies seem to be saying that they want 
to have control of the total agenda. So, perhaps this Commission is 
more about trying to control the conflicting views about land use 
policy within the Australian Labour Party than it is about putting 
something in place to address these very complex issues to which the 
nation and industry want and need answers.182 
In support of this assertion, the Liberal Party pointed to the strong support given to 
the concept by Ministers Kerin and Cook who had been critical of the radical green 
agenda. Their support, it was argued, resulted from a recognition that there needed 
to be a solid bureaucratic bulwark against the environmental movement and the pro-
conservation views of the Department of Arts, Sport, Environment and Tourism 
181 Australia, House of Representatives, 1989, Debates, 4 May, p.1942. 
182 Australia, House of Representatives, 1989, Debates, 11 May, p.2559. 
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(DASET) led by Senator Richardson. In support of the RAC a contrast was drawn 
between the RAC and the Helsham Inquiry. This Inquiry was seen as expensive 
(costing nearly $3 million) and overly legalistic, attempting to give black and white 
answers to complex problems. The Opposition, and some Labor Ministerssuch as 
Kerin, believed that a formalised Helsham Inquiry process would not solve 
environmental conflicts. 
The Opposition also raised questions concerning the wide scope of potential 
inquiries suggested by the Bill. An examination of the paper manufacturing industry 
could for example range from the question of marine pollution created by a pulp mill 
to the likely future world market for unbleached paper. The sheer numbers of 
inquiries already undertaken in recent years in the single area of forestry was cited as 
a factor which undermined the value of inquiry-led decision making. Although there 
had been fifty five Commonwealth and State forestry enquiries since 1946, with 
- Tasmania being involved with nineteen of these, controversy still surrounded the 
industry.183 All Opposition spokesmen came to the view that the RAC was unlikely 
to operate as an independent entity which would carry on its own research and 
develop a consistency of approach due to lack of staff. 
Despite these varied concerns, the Government confidently asserted that the 
Commission would be able to both conduct methodological inquiries and research 
while ensuring that the Commission Chairman had adequate secretarial staff. From 
the outset it was claimed additional staff and special commissioners would be 
appointed when an inquiry was initiated. The first of these was to be into the likely 
impact of mining on the Stage III area of Kakadu National Park. 
Unlike the Opposition, the Australian Democrats were generally supportive of the 
RAC concept despite a concern that the new body might insulate the Government 
from the environmental community. The Democrats strongly adhered to the notion 
that the provision of 'expert advice' alone would resolve environmental problems 
despite evidence to the contrary provided by the Helsham Inquiry saga and the 
experience of the AHC. Deomcrat Senator Norm Sanders stated: 
We are not worried about what the minerals industry or the wood 
183 Mercury, Editorial, Nov 3, 1992, p. 8. 
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chipping industry can come up with in terms of information. We 
believe that when the facts are evaluated in a dispassionate light, 
justice will prevail.184 
Sanders believed the likely value of the RAC lay in its capacity to probe both the 
economics of major resource issues and the financial position of key players. 
Senator Sanders pointed out that an understanding of fundamental economic issues 
such as bulk power rates for major electricity users in Tasmania or the purchase price 
for woodchips taken out of the South Coast forests of NSW was critical to the 
conservation position. He pointed out that 
... if we are going to frame an argument or discussion about the value 
~fan industry in economic terms versus the environmental damage, 
we must have this information available in trying to come to some 
rational conclusion.185 
The Democrats claimed that the AHC should be required under the Act to give 
evidence on matters relating to the National Estate and proposed this as an 
amendment. This was seen as a means of balancing the power of the Industries 
Assistance Commission and the Australian Science and Technology Council which 
would be involved in the selecti,on of Commissioners. Opposition spokesmen 
naturally suggested this was to ensure there was an 'environmental mole' in the 
organisation. The Democrats successfully argued that the AHC would be able to 
contribute significant data in such areas as forest management and, thus, balance the 
input of pro-development Government and non-government agencies including 
Primary Industry and the National Association of Forest Industries (NAFI). 
Provision of financial assistance to conservationists who had been requested to 
provide evidence was also proposed by the Democrats in a second amendment. Both 
amendments were subsequently supported by the Government to allow passage of 
the Bill. 
The political complexities of managing the environment as a public issue were 
reflected in the ambivalent position of the Opposition. While opposing the Bill in 
184 Australia,Senate,1989, Debates, 16 June, p.4239 - 40. 
185 ibid p. 4274. 
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principle as another 'bureaucratic layer', their supporters in major industry bodies 
approved the passage of the Bill. For groups such as the Australian Mining Industry 
Council (AMIC), the hope was that 'outrageous' claims by environmental groups 
would be subject to 'proof through scientific scrutiny. While it was acknowledged 
inquiries were often long-winded and inconclusive, these bodies saw the RAC as an 
opportunity to reduce the amount of erratic and ad hoe decision making which 
supposedly characterised decision making under the Hawke Government. The 
Wesley Vale case was seen as a prime example of this, with the Government 
preventing a major resource project from proceeding without having either guidelines 
or sufficient data. Despite this, the Opposition claimed there was a strong likelihood 
that the Ccoalition would reshuffle or even abolish the RAC on achieving 
government. The Australian Democrat amendments futher heightened Opposition 
concerns about the RAC as they believed these changes had not been brokered by the 
Australian Democrats at all but by the ACF. Their lukewarm acceptance for the RAC 
wasbased on the support the legislation had from industry groups. Mr McGauran 
(Gippsland) proposed it would be the ' .... the only forum where the forestry 
industry as well as the mining, petroleum, farming and fishing industries, have any 
hope whatsoever of an objective, unemotional and rational examination of proposed 
projects' .186 
This proposition was clearly a striking criticism of previous committees of inquiry 
and the AHC itself. Mr McGauran was undoubtedly repeating a popular view among 
industry groups that they were unfairly treated when dealing with Government 
inquiries because of prejudice exhibited by those bureaucrats conducting them. The 
prevalence of such a view, whether warranted or not, placed a question mark over 
the value of the AHC as a link between Government, industry and the environmental 
movement. In this context, the considerable effort by the AHC in educational forums 
could be dismissed by cynics as propaganda rather than a genuine attempt to expand 
understanding of a complex public policy area. This dismissive approach was 
reinforced by the argument advanced by the Opposition that all proposals put 
forward by environmentalists receive l~ttle scrutiny from the Labor Government and 
the media. Lack of confidence in the existing processes clearly permeated Opposition 
thinking and, like the AHC fifteen years earlier, the RAC was seen as a potentially 
unbiased, vigorous and fair minded structure which could balance conflicting 
186 Australia, House of Representatives, 1989, 16 June, p. 3365. 
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environmental and industry considerations. 
Undoubtedly, the dramatic decline in Australia's economic position towards the end 
of the 1980s and the need for government to urgently facilitate new large scale 
industrial or resource extraction projects was at the heart of the RAC and its 
formation. This turn of events also reflected the growing complexity of government 
decision making and the political emphasis placed on environmental issues by the 
Hawke Government. It was not a rejection of the AHC but rather a recognition of its 
limitations. In many respects the Commission was doing an outstanding job during 
the late 1980s, especially in the collection of data on National Estate areas. The 
difficulty for the Hawke Government was that the Commission's brief simply did 
not include the broad assessment of proposed resource development projects at an 
economic, social and environmental level. Prior to 1987-88, both Coalition and 
Labor Governments had considerable latitude when examining the impact of large 
developments. The decline of the economy from mid 1986, however, ensured that 
greater prominence would be given to the political, social and economic impact of 
environmental regulation in future. 
One option the Hawke Government could have pursued in recasting the 
environmental bureaucracy was to graft onto the AHC a new responsibility to 
broaden its assessment criteria when considering National Estate listings. This 
would have required major changes to the AHC Act and would inevitably have 
created divisions at a staff level. In view of the specialised nature of the 
Commission's work and the long tradition of controversy associated with the body, 
it was also reasonable to assume that the organisation would simply not be able to 
manage new, complex and divergent responsibilities. With some wisdom the 
Government chose to create a new body unburdened by past controversies. 
Changes to the Australian Herita~e Commission Act 1975 
In May 1990 a 'confidential' letter was sent by the out-going Resources Minister, 
Senator Cook, to the Commission Chairman in which he claimed: 
I have become disturbed about the Commission's role in our 
assessment of National Estate issues ... Substantial questions have 
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been raised about the Commission's competence and 
professionalism ... There is a growing and very disquieting perception 
in government, industry and scientific circles and in all the states that 
the Commission is behaving suspiciously like a mere client group of 
some sections of the conservation movement, and that its advice lacks 
the scientific objectivity and professional honesty that good public 
policy requires . 
... There is a widespread concern that the Commission has simply 
become an advocate in the public debate over conservation and the 
National Estate and that its advice is tainted by that bias.187 
A swift denial of these claims was subsequently issued by the Director of the 
Commission, Ms Sharon Sullivan, who publicly reminded interested parties that the 
Commonwealth received a variety of advice on the economic and social implications 
of any given environmental dispute.188 Critics of the Commission, she argued, were 
claiming that the Commonwealth should not receive advice on one part of the debate, 
that of National Estate values. While such a response was extremely deft, it did not 
address the key concern of industry, that there was a seeming exponential growth in 
the National Estate. 
During 1990, in response to a number of significant conservation disputes and 
continuing research by the Commission, 145,000 hectares were added to the 
National Estate with a further 340,000 hectares189 under consideration. Critics of the 
Commission claimed that continued expansion of the National Estate was totally_ 
inappropriate and not reflecting the concerns of Parliament. 
With a federal election due in 1990, the general level of hostility towards the 
Commission increased and the simmering offensive by the forest industry against the 
organisation once again erupted. Faced with an aggressive blockade of Parliament by 
log trucks, the Government agreed to seriously consider a new resource management 
187 This letter was leaked and formed the basis of multiple newspaper articles including: 
Sydney Morning Herald, 'Cook attacks integrity of Heritage Commission', July 14, 1990, p. 2. 
188 Australian, 'Heritage body defends role', August 22, 1990, p. 10. 
189 Kalgoorlie Miner, "Heritage Commission must be made more accountable to public', May 24, 
1990, p. 14. 
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concept proposed by the forestry industry, that of 'resource security'. Integral to this 
new idea was the belief that the logging industry should be guaranteed access under 
Federal and State legislation to adequate timber reserves. For much of 1990, support 
grew among resource ministers for some form of legislation to be introduced and 
resource security became a key policy focus for the Government. 
The notion of resource security included the implicit assumption that any new 
proposed legislation brought forward would override the Australian Heritage 
Commission Act 1975.190 A direct consequence was to generate a sense of crisis 
about the future of the Commission and change the perception by commentators 
concerning the relatively innocuous Australian Heritage Commission Amendment 
Bill 1989. A long overdue program to improve the Commission's administrative 
transparency had now become a last ditch effort to prevent the organisation's 
downgrading. Lenore Taylor claimed 
... last August [1990], before the Committee [Resource Security] had 
even reported, the Government Minister, Mrs Kelly, headed off at the 
pass the plot to trim the AHC by introducing into Parliament some old 
and innocuous amendments to the Australian Heritage Commission 
Act and using the occasion to say there would be no other 
changes.191 
At a critical Cabinet meeting in mid October 1990, it was decided that calls by 
industry for the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 to be overridden should 
be rejected.192 By way of compromise, Cabinet accepted the question of resource 
security should remain on the agenda, with the Minister for Resources continuing to 
negotiate with industry groups on the issue. 
The origins of the Australia Heritage Commission Amendment Bill 1989, which was 
considered by Parliament for some 18 months, lay in the Cohen review of the mid 
1980s, discussed in Chapter 6. This report suggested only minor administrative 
changes, a view that was subsequently endorsed by Ministers Richardson and 
Cohen. 
190 R. Peake, 'Clash tipped on plan for Commission', Age, October 23, 1990, pl6. 
191 L. Taylor, 'Conservation plan faced with the Axe', Australian, March 11, 1991, p.11. 
192 Financial Review, 'Heritage Act granted reprieve in Canberra', Oct 24, 1990,p. 6. 
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Opposition spokesman on the environment, Warwick Smith, during the second 
reading speech of the Bill astutely characterised the Government position as follows. 
It is a little intriguing to see this Bill actually come to the House. It is 
almost as though it has picked up a few issues and been brought in, 
but it has not addressed the big issues which are: how far should the 
AHC be able to go and when will we finally sit down and sort out 
this issue of the economic and social impact of the listing of items in 
the National Estate.193 
The proposed amendments were broken down into six categories, the most 
important of which related to the clarification of operational procedures and the 
extension of Commission powers to allow the organisation to administer the 
National Estate Grant Program. Other amendments concerned the deletion of a 
subsection affecting Aboriginal sites and the exemption of self-governing territories 
from the Act. Changes were also proposed to clause 4 of the Act which defined the 
National Estate. While the general definition of the National Estate was retained, a 
subclause was inserted which specified the criteria against which places were 
assessed for possible future inclusion on the Register. In a similar vein, changes to 
Subsections 22(5), 23(2), 23(3) and 28(4) were designed to outline more clearly the 
administrative procedures associated with the proposed and actual listing of 
properties, the procedures for a challenge and the method by which a property could 
be taken off the list. In essence, the Commission was required to more strenuously 
ensure property owners were made aware of and understood the process of listing. 
Conversely, greater powers were provided to objectors. 
A jaundiced interpretation of the preceding amendments could present the changes as 
a diminution of Commission authority rather than a reasoned response to public 
pressure for a more efficient and fairer register. This negative view cannot be 
sustained as the decision to effectively reinstate original clauses of the Act 
concerning the provision of advice on the expenditure of National Estate funds 
represented a positive endorsement of the Commission. These changes were 
necessary following the Government's decision to allow the AHC to administer the 
193 Australia.House of Rcprcscntalivcs,1989,Debates, 23 Nov, p. 2880. 
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National Estate Grant Program as envisaged by the Hope Inquiry. For the previous 
fourteen years this responsibility had been vested with the Department following the 
first Fraser Government Review. The 1986 Review of the Commission had been 
ambivalent on this issue due to the staffing implications of such a proposal. The 
report noted that: 
Providing staff within the Commission to administer the program 
would not be simply a matter of transferring positions and staff from 
the Department to the Commission. These positions include NEGP 
administration as only one of a number of duties which the Minister 
needs performed by a Department which is itself severely stretched.194 
This issue was made redundant when Senator Richardson announced in 1989 that, 
along with the reform of the Act, the Commission was to have its resources 
' ... almost doubled with the allocation of an additional $2 million annually.' This 
allowed for the recruitment of twenty two additional staff. These decisions 
undoubtedly increased the capacity of the Commission to function effectively and 
was long overdue. By way of contrast, the newly created RAC reached a staffing 
complement of forty one within two years of its creation. For the Commission it 
took some fifteen years to reach a similar level. 
The last significant amendment proposed in the Bill concerned the removal of places 
from the Register. A new Subsection 24(1) included an additional provision which 
would allow the Minister to direct the AHC to review listings and to determine 
whether they should be removed. The Government's intention in this respect was 
twofold. It encouraged Commission staff to both regularly revisit listings and 
secondly, to respond to legitimate criticism that an area has become so degraded it 
should be removed from the Register. By promoting the passage of this and othe_r 
amendments, the Government believed it had essentially neutralised key critidsms· of 
the Commission and avoided 
.... some of the kinds of obfuscations raised by those who wish to 
distant the purpose of the Australian Heritage Commission Act and 
some of the alleged difficulties with notification and publication of 
194 Report of the Review of the Commonwealth Government Role in the Conservation of the 
National Estate, p. 38. 
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notices.195 
Unfortunately, several factors compromised these attempts to revive the 
Commission's reputation among 'pro development' groups. The most significant of 
these factors was the electoral cycle. Not only was passage of the legislation through 
Parliament derailed by the 1990 election campaign, but the upsurge in discussions 
over the future shape of the forestry industry led once again to a questioning of the 
National Estate concept. The Australian Heritage Commission Amendment Act 
1990, which finally received assent in January 1991, achieved a limited set of 
objectives concerning the administrative procedures adopted by the Commission. A 
significant increase in the organisation's authority was achieved with the AHC 
becoming directly responsible for the National Estate Grant Program. It was an 
objective which had been set by the Hope Inquiry some sixteen years previously. 
However, any belief that this process of review would silence the critics was dashed 
by the timing of the 1990 election and a consequent upsurge in forestry disputes. 
195 Australia.House of Reprcsentatives,1989, Debates, 23 Nov, p. 2894. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE AHC IN THE POST - HAWKE ERA. 
The inability of the Commonwealth to reduce the level of unemployment, a dramatic 
drop in stock prices in 1987, and the economic fallout associated with the collapse of 
the commercial property market in 1989-90 ensured that the focus of government 
policy between 1987 and 1993 was macro and micro economic reform measures. 
Many within Government believed every effort should be mad~ to attract and assist 
large scale export oriented development projects which were preferably both labour 
and capital intensive. Moreover, the perfect project would have the added benefit of 
'value adding' to a resource which Australia already had in abundance such as timber 
and minerals. The complexity of implementing this legitimate strategy and 
accommodating a community desire for the application of high environmental 
standards was symbolised by the billion dollar Wesley Vale pulp mill proposal and 
its ultimate collapse. 
For the Australian Heritage Commission this economic environment created a new 
political climate which was focused less on environmental confrontation and more on 
resolution by discussion. The creation of the Resource Assessment Commission was 
based ort the premise that a pro-active, industry-wide assessment of environmental 
concerns would reduce the potential for major disputes. The adoption of sustainable 
development principles further reflected a desire by the Commonwealth to downplay 
its role as an environmental 'policeman' who was always in conflict with developers 
and State Governments on one side and environmentalists on the other. 
While represented as a powerful opponent of development, the statutory powers of 
the AHC were limited. Short of actual abolition, the options available to the 
Commonwealth to ensure a more accommodating Commission were limited. 
Between 1987 and 1993, a subtle but critical change to the corporate culture was 
achieved through the office of Chairman without attracting significant political 
odium. Chapter Seven identifies and explores this changing environment within 
which the AHC operated and its response to a new political agenda. It also confirms 
that the power of the Commission does not reside in its legislation alone but rather its 
capacity to consistently present an environmental perspective to economic policy 
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decision makers within government. As such, it was able to carry out a task which 
was difficult for organisations such as the Australian Conservation Foundation to 
perform. Furthermore, the all-embracing concept of the National Estate provided a 
unique platform from which the Agency could legitimately address local, state and 
national issues as a matter of routine. 
A new Chairman for the AHC 
From the AHC's inception in 1976, the position of Chairman had been filled by 
individuals who possessed outstanding qualifications as scientists or 
conservationists which was both logical and appropriate given the brief of the 
Commission. The initial appointment of Mr David Yenken, an eminent town planner 
and environment advocate, as Chairman was also critical in establishing the 
credentials of the organisation. 
In the early year~ of the AHC, the Chairman and Commissioners represented an 
important source of advice for resolving day to day issues. As the Commission 
became increasingly embroiled in complex conservation disputes, the range of skills 
required by a successful Chairman increased. In addition to a broad academic 
knowledge of conservation issues, the Chairman now required outstanding 
communication skills, political 'savvy' and a comprehensive knowledge of the 
Australian political and administrative system. 
In late 1987 the Commonwealth broke dramatically with the past and appointed Pat 
Galvin, a former Head of the Department of Arts, Sport, the Environment, Tourism 
and Territories as Chairman. Mr Galvin brought with him an intimate knowledge of 
the Commonwealth bureaucracy which undoubtedly assisted the AHC gain 
unprecedented access to staff resources during his period of chairmanship. His 
undoubted administrative skills were also supplemented by a willingness to act as a 
forthright environmental advocate. Despite operating in a rapidly changing political 
and economic climate, he was prepared to articulate an independent line. In a speech 
to the Royal Australian Institute of Public Administration he warned 
... that governments and developers who ignored the Australian 
people's clear desire to protect places of special value would do so at 
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their own peril ... The great lesson of the eighties, which emerges into 
the nineties, is that whilst Governments have retreated from social 
concerns, people have not.196 
This confident style suited the aims of his Minister, Graham Richardson who 
maintained a high profile for environmental policy between 1987 and 1990. With the 
departure of Richardson and his replacement by Ros Kelly greater emphasis was 
placed within the Department on the resolution of disputes. It was, therefore, no 
coincidence that the character and qualifications of the new AHC Chairman mirrored 
this policy change. In announcing the appointment of Tony Fitzgerald QC, Mrs 
Kelly argued it was ' ... essential for the Commission to have a high profile 
Chairman.'197 In addition to being someone who would 'call a spade a spade', the 
Minister identified his skill in dispute resolution as being of critical importance. The 
subsequence performance of the new Chairman and his public utterances certainly 
revealed his commitment to the new government agenda. 
An analysis of Ministerial press releases and subsequent comments by Mr Fitzgerald 
reveals that the Government had an expectation that the new Chairman could change 
the corporate culture within the AHC and, consequently, enable the Commission to 
present a new image to those resource industries which had previously been so 
critical of the organisation. More ~roadly, his appointment formed part of a larger 
strategy to address the argument put forward by industry that investment was being 
restricted by increasingly stringent environmental guidelines. 
Well known for his role in heading an inquiry into Queensland police and political 
corruption of the late 1980s, Mr Fitzgerald also possessed experience in 
environmental management. As chairman of a Queensland Government Commission 
of Inquiry into the future land use on Fraser Island, he came to the organisation with 
firm if not sympathetic views on the resolution of environmental disputes. In a wide 
ranging interview following his appointment, Fitzgerald claimed that the standard of 
environmental debate in Australia was poor and a more 'structured approach' to 
assessing disputes was required. He argued: 
196Australian Heritage Commission, Community Prepared to Pay for En v1ronmental Protection, 
Media Release, 7 Feb, 1990. 
197Canberra Times, 'Fitzgerald to head Australian Heritage Commission', Oct 25, 1990, p. 3. 
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We need processes to pull all the threads together, and in a way which 
focus attention on the merits (of the issue) rather than on who has the 
biggest clout. In a way also, which accurately informs other general 
community and treats them as being possessed of some common 
sense, revealing to them that, whatever course is followed will have 
disadvantages as well as advantages instead of creating the pretence 
that we can follow whatever is the fad at the moment without any 
consequences.198 
In making these observations, he also noted that difficulties would continue to arise 
so long as governments worked on disputes purely on a case by case basis. In 
addition, he believed the problem of duplicated responsibility had to be resolved. 
The new Chairman did not disguise his role as an agent for change and was also 
unwilling to endorse past Commission policies. Fitzgerald articulated a view 
commonly held outside the Commission that the organisation's effectiveness was 
blunted by its endless involvement in environmental controversies. The answer, he 
argued, was partially a more 'pro-active' assessment of potential heritage areas 
regardless of whether they were under threat or considered for National Estate 
nomination.199 
These views coincided with preliminary AHC planning for a regional assessment 
project in Western Australia and an increasingly science-based dispute resolution 
strategy articulated by Minister Ros Kelly. His appointment was also a public 
relations coup for an embattled Minister, reinforcing the notion that the guard had 
changed at the Commission. Much to the dismay of Commission staff,200 Mr 
Fitzgerald introduced a mildly critical tone to the 1990-91 AHC Annual Report, 
suggesting 'The Commission might also have contributed to its own difficulties 
[through] ... some unevenness in its decision-making, especially in its initial 
years'201 These ideas were later expanded in an address to the Mining Industry 
Council where he argued the Commission had suffered from a preponderance of 
198 Australian, 'Fitzgerald slams green debate', Nov 10-11, 1990, p. 4. 
199 ibid 
200 The author was advised that senior staff had not been privy to the Chairperson's comments in 
the Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report, 1991, prior to publication. 
201 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report,1990-91,, p. 2. 
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technical staff and insufficient senior managers to support the Director.202 The new 
Chairman also detected a management culture which was inward looking and 
defensive, a natural consequence of the intense criticism suffered by staff over many 
years. This problem was magnified, he claimed, by a failure to adequately address 
the issues raised by critics and correct misconceptions concerning the ARC. 
His arrival added urgency to initiatives designed to solve a number of difficulties 
facing the organisation. These initiatives included a paper reviewing the definition of 
key National Estate concepts and a new process of regional assessment. Both 
developments were partly the result of stinging criticism of the organisation by the 
Carmen Lawrence Labor Government in Western Australia which accused the ARC 
of pre-empting WA planning laws following several National Estate listings in the 
State. An agreement was subsequently reached whereby a joint regional survey 
would be carried out to determine the heritage value of important forested areas. This 
ground breaking arrangement was subsequently promoted by both the Minister and 
Fitzgerald as a major achievement in reducing the likely number of future 
Commonwealth-State government disputes. It also added impetous to the 
restructuring of the Commission and the subsequent creation of a Regional 
Assessment Branch (see Figure 5). Other measures introduced to improve the 
administrative 'transparency' of the Commission included the development of a new 
corporate plan and an examination by the Attorney General's Department of various 
'practices and procedures' adopted by ARC staff. The cataloguing and publication of 
legal advice and policy decisions received or made since the Commission's 
establishment was also recommended. 
In summary, the new Chairman suggested the performance of the Commission was 
far from perfect and considerable remedial action was required. He stressed to his 
fellow Commissioners and staff that the organisation 
... must confine itself to its statutory functions and the criteria which 
are material. It must encourage broad acceptability within the 
community so that its professionalism becomes widely known and 
generally accepted. I am confident that the Commission has embarked 
upon such a process, and that future prospects are bright.203 
202 T Fitzgerald, 'Overcoming the adversarial mind set in Heritage Commission issues', The 
Mining Review, June, 1991, pp.26- 30 
203 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report 1990-91, p. 6. 
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Ironically, this robust chairmanship was short lived. After only eighteen months, 
Fitzgerald resigned to take up a senior Queensland legal position. The choice of his 
replacement was to confirm that the 'experiment' with a new style Chairman was to 
continue. Ms Sonja Lyneham took up her appointment in December 1991. Lyneham 
possessed a strong commercial background and the perspective of a 'hands-on 
operator'. In her first press announcement, she referred to a 'heritage-led economic 
recovery' and supported the general proposition that heritage conservation and 
economic activity should be linked.204Lyneham's appointment confirmed a change 
in management style reflecting intense political pressure from the Minister for the 
AHC to adopt a more pragmatic and accommodating approach when working with 
industry. 
The AHC and the Wesley Vale Pulp Mill dispute 
The Hope Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate had envisaged the 
Australian Heritage Commission as being the primary source of advice to Cabinet on 
environmental issues with such advice based on rigorous scientific analysis. The 
bitter Wesley Vale Pulp Mill dispute in Northern Tasmania confirmed the critical 
importance of such advice but also revealed that in the late 1980s the Commission 
had a relatively minor role to play in resource industry policy. 
In mid 1988, North Broken Hill and the overseas paper manufacturer, Noranda 
Canada, proposed a 50/50 share proposal to develop a 'state of the art' pulp mill in 
North-West Tasmania. The project represented a potential $1.3 billion investment in 
the Australian economy and a manufacturing plant capable of generating millions in 
export income. The ultimate withdrawal of the proposal in mid 1989 was a 
consequence of the partners' failure to accept environmental guidelines laid down by 
the Federal Government. This outcome represented a victory for a scientific based 
decision-making process which the AHC and others had long supported. Despite the 
project representing a 'perfect' value adding investment scheme, Cabinet was not 
prepared to accept anything less than the highest international standards for waste 
disposal. Commentator Paul Kelly described the outcome in the following manner: 
204 In a visit to Tasmania she responded to a request from the National Trust for financial help in 
restoring several properties by proposing they be leased out for a commercial purpose such as a 'bed 
and breakfast' accommodation. 
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The decision caused uproar but it was misunderstood. It was assumed 
wrongly that politics had prevailed. The irony is that science, not 
politics had prevailed ... Keating declared the conditions were 'in the 
national interest' and were 'reasonable and achievable' ... The Cabinet 
saw the mill die with regret, not from any couning of the green vote. 
The reality is the environmental gap was never going to be bridged 
with Noranda.205 
Political activists and commentators alike condemned the decision-making process 
which led to this outcome. After strong initial suppon for the project,206 the position 
of the Commonwealth only changed after the Tasmanian Liberal State Government 
demonstrated an inability to manage preliminary negotiations and the failure of Nonh 
Broken Hill-Noranda to prepare a professional EIS. The strength of the conservation 
vote was also demonstrated by the defeat of the Tasmanian Liberal Government and 
the emergence of the Greens as an electoral force in that State207. 
The initial involvement of the Commonwealth with the proposal was through the 
Foreign Investment Review Board whose task was to determine the appropriateness 
or otherwise of proposed overseas funded development schemes. The AHC was 
also routinely involved in this Foreign Investment Review Board process and 
provided advice on some one hundred and thirty proposals during 1988-89. While 
this represented an important opportunity for the Commission to express the 
environmental perspective on a given project the procedure was far from 
satisfactory. Initial proposals were often sketchy and once approval had been granted 
it was often difficult for the AHC to intervene.208 
With respect to the Wesley Vale pulp mill proposal, the Commonwealth Government 
was keen to assist the project and an offer to waive tariff charges on imported 
equipment and to allow accelerated depreciation was made. When invited to 
205 P.Kelly, p. 523. 
206 Senator G. Richardson recalled 'I remember Lhe Wesley Vale pulp mill; the first time it came up 
in Cabinet we voted to give it all sorts of money to the project to get 1t off the ground. We were 
offering money, we were throwing millions at it. At that time, of course, there had been no 
environmental investigation of it all. in G Richardson, 'Where There is a Will, There is a Way', 
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, No. 62, Oct, 1992, p. 13. 
207 M. Haward, P. Larmour. (Ed). The Tasmanian Parliamentary Accord & Public Policy 1989-92, 
Federalism Research Centre. Australian National University, 1993, p.l. 
208 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report 1988-89,, p. 62. 
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comment on Wesley Vale, the Commission expressed concern about three areas: the 
likely large consumption of woodchips; the water required to run the plant; and the 
toxic waste which would be produced. The AHC was also mindful of other similar 
projects under consideration in Victoria, NSW and Western Australia. Combined, 
these would have placed enormous stress on the nation's native forests. It was 
estimated, for example, that a proposed mill at Grafton would require between 
1.200,000 and 2,000,000 tonnes of timber annually.209 
Against this background there was also the strong campaign by the Forestry Industry 
and some State Governments for the introduction of 'Resource Security.' In a paper 
to Caucus, the Resources Minister Alan Griffiths linked Wesley Vale and resource 
security to future economic prosperity in an effort to defeat alternative perspectives. 
A high level of stability in the Government's policy framework is 
required if industry is to invest in high technology world-scale paper 
mills each requiring investment of around $1.5 billion. Put simply, 
without...Commonwealth and state legislation then the investments 
will not proceed and the benefits of those investments will not be 
conferred on the Australian community.210 
This proposition was generally supported by other industry Ministers including John 
Kerin and John Button. Based on this general strategy, the Forest Conservation and 
Development Bill 1991 was introduced into Parliament with the aim of encouraging 
investment in one or more world scale pulp mills. The Commission for its part had 
12 months earlier totally rejected the destruction of old growth forest which was the 
very resource the proposed pulp mills would need to utilise. 
As the level of local resistance to the Wesley Vale proposal became obvious to 
Cabinet and an increasing level of conflict over scientific evidence emerged, the need 
for clear government development guidelines became critical. This led to an overseas 
fact-finding mission by scientists from the CSIRO. The subsequent report provided 
Cabinet with not only assessment guidelines but a better understanding of the latest 
overseas technological and pollution control measures. 
209 ibid, p. 25. 
21DM. Grattan, 'Hawke looks for a way through resources forest', A~e. March 2, 1991, p. 2. 
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Despite the validity of the AHC position, the organisation was not considered a key 
player in the outcome of Wesley Vale. Two reports prepared by the CSIRO and the 
Bureau of Rural Resources ultimately shaped the debate which saw Cabinet require 
the proponents to guarantee the highest feasible environmental standards for the mill. 
The failure of North Broken Hill-Norandra to produce an EIS which addressed the 
critical issue of waste disposal into Bass Strait also doomed the project. Graham 
Richardson noted 
... the main thing that brought Wesley Vale undone was the absolute 
refusal of either the proponents or the Tasmanian Government to do 
any studies at all on the hydrology of the area or the meteorology 
prior to the project beginning. The locals who understand Bass Strait 
knew that the place at which we would have dumped 13 tones of 
organo chlorines every single day was a place at which there was no 
tidal movement. 211 
In the final analysis, a pulp mill was not built at Wesley Vale because the proponents 
were unable or unwilling to resolve the issue of waste disposal even though many 
believed the technology existed which would have enabled the joint partners to meet 
the guidelines set by Cabinet. The difficulty lay more in the implications for Noranda 
in Canada rather than any technological problem. Agreement in Australia to higher 
pollution control standards would have set off a train of events that could have 
forced the company to adopt similar standards at other mills. 
From this analysis it is clear that the threat posed by the pulp mill to Tasmanian 
native forests as stressed by the AHC did not affect the outcome. The subsequent 
decision by the Government to proceed with Resource Security legislation confirmed 
the suspicion that Commission advice on forest resource policy at this time was not 
dominant. Indeed, broader conservation considerations regarding other forestry 
issues were also temporarily frozen as the Government conveniently awaited the 
outcome of a major RAC inquiry on that subject. 
211 Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, No. 62, October 1990,p.14. 
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The AHC and the Resource Assessment Commission inquiry process 
In outlining the benefits he foreshadowed from the formation of the RAC and the 
creation of ecological sustainable development working groups, Prime Minister 
Hawke stressed the opportunity it provided for all parties to press their point of view 
in a neutral forum. It was hoped the very process of bringing disparate and often 
opposing groups together would encourage the resolution of environmental disputes. 
Prime Minister Hawke claimed: 
These processes are designed to bring together the full range of 
relevant interests - developers,unions, environmentalists, and State 
Governments and to hear the full range of their views, so that the 
recommendations for decisions that emerge will be based on the 
broadest base of knowledge that can be assembled. Differences within 
the community that would otherwise, and inevitably, hamper the 
resolution of these issues will I trust to a considerable extent be 
resolved while decisions are being reached.212 
This optimism was quickly placed in doubt by the early decision of the Wilderness 
Society not to participate in the first RAC inquiry on Kakadu. Indeed, the 'adverse' 
findings of the earlier Helsham Inquiry had convinced many conservation 
organisations that their limited resources should be concentrated on gaining public 
support for their cause rather than contributing costly research to well paid 
Commissioners. 213 
The Australian Democrats in the Senate were more optimistic and had fought hard to 
ensure the AHC was involved by statute in all RAC enquiries concerned with the 
National Estate. This took the form of Section 30A of the Resource Assessment 
Commission Act 1989, a measure designed to ensure the conservation perspective 
was always represented. At an official level the Commission welcomed the creation 
of the RAC and the Chairman was hopeful the new body would deflect much of the 
criticism previously levelled by industry at the AHC. In the 1988-89 Annual Report 
212 R.J. Hawke, RAC/CEPR conference dinner speech entitled The Economics of Environmental 
Policy', Canberra, Oct 11, 1990. 
213 The Director of the Wilderness Society Mr Alastair Graham also observed 'It's not the enquiries 
as such, it's the structure of the Resource Assessment Commission ... We'd much rather be out in the 
streets talking up Kakadu as a nice pince than discussing the potential values of a gold mine', 
Tasmanian Wilderness Society, Chain Reaction Newsletter, No. 60, April 1990. 
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he expressed the hope that 
... no more should there be calls from development interests for the 
AHC to take economic, employment or production values into 
account when deciding whether to list a place on the Register of the 
National Estate.214 
This hope was soon replaced by the most tangible impact of the RAC on the 
Commission, a noticeable and unwelcome increase in its workload. The AHC would 
also continue to be vilified by its critics as it soon emerged in the first RAC Inquiry 
into the proposed mining of Coronation Hill at Kakadu that the Commission's 
perspective was significantly different than that of the RAC. In contrast to the RAC 
Commissioners, the AHC submitted for the public record that mining should not 
proceed because the area possessed high National Estate values from both a cultural 
and nature conservation perspective. While it was acknowledged that some mining 
techniques would minimise potential damage the risk was seen as too great by the 
Commission. This argument was not accepted in the final report but this anti-mining 
position had the effect of buttressing a similar stance taken by all community-based 
conservation groups. 
The RAC report instead placed considerable emphasis on respecting the wishes of 
the local Jawoyn people who did not support the project and it was this issue that 
was ultimately used by the Prime Minister to justify a Cabinet decision to reject 
mining. This outcome angered many in the mining industry and further convinced 
them that powerful pro-conservation elements within the Government held sway in 
industry policy. Consequently, the advent of the RAC did not blunt anger towards 
the AHC but instead exacerbated it. 
The 1990 RAC Inquiry into the management of Australian forests provided a further 
opportunity for the AHC to pursue forcefully a pro-conservation forest management 
strategy at odds with the timber industry. In evidence to the Inquiry, the then AHC 
Chairman Pat Galvin argued there should be an immediate moratorium on the 
logging of all old growth forests. Furthermore, this moratorium should remain in 
place until all current Commonwealth conservation initiatives had been completed. In 
practice this would mean a complete ban, a position the Commission continues to 
hold. Mr Galvin also emphasised the urgent need for a national survey to identify 
214 Australian Heritage Comm1ss1on, Annual Repor1 1988-89, p. 2. 
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those forests which had National Estate importance. By so doing he claimed the 
current uncertainty in the timber industry would be 'overcome.'215 This proposition 
was of course highly optimistic as many in the industry did not accept the legitimacy 
of the National Estate concept itself. Others, while slightly more sympathetic, would 
inevitably dispute the increase in National Estate forests which would inevitably 
result from further surveys. 
In its comprehensive submission to the Inquiry, the Australian Heritage Commission 
sought to confirm its credentials in forestry conservation issues. The Chairman 
boldly stated: 
The Commission hopes that through its submission, there will be 
greater understanding of the rigorous process it follows in assessing 
places and of the implications of listing in the Register, the 
Commission's role in forest issues and the factors it must take into 
account when preparing advice for Government and the wide range of 
values for which forest areas in Australia are part of our national 
estate.216 
Along with these comments the AHC ironically made the important admission that 
the organisation was partly to blame for uncertainty in the timber industry because 
the work of compiling a list of National Estate quality forests was not complete. 
While to some extent a public ploy to gain additional resources from Government, it 
was also a realistic reflection on its own role in forestry disputes. 
The completed RAC Forest and Timber Inquiry report was tabled in the House of 
Representatives on April 2, 1992. The report was generally well received. Many of 
its recommendations were adopted in the Commonwealth Draft National Forest 
Policy Statement released several months later. Despite this response the report as a 
whole rejected several basic AHC assumptions. Instead of adopting the 
Commission's position of a total ban on logging, two possible options were 
proposed. The first was 'a rapid cessation' of logging operations in sensitive areas 
215 P. Galvin, Opening comments by the Australian lleritage Commission, Mr Pat Galvin to the 
Resource Assessment Commission Inquiry into Australia's Forest and Timber Resources, 22 June, 
1990, p. 5-6. 
216ibid, p.l. 
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and their inclusion in conservation zones. A second approach was the preparation of 
management plans by forestry agencies which would allow for their identification 
and 'ranking'. By recommending two options, the RAC had clearly moved away 
from the Commission's position but provided considerable room to manoeuvre for 
the Commonwealth. 
A much broader approach to the issue of conservation management was also 
advocated by the Inquiry than allowed for under the AHC legislation. It was 
proposed that a national framework be established for assessing forested areas with 
National Estate and conservation values to be only part of the equation. 
The Inquiry recommended that a national framework be established 
for cooperative and integrated regional assessments taking into 
account National Estate and World Heritage values, endangered 
species, bio-diversity, old growth, vegetation remnants, pests, 
diseases, water catchments and fire management as well as social and 
economic considerations.217 
By failing to adopt the AHC regional assessment model as an effective template and 
proposing that future procedures should integrate non-conservation criteria, a serious 
question mark was placed against the AHC approach. Under existing arrangements 
different agencies dealt with their own area of expertise, allowing the political 
process to weigh up the economic, social and conservation implications flowing 
from a given decision. It was a proposition that had long been accepted by the AHC. 
Following the completion of this report, a further RAC Inquiry into Australia's 
coastal zone was announced in October 1991. AHC comments focused on the 
substantial threats posed to the National Estate in coastal areas and argued for the 
integration of heritage concerns into future coastal management. This was an 
important area of public agreement between the two bodies and reflected a desire for 
closer cooperation in the long term. It was also an area with which the AHC had had 
less involvement. 
An important function of the RAC was to demonstrate the continuing policy vitality 
' 
217 Resource Assessment Commission,Annual Report 1991-92, 1992. 
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of the third Hawke Government, a task which it successfully achieved. Its origin in 
the fierce conservation battles of the 1980s and the Hawke consensus style of 
decision making meant its future in the 1990s under a new Prime Minister was not 
guaranteed. Indeed, in 1993 the decision was taken by Paul Keating to wind up the 
RAC, a reflection of his desire to place less emphasis on conservation issues than his 
predecessor. 
In contrast to the RAC, the mandate of the AHC had always been limited to matters 
associated with the National Estate. Broader aspirations for the organisation as 
envisaged by Justice Hope were dashed by the Fraser Government in 1976. No 
subsequent Government had seen fit to revisit the Australian Heritage Commission 
Act 1975 with a view to significantly strengthening its policy and financial powers. 
Initial concern that the creation of the RAC was a threat to the AHC was proved 
unfounded. The willingness of the Commission to put forward a consistent 
conservation line at the various Inquiries was no doubt well received among 
conservation groups and strengthened its standing. It also reaffirmed the continued 
capacity of the AHC to influence, if not shape, environmental policy. 
Ecological sustainability as a challenge. 
Initial hopes by the Commonwealt~ Government that the creation of the RAC would 
lead to a reduction in environmental disputes quickly dissipated. Critics who had 
previously focused on the performance of the Australian Heritage Commission now 
turned their attention to the shortcomings of the RAC. Within 12 months of its 
creation the Opposition was calling for the organisation to be disbanded. Fred 
Chaney identified the ' ... proliferation of inquiries and working groups created by the 
government to help solve environmental-development conflicts' as a key reason for a 
lack of confidence in the government decision making process.218 This scepticism 
towards the RAC was also directed towards the AHC more generally. 
Commentators noted that much of the frustration surrounding environmental policy 
was ' ... concentrated on the preparation of scientific reports - a peculiar feature of the 
green-development debate being an urge for both sides to commission scientific 
218 H. Lamberton, 'No faith in Government's decision - making process'. Canberra Times, 21 Feb, 
1991, p.13. 
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reports and then argue over the results.'219 The emergence of a new approach to 
managing economic growth, in the form of ecological sustainable development 
(ESD), provided an opportunity for Prime Minister Hawke to try and switch the 
national conservation debate from individual environmental disputes to broader 
issues.220 It also allowed his Environment Minister Ros Kelly to encourage agencies 
within her portfolio to rethink the basis upon which they operated. For the AHC it 
led to increased pressure to shift away from a 'protect at all costs' mindset and 
towards greater negotiation with industry and State Governments. A direct outcome 
of this change was the development of a regional assessment approach to the 
Register of the National Estate and associated forestry agreements with State 
agencies. 
The summary of the Resource Assessment Commission Coastal Zone Inquiry also 
reflects a change in language deployed by government in negotiating a balance 
between industry and conservation requirements. 
This Inquiry contends that we must also look at our country and our 
resources from a new perspective. We must see our Coastal Zone as 
a national asset in its won right, arguably our nation's greatest prize. 
That is not a perception that we have properly embraced in the past. If 
we had, we would not hav~ the problems we encounter today. What 
this Inquiry proposes is to give the Coastal Zone a new focus and 
new identity in the policy making system, across the nation as a 
whole, and at every level of government.221 
This new approach to resource management had its origins in the document Our 
Common Future which had been prepared by the World Commission on 
Environment and Development. 222 The report defined sustainable development as a 
process which did not compromise the needs of future generations. For the 
discipline of resource economics and associated government policy it introduced a 
whole new paradigm which Redhead alludes to in the following description 
219 Australian Financial Review, 'Labor's each way bet on the environment". 5 Sept, 1990, p.14. 
220 Hawke, R. 'Speech By The Prime Minister To The Environment: 1990 Conference', Sydney, 2 
May 1990. 
221Resource Assessment Commission, Coastal Zone Inquiry, Final Report Overview, AGPS, 
1993, Canberra, p. 44. 
222 World Commission on Environment and Developmcnt,Our Common Future, Oxford, 1987. 
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... sustainable development involves the application of environmental 
economics in environmental valuation and management. Maintenance 
of the capital stock to be passed on to each generation involves a 
trade-off between natural and man made capital. This necessitates a 
valuation of the environment, usually in dollar terms. Conversely, it 
should mean that a similar process is applied to any conservation 
proposal or restraint so as to be able to measure it against any 
competing development proposal,223 
Clearly sustainable development was an attractive concept to politicians and others 
seeking a resolution to the seemingly interminable environmental disputes which 
marked the 1970s and 1980s. It represented an opportunity to more effectively 
weigh competing aims in the resource development arena and promote a more 
optimistic outlook among major potential investors. Another benefit was the 
challenge it offered to traditional government conservation policy.224 Under existing 
arrangements, the AHC and similar organisations established a set of standards and 
then attempted to police them.225 The difficulty with this approach was that those 
groups being policed did not necessarily accept the standards devised and those who 
set the rules had difficulty defining the 'value' of a threatened amenity. To translate 
this new theory into government policies and strategies was clearly a major task and 
following the release of a Commonwealth discussion paper in June 1990, the 
Government announced the establishment of four working groups to explore the 
implications for forestry, mining, fisheries and agriculture. 
The objective of this process was to explore the implications for individual industries 
and to defuse criticism made by the opposition that the initial government discussion 
paper was ' ... all things to all people'.226 General agreement did exist over the 
concept of sustainable development, although more disagreement arose over details. 
223 C.L. Redhead, 'Commcnl on Resource IndusLrics at Risk? (Impact of Resource Assessment 
Commission)', a paper delivered at the FourLccmh Annual Conference of the Australian Mining and 
Petroleum Law AssociaLion LimiLcd, Sydney, 1-3 August, 1991, p. 5. 
224 R. Kelly, 'Clever PoliLics or Lhc Clever Country', an address to the Australian Institute of 
Political Science, Canberra, 3 Oct 1991, p.3. 
225 This point is developed by Redhead when discussing the RAC in the same aniclc, p. 5. 
226 F. Chancy, 'The alternatives - Lhc Opposition view on ESD', an address by the Shadow 
Minister for Lhc Environment to the Australian Institute of PoliLical Science Conference, October 3, 
1991, p. 3. 
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Some elements of business were particularly supportive as they saw an opportunity 
to escape the case by case conservation assessment procedure adopted by 
government agencies such as the AHC. The Chairman of the Institution of 
Engineers, Dr Bryan Jenkins, was speaking for many when he argued; 
You have to take into account the ability of the resource base and the 
environment to absorb the development....One of the disadvantages of 
the current Australian environmental legislation is that it is project 
specific. Broader resource and environmental management issues are 
not looked at.227 
The AHC made a variety of submissions to all the working groups through the 
Department of Arts, Sport, Environment, Tourism and Territories, but in particular 
those concerning mining and forestry. The AHC's contribution to this process was 
helped by the increase in full time staff achieved in the 1990s (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6 
AHC fulllime staff 1977 - 1994 
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 
Years 
Source: AHC Annual Reports, 1975- 1996 
For the AHC, the establishment of the Ecological Sustainable Development (ESD) 
working groups confirmed a tangible change in the priority of government, from 
227 J. Arbouw, 'Hope for development - but can it be sustained?' Australian Business, March 27, 
1991, p. 63. 
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protection and confrontation to 'discussion and analysis' of environmental issues.228 
Individuals within the organisation no doubt shared the concern of many 
conservation groups that the ESD process was flawed. As a small government 
agency with a heavy workload, there was little appeal in allowing the new 
sustainable development philosophy to provoke an internal or external review of 
procedures and outlook. It was easy to accept the skepticism of those like Chaney 
who claimed that 
... what the Government has put in hand is essentially an academic 
process which may or may not produce specific outcomes. The draft 
reports of the nine sectoral working groups ... underline the 
preoccupation with forn1 rather than substance.229 
The advent of ESD undoubtedly caused a significant change in the political 
environment within which the Commission operated and promoted a greater 
commitment to the effective negotiation of National Estate disputes. It did not, 
however, end attempts by industry to attack the AHC as Ros Kelly herself 
acknowledged. When discussing the contribution of the forestry industry to the 
sustainable development debate she was reported as saying 
.... the main forestry industry group's agenda for sustainable 
development was little more than attacking the Australian Heritage 
Commission and supporting 'unrestrained development'. 
In this context, the release of the ESD working group reports had little impact on the 
Commission or its outlook. More significant had been the creation of the RAC and 
the level of government resources it quickly acquired. A general desire by the fourth 
Hawke government to resolve rather than confront environmental issues required a 
more flexible Australian Heritage Commission. By developing and promoting 
cooperative strategies such as regional forest assessment and concentrating on 
community education programs, the Commission again demonstrated its innate 
survival skills. 
228 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report 1990- 9 I, p. 23. 
229 C. Channey, 'The alternatives - the Opposition view on ESD', p. 3. 
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The Commission entered the 1990s faced with a plethora of Government initiatives 
competing for funds and policy support. These included The Better Cities program, 
the One Nation Statement, a draft National Forestry Strategy, the RAC reports and a 
draft Bio-Diversity Strategy. While many were designed to facilitate development 
through streamlined assessment procedures and had a positive impact on the 
National Estate, an accelerated program to dispose of surplus Government assets 
also posed a major new threat to the National Estate. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
THE AUSTRALIAN HERITAGE COMMISSION 1975 - 1995 
This chapter draws together the central themes of the thesis, and in so doing, 
demonstrates the Commission has been successful in gathering the scientific and 
cultural information necessary to give meaning to the term 'National Estate'. By 
defining for both government and the wider public the nature of our cultural and 
natural heritage, and developing cogent arguments for its preservation, the AHC has 
also defined many of the battlefields over which conservationists and developers 
would fight. The AHC has been, as this thesis argues, less successful in achieving 
other aims, or fulfilling the roles envisaged at its establishment. 
In drawing up the original legislation the Whitlam Government envisaged that a 
powerful agency would be created which would both define the nature of the 
National Estate and actively assist in its preservation. This was to be achieved 
through the provision of grant funds and high level advice to Cabinet. In style and 
substance it was also to fit neatly into the tradition of policy activism established by 
the Department of Urban and Regional Development. The Commission was, 
however, never to achieve these lofty ambitions due to the rapidly changing 
economic and political circumstances which befell Australia in the late 1970s and 
1980s. In 1976 the Fraser government amended the Australian Heritage Commission 
Act 1975 and reduced its brief to essentially the mechanical documentation of the 
National Estate. Ironically, this change was to assist in the long term survival of the 
organisation. Under the amended Act the Commission has little formal authority to 
shape government policy and the almost hysterical criticism which has dogged the 
organisation since its inception has appeared somewhat hollow. The 'power' of the 
Commission has ultimately been symbolic, derived from its perceived status as the 
primary proponent of conservation arguments within the Commonwealth 
bureaucracy. 
In the thirteen years of Labor Government between 1983 and 1995 no serious 
attempt was made to resuscitate the original aspirations of the Hope Inquiry for the 
Commission. Thus the Commission has been unable to deviate from the minimalist, 
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National Estate centred framework forced onto the Commission by the Fraser 
Government. Within this context the AHC has undoubtedly succeeded in gaining 
acceptance for the Register of the National Estate as a vital land management tool. In 
addition, by the late 1980s the AHC was able to expand the concept of the Register 
with the creation of the Regional Assessment strategy and the adoption of thematic 
analysis techniques. 
The intense environmental disputes of the 1980s had, however, demanded that 
Government find alternative ways to manage and resolve conflict. Because the 
Commission had largely been marginalised as a policy development body by this 
time, the Government turned to new bodies and strategies such as the Resource 
Assessment Commission and the ESD process, rather than to a revitalised AHC. In 
so doing the Commission was further displaced from the centre of environmental 
policy development. 
The evolution of the AHC as an organisation 
The cun-ent form of the Commission was shaped by the initial findings of the Hope 
Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate and the four distinct phases through 
which the organisation has passed. The years 1973 through to 197 5 represents the 
genesis of the Commission, . when the philosophical commitments of 
environmentalists were translated into an Act of Parliament. During this time the 
intermeshing of changing social values and the emergence of environmentalism as a 
political force encouraged the Whitlam Government to enact a range of 
environmental legislation, of which the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 
was one. Passage of this Act was a principle recommendation of the 1973 
Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate chaired by Justice Hope. Their report 
envisaged the creation of a powerful, independent and well resourced statutory 
authority which would co-ordinate a range of new Commonwealth initiatives 
designed to protect and enhance the National Estate. 
Between 1976 and 1982 the AHC was forced to adopt an organisational profile and 
method of operation based on significant legislative changes implemented by the 
Fraser Government. Originally conceived as a wide ranging policy 'engine room' for 
all matters pertaining to the preservation of the National Estate, under the Fraser 
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Government a significant reduction in its scope and function occurred. Specifically, 
it lost any operational capacity to manage the National Estate grant program or to 
play the role of supervising agent for the implementation of Commonwealth National 
Estate initiatives as envisaged by the Hope Inquiry.230 
During this formative stage the Commission had limited staff and financial resources 
which severely restricted its capacity to develop as an organisation. Vocal and 
persistent criticism from industry groups concerned at the impact the Register of the 
National Estate would have on their operation further diverted scarce resources from 
the task at hand. The fledgling Commission also suffered from the real fear that it 
would be abolished by such committees as the 'Review of Commonwealth 
Functions' chaired by the then Treasurer Philip Lynch. Conflict also existed with its 
parent department as the Commission struggled to assert its own independence and 
policy profile. 
By the end of the 1982-83 financial year, eight years after the passage of the 
Australian Herita£e Commission Act 1975, the new body had it increased its staffing 
complement from ten permanent staff and a financial allocation of $291,000 to a 
complement of 22 and an annual budget of $1,200,000.231 By comparison, the 
Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service (ANPWS), later to be restructured as 
the Australian Nature Conservation Agency (ANCA), had acquired by the end of 
1982 - 83 financial year some 85 full-time and 4 part- time staff. The annual budget 
was nearly $6.4 million.232 This was despite the ANPWS commencing at the same 
time as the Commission. 
Unlike the ANPWS and other environmental agencies the Commission did not 
acquire new administrative or legislative duties. Responsibility for the operation of 
the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, for example, 
remained vested in the Department of Arts, Sport, Environment, Tourism and 
Territories along with administration of the National Estate grant program. This was 
despite the rapid development of staff expertise and the obvious policy and 
230 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate, p.346. 
231 Figures from the 1975-76 and 1982-83 Australian Heritage Commission Annual Reports 
respectively. 
232 M. Hill, A Brief I listory, The Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service and its successor 
the Australian Nature Conservation ARency, ANCA, Canberra, 1994, p. 10. 
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administrative linkages. The dominant view within the Fraser Government was 
clearly that the AHC should operate as a specialised, science based organisation, 
almost entirely focused on the herculean task of defining Australia's National Estate. 
For this reason the Commission's single greatest achievement between 1976 and 
1982 was the publication of The Heritage of Australia, an illustrated guide to the 
6600 places accepted on the Register by 1981. 
The election of the first Hawke Labor Government in 1983 ushered in a third phase 
in the Commission's evolution which was characterised by intense external criticism 
and maintenance rather than expansion of policy functions. Despite these factors the 
Commission did benefit from the high priority given to environmental issues by the 
Labor Government as it fought to assert its green credentials. In pursuit of electoral 
success the Government became locked into a series of decisions that involved 
conflict with industry groups which in turn placed the AHC in an invidious position. 
As the principle advisor on National Estate issues it consistently put forward 
conservation arguments that allowed the Commonwealth to adopt an activist 
environmental policy, especially in respect to the management of state managed 
forestry and mineral reserves. The structure and limited powers of the Commission, 
however, limited its capacity to manage those conflicts with which it became 
embroiled such as the protection of Tasmania's Lemonthyme and Southern forests 
during the mid 1980s. 
Faced with often hostile State Governments and vested interest groups which 
questioned individual National Estate listings, the AHC had little room to 
manoeuvre. By law required to provide advice, it could not under pressure either 
disavow this advice, or compensate those detrimentally effected by a National Estate 
listing. With the passage of time it became increasingly obvious that despite the 
original intention of those who drafted the legislation, the National Estate process not 
only identified those areas which possessed heritage significance, but often defined 
the boundaries of a future environmental conflict. As the Register became more 
comprehensive and detailed the opportunity for complex land use disputes to occur 
increased. 
In 1984 and again in 1990 the dramatic reduction of AHC powers were discussed 
informally at Cabinet level as the Commission was increasingly painted as an 
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intransigent opponent of legitimate resource development projects. 233 The 1984 
review initiated by Minister Cohen was in direct response to a perceived lack of 
transparency and efficiency in the Commission's general operation and decision 
making process. Strong support for the Commission among conservation 
organisations and an unwillingness within the Departmental review team to accept 
the more extreme criticism ensured no significant changes were recommended. The 
extent of criticism did, however, largely neutralise attempts by the AHC to obtain 
substantial additional financial resources during the mid 1980s. 
The growing complexity of conservation issues continued to create a requirement for 
more comprehensive information on individual National Estate listings and its 
dissemination. This situation provided legitimate grounds for the Commission to 
request additional staff and financial resources. This argument received a positive 
response from Cohen's replacement as Minister, Senator Richardson, and by June 
30,1990, staff numbers at the AHC had increased to forty eight full time, two part 
time and five temporary officers. The annual budget had also grown to some $4.5 
million.234 
This expansion primarily related to a 1988 decision by Cabinet to ensure the backlog 
of National Estate listings was drastically reduced, thus eliminating a prime source of 
Commission criticism. During this period the organisation did not gain any 
significant new responsibilities which would justify further expansion. The transfer 
of management responsibility for the National Estate Grant program and a new duty 
to respond to RAC enquiries by the ARC was not considered of sufficient 
importance alone to justify significant staff increases. Both Cohen and Richardson 
believed, however, that the communication section of the Commission should be 
strengthened to enable the organisation to better participate in public debate and 
ensure more Australians understood the principles which guided its work. With a 
staff of eight it had become by 1993 the equal second largest division consuming 
10% of the budget.235 
The current phase of the Commission's development has been characterised by a 
determined endeavour to position itself as a key player in an increasingly complex 
233 L Taylor, 'The plot to trim Lhe Heritage Commission', Australian, 2 Nov, 1990, p.11. 
234 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report 1989-90, p. 82. 
235 Australian Heritage Commission, Annual Report 1992- 93, p.87. 
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constellation of Commonwealth conservation agencies and departmental divisions 
formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These included the Resource Assessment 
Commission, the Commonwealth Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Ecologically Sustainable Development working groups. Other peripheral 
organisations such as the Australian Cultural Development Office (ACDO) also 
became involved in areas previously the sole domain of the Commission. 
For the Commission there was ample evidence to suggest the organisation was being 
outflanked and excluded from new Commonwealth initiatives. A prime example was 
the administrative arrangements set in place for the tax relief scheme for individuals 
restoring historic stmctures. Despite the AHC pursuing this idea with Treasury for 
many years, it was the ACDO, not the Commission, which ultimately gained 
acceptance for the concept and responsibility for administering this important new 
initiative.236 Similarly the Commission has never possessed a formal relationship 
with the National Cultural Heritage Committee or the Taxation Incentive Scheme for 
the Arts advisory committee despite obvious linkages.237 
This reduction in influence was confirmed in a briefing paper prepared for Senator 
Faulkner who replaced Ros Kelly as Minister. In the section entitled Current-
Contentious Issues, the document noted that 
... while the Australian Heritage Commission is located within the 
environment portfolio, responsibility for much of the Commission's 
work on cultural heritage has moved to the Minister for Arts and 
Communications, Michael Lee.238 
Of more significance was the establishment of the Resource Assessment 
236 This idea had been raised in the Hope Enquiry and promoted sporadically by the AHC since 
then. A tax rebate scheme was announced in the Commonwealth Distinctly Australian cultural 
policy of February 1993.Commission staff did work on the drafting of the policy. However it was 
ultimately an initiative of the Department of the Arts and Administrative Services who then actually 
administered the new program through the ACDO.This was despite the obvious relationship of the 
scheme to the very raison d'etre of the Commission and its field of expertise 
237 Both committees were set up under CommonwculLh legislation during Lhc mid 1980's and are 
concerned with the protection of cultural material.The Hope Enquiry saw the AHC playing a role in 
this field. 
238 Australian Heritage Commission. Internal document entitled 'Brief for Incoming Minister', 
1994. 
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Commission as a statutory body with agency links through the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet. By creating this new body, the Government virtually advised 
the AHC that the approach taken by the Commission to its work was inadequate. 
Experience had demonstrated, it could be argued, that the identification and 
documentation of 'the things we want to keep' was not sufficient to resolve conflict. 
This perception was of course quite contrary to that held by those who originally 
framed the AHC legislation. By creating the RAC the government was also 
suggesting that the structure, operational culture and methodology of the AHC was 
not suited to developing strategies which addressed the interface between industry 
and a progressive land management ethos. 
In this less than sympathetic environment the Commission simultaneously sought to 
reduce the level of external criticism and to ensure its policies harmonised more 
closely with current Commonwealth economic policy. This move was no doubt 
hastened by the replacement of Hawke by Keating as Prime Minister. To reassert the 
Commission's policy credentials within Government, the AHC strenuously argued 
that the implementation of Commonwealth-State regional assessment forest 
agreements would make a major contribution to resolving forestry conflicts.239 By 
reaching agreement with State agencies over heritage assessment criteria and 
management activities the AHC claimed greater cooperation from individual State 
Governments would be possible. J.n this process less emphasis has also been given 
to interaction with community based organisations and individuals seeking to have 
particular areas listed on the Register. Resources instead have been directed at 
ensuring a new backlog of nominations did not develop. Additional research has also 
been carried out on areas already listed to ensure data is always current. The 
development of regional linkages between National Estate areas for tourism and 
planning purposes has also been seen as particularly useful, and less likely to attract 
adverse criticism than further expansion of the list. 
This refocussing of policy, with particular emphasis on Regional Assessment, has 
not been without its critics in the green movement. Dr Bob Brown, in his capacity as 
a Green Independent member of the Tasmanian Parliament, dismissed the proposed 
Commission's 'bilateral' study of Tasmania's forests in late 1992 as a ploy to allow 
239 The Commission actively sought such an agreement with the WA Department of Conservation 
and Land Management (CALM) to Jointly survey section of the South West forests as a means of 
preventing future land use conflict. The subsequent agreement reached with CALM was then heavily 
promoted by the Comm 1ssion between 1981 - 1991 as a r uture model for other states. 
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' ... Mrs Kelly and the Federal and State Governments to avoid the proper full-blown 
environmental impact assessment of the impact on Tasmania's forests of new export 
wood chip mills such as that proposed for the Huon.'240 Dr Brown went on to argue 
that the employment of the more traditional environmental impact assessment 
procedure would protect National Estate forests but ' ... this set up [Regional 
Assessment] could well let Mrs Kelly avoid her direct responsibility to stop the 
broad scale destruction of forest ecosystems in Tasmania immediately.' 241 
The development of the Regional Assessment process within the AHC did, 
however, lead to a substantial increase in staff numbers with, seventy three full-time 
and four part-time staff employed by the Commission as at June 1994. The annual 
operating budget at this time had reached a record $13,735,500.242 This represented 
an increase of some twenty six full time officers over two years. Thus, in a final 
irony, the project designed to alter the manner in which the Register operated actually 
provided the AHC with the staffing levels necessary to effectively document and 
analyse National Estate data. 
The contribution of the AHC to the changing face of Commonwealth 
environmental policy. 
Like many similar government organisations, the Commission has always possessed 
limited fornial power to compel individuals to comply with its own Act. Instead the 
AHC has had at its disposal a limited amount of authority based on the willingness 
of at least some groups and individuals to comply with suggestions and requests to 
conserve the National Estate. This authority has been derived from its status as a 
statutory authority and from respect for the expertise of its staff. A personal 
commitment by many conservationists to the principles embodied in the notion of a 
national conservation body adds further to the Commission's ability to direct events. 
The Hope Inquiry envisaged that the Australian Heritage Commission would be 
primarily a wide ranging policy driven body with sufficient authority to direct those 
Commonwealth strategies designed to preserve and enhance the National Estate. In 
attempting to evaluate the success or otherwise of the Commission in fulfilling this 
role it is appropriate to reaffirm the accepted nebulous nature of policy development 
240 B. Brown, 'Heritage Commission Warning', Media release, Nov 5, 1992 p 1. 
241 ibid, p 2 
242 Australian Heri111ge Commission, Annual Report 1993-94, p.72. 
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in government. Hughes notes for example: 
No-one really knows where policies are derived from, other than 
through the internal political processes of governments, in which the 
bureaucracy is as much a political actor as are outside interest groups 
or politicians.243 
Between 1972 and 1975 four key pieces of Commonwealth environmental 
legislation were enacted by the Whitlam Labor Government. This legislation was 
built around a central premise, namely that the natural and cultural environment of 
Australia was being degraded and it was the legitimate responsibility of the 
Commonwealth to initiate policies and programs which would address this situation. 
The passage of the Environmental Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974 was 
the single most important environmental initiative of the Labor Government. By 
requiring Commonwealth agencies or organisations acting on behalf of the 
Commonwealth to state the likely impact of developments on the environment a new 
level of accountability for developers was introduced. Two subsequent pieces of 
legislation, which established the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority and the 
Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, emerged from related ALP policy 
which argued the Commonwealth should possess the capacity to professionally 
manage natural heritage areas under its control. 
A third component of ALP policy reflected a more general concern that the 
Commonwealth direct a share of revenues to the protection, maintenance and 
restoration of Australia's heritage in cooperation with State and Local Government. 
By creating an Australian Heritage Commission the Whitlam Government gave 
substance to this notion and created a vehicle for both the identification and 
resourcing of the 'National Estate.' In this sense the Commission was conceived as a 
service delivery body rather than one concerned primarily with policy formulation. 
The prolonged Franklin Dam dispute revealed to the Fraser Government the 
comparatively weak position of the Commonwealth in the environmental arena when 
dealing with a determined State Government. The traditional technique of exercising 
Commonwealth financial muscle to resolve differences failed spectacularly in this 
243 0. Hughes ,Public Management and Administration, An Introduction,, Macmillan Press, 
London, 1994, p. 148. 
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case when Premier Gray rejected a $500 million compensation package. Labor's 
subsequent successful assertion of Commonwealth power on environmental issues 
in the High Court changed for ever the relationship between Federal and State 
Governments. Extended disputes with the resource industry sector however hurt the 
economic credentials of the Government and promoted internal divisions. By 1984 -
1985 it had become clear to the Commonwealth Government that a clear policy 
balance had to be struck between the 'protect and regulate' strategies embodied in the 
Australian Heritai:re Commission Act 1975 and the Environmental Protection (Impact 
of proposals) Act 197 4 and the need to ensure the timber and mining industries had 
reasonable access to natural resources. 
The subsequent decision in 1986 to appoint a Commission of Inquiry into the future 
management of Tasmania's Lemonthyme and Southern Forests was an overt 
acceptance that a new approach to resolving environmental disputes, in which the 
AHC would no longer be the leading player, was required. This signal may well 
have been ignored by the AHC as the organisation adopted a significantly different 
position to the Helsham Inquiry on the all important question of future World 
Heritage boundaries. For its pains the AHC was roundly condemned by the 
Committee of Inquiry for being less than helpful. 
Ironically the position of the Austr~lian Heritage Commission had a major impact on 
the political power play which followed the release of the recommendations. For 
party political reasons, Environment Minister Graham Richardson convinced Cabinet 
to reject the findings. Such a position would not have been viable if the AHC itself 
had not also publicly opposed the findings. Thus, in a negative sense, the 
organisation played a pivotal role in the outcome of an ill-fated policy initiative, the 
use of a quasi-judicial enquiry to adjudicate on a competing set of scientific, 
economic and environmental claims. 
For the AHC several important issues emerged from the Helsham Inquiry. These 
included the need for improved research capacity, strategic planning in the collection 
of data and improved use of information technology in the presentation of the 
material gathered. Hence during the mid 1980s the Commission was in the forefront 
of initiatives to improve the mapping of National Estate areas, the regional analysis 
of forested areas and the creation of a specialist wilderness inventory. These 
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initiatives, whilst important in their own right, did not represent the adoption of a 
new function for the AHC but rather the refinement of an existing one. Their 
creation, however, provided an opportunity for both the organisation and the 
responsible Minister to appear innovative and responsive to changing environmental 
management needs. 
The failure of the Helsham Inquiry to provide a satisfactory set of recommendations 
to the government proved that an unduly legalistic approach would not resolve 
environmental disputes if competing ideological, governmental, scientific and 
commercial interests were not sufficiently accommodated for a politically viable 
solution to emerge. From the perspective of industry representatives and government 
economic advisers the AHC also unfortunately made no significant contribution to 
the shaping of a favourable outcome. The provision of detailed technical information 
and the enunciation of National Estate principles had become a familiar, but 
unconvincing, mantra. 
Perhaps most disturbing of all for industry groups and Ministers with an economic 
portfolio was the subsequent power play which saw Cabinet overturn the Helsham 
Inquiry findings. This was despite the process costing several million dollars and 
producing recommendations which largely had the support of the forestry industry 
and the Tasmanian Government. This unsatisfactory situation encouraged further 
policy development within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet which 
ultimately led to the creation of the Resource Assessment Commission and draft 
Resource Security legislation. It also galvanised those forces in government which 
called for either the abolition of the AHC or its sublimation under new legislation. 
No serious consideration was given to broadening the narrow functions of the 
Commission to move beyond contributing technical scientific data on the National 
Estate. As a consequence the AHC remained an extremely blunt but consistent policy 
instrument. This situation suited an aggressive environment minister like Senator 
Richardson who could rely on the organisation to provide detailed and timely advice 
on complex scientific issues without complicating economic and social factors. 
The release of Our Common Futllre by the United Nations World Commission on 
Environment and Development (the Brundtland Commission) which argued 
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economic activity should be based on the sustainable use of natural resources offered 
a new perspective. The opportunities proffered by the sustainable development 
philosophy were eagerly seized upon by a government keen to establish a balance 
between competing commercial and environmental considerations. Hence the 
emergence of ecological sustainable development (ESD) principles was used by the 
Commonwealth to open up debate on how the nation's extractive industries operated 
within the new environmental ethos. From this debate it was hoped a new spirit of 
cooperation would be generated where industry accepted the legitimacy of 
community concern over the environment. The release of the draft industry reports 
which discussed the implications flowing from the application of ESD principles to 
key industries revealed that there was no 'quick fix' to environmental disputation. A 
number of industries would require long term restructuring and even in forestry, 
where the expansion of renewable plantation timber reserves were well underway, 
significant problems existed. 
In these circumstances government was receptive to renewed calls from the AHC for 
the implementation of a regional assessment process to improve the quality of 
Commonwealth decision making. By the early 1990s the Commission had reached 
the conclusion that -a simple case by case analysis of threats to individual National 
Estate areas was inadequate because large scale projects such as the Wesley Vale 
Pulp Mill scheme had state wide ~mplications. In this case the pressure on native 
forests to provide a timber resource would have affected reserves across northern 
Tasmania. Any meaningful advice tendered by the Commission would necessitate 
the organisation possessing not only a broad understanding of available Tasmanian 
timber resources but also an agreement with the Tasmanian Forestry industry over 
assessment methodology . Through Wesley Vale and other pulp mill proposals the 
AHC was able to demonstrate to Commonwealth decision makers the need for 
comparative national studies of endangered heritage resources, specialised resource 
directories for natural features, such as Wild Rivers and Commonwealth-State 
agreements with land management bodies. The understanding reached with the West 
Australian Department of Conservation and Land Management and the AHC in 1991 
over forest resources in south west Western Australia was the first such agreement. 
This policy breakthrough prompted Commission staff to be increased by some 20 
positions between 1991 and 1994 and the creation of two new divisions, the Wild 
Rivers Assessment Branch and the Regional Assessment Branch. 
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The AHC as adviser to Cabinet 
Over a twenty year period the Commission has made three modest but never the less 
significant contributions to Commonwealth environmental policy development 
through its advice to Cabinet. In compiling an effective Register of the National 
Estate it both defined a powerful concept and introduced a new rigour and 
environmental consciousness into departmental decision making. This was largely 
achieved through sheer persistence in the face of entrenched opposition. A second 
achievement, more difficult to define, was to focus political attention on projects 
which degraded or threatened to degrade the nation's heritage resources. Though 
lacking in direct punitive powers it functioned as a trip wire which alerted other 
agencies and community groups to emerging problems. The Franklin Dam dispute 
and the protection of old growth forests are two prominent cases where the 
implications of the proposal were spelt out early and persistently to the 
Commonwealth. More indirectly the AHC championed a number of other less 
known causes within government such as the provision of taxation support for 
individuals restoring historic properties. While the AHC's influence in such cases is 
hard to determine, its involvement made it more difficult for it and the issues it 
supported, to be ignored by government. 
The principle of Regional Assessment agreements was perhaps the single most 
important recent contribution to Commonwealth policy development. Undoubtedly 
born out of AHC frustration with its marginalisation as a policy body and the 
continued expansion of the timber industry in the second half of the 1980s, the long 
term value of this concept is still to be confirmed. The successful negotiations in WA 
and Victoria and the financial support given to expand staffing levels bodes well. 
This initiative also confirmed that the AHC was capable of formulating new policy in 
tune with shifting economic and political circumstances. 
The AHC and the establishment and maintenance of the National 
Estate 
With the dismissal of Labor in late 197 5 the policy settings and priorities of the 
Commonwealth Government changed dramatically. For the Commission the next 
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seven years saw the removal of its capacity to fund conservation projects, both in a 
technical sense through changes to its Act and as a consequence of economic 
austerity. In the face of these changes the AHC was largely restricted to 
implementing a purely technical function, documentation of the National Estate. 
Force of circumstances, however, ensured that the Commission would develop a de-
facto policy function that would become increasingly significant during the 1980s. 
As a technical advisory body which employed a range of specialists the Commission 
appropriately became a recognised authority on complex environmental issues which 
other Departments, including its own, often could not match. By merely making a 
technical pronouncement or expressing a view the Commission could shape a 
debate. A strong.position on the Franklin Dam case, for example, strengthened the 
resolve of Malcolm Fraser to oppose the Tasmanian State Liberal Government over 
the issue. 
Under the Commission Act the AHC was required to comment each year on the 
condition of the National Estate. This responsibility provided an ideal opportunity 
for Commissioners to articulate current concerns within the wider, non-government, 
conservation movement. Indeed, as one of the few Commonwealth agencies 
operating daily in the interface between development and conservation, the AHC 
. 
inevitably developed strong links with the conservation movement at both an officer 
and Commissioner level. By appointing well known conservation figures such as 
Vincent Serventy as Commissioner's this link was both officially sanctioned and 
encouraged by Coalition and Labor administrations. As a direct consequence, the 
AHC gradually came to possess considerable informal influence in determining the 
importance or otherwise of emerging issues for the Government. By adopting a firm 
position on the protection of native forests from wood chipping in the late 1970s, for 
example, a clear signal was sent to government that a coherent set of national forest 
policies should be devised. 
The early success of the Commission in developing a comprehensive National Estate 
Register covering some 6000 localities by 1980 also significantly affected the 
environmental policy climate. Listing proposals were often generated when an area 
was believed to be under threat from development. By the Commission accepting a 
nomination under these circumstances, conservation forces were able to continually 
argue their position was strengthened, while developers could claim unwarranted 
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government interference in land use disputes had occurred. While neither proposition 
was necessarily correct, the nomination process soon became mired in conflict. As a 
consequence the original bi-partisan support for the Commission gradually began to 
break down. In turn it became the policy of some elements within the Fraser 
Government and the subsequent Hawke-Keating administrations to abolish the AHC 
itself. 
The AHC as an environmental advocate 
At a Colloquium 244 to discuss 'Australia's Heritage - Hope for the Future' David 
Yenken, the first Chairman of the Commission argued the ' ... environmental 
movement had an un written charter to lead the environmental debate in the public 
arena.'245 The role of the Commission, it followed, was to take up major issues 
raised by such groups and pursue them within government. In this analysis the 
environmental movement provided a much needed mandate for the Commission's 
work, with the relationship between the two groups being mutually beneficial. 
Certainly the Hope Commission of Inquiry called on the Parliament to place the 
environment squarely on the agenda of Government. The flavour of those times are 
caught in the recollections of Max Bouke, the Commission's first Director. 
Then .... there were just six.staff. We all sat in one room and tried to 
invent the. Register of the National Estate .... Those were the days of 
the Franklin Dam, Fraser Island, the demolition of the Bellevue Hotel 
in Brisbane, and so on. The commission had a finger in every 
politico-environmental pie.246 
Certainly for much of its life the AHC has been perceived by the environmental 
movement as its principle friend in government. Moreover the organisation has been 
credited as a powerful advocate which has achieved some notable conservation 
victories. Dr Bob Brown noted; 'It's a great organisation with a proud history and 
was critical to saving such places as the Franklin River and Daintree rain forests.'247 
244 This activity was held to mark the 100th meeting of the Australian Heritage Commission in 
Canberra during December 1994. 
245 D.Yenken, 'Issues for the future', Heritage News, vol 16, Number 1, Australian Heritage 
Commission, 1994, p. 10. 
246 Canberra Times, 'In the Public's Service', Aug 20, 1995. p. 17. 
247 B. Brown, 'Heritage Commission Warning', Media Release. 5 Nov,1992. 
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Undoubtedly most Commissioners and staff have been passionate advocates for a 
range of environmental causes and have successfully influenced government policy 
outcomes, particularly during the mid to late 1980s. Throughout the Commission's 
existence critics have suggested that staff have lacked objectivity in carrying out their 
duties. In defence the AHC has consistently argued it does no more than implement 
its own Act and any political manipulation of events is the responsibility of others. 
With the passage of time this response became less credible as Commissioners and 
senior staff became directly engaged in the political process. As Taylor noted 
... the commission's protestations of complete impartiality are 
evidently not true. They lobby ministers and strategically time the 
release of information with political skilJ.248 
The adoption of such tactic was the inevitable result of an unwillingness by most 
industry groups to accept the assumptions and premises which underpin the work of 
the Commission. It was a difficulty which was not identified by the Hope Committee 
of Inquiry and has resulted in the Commission throughout its existence being 
continually required to refine and expound its conservation rationale and 
methodologies.249 
The Commission's greatest success has been achieved when there has been a 
confluence of political need and conservation aspirations such as occurred in 1983 
with the Labor election campaign and the Fra.nklin Dam dispute. Community 
expectations for the Commission have always been high and for much of its life the 
relationship between grassroots organisations and the AHC has been self 
supporting. This was particularly the case when the community was encouraged to 
propose sites for listing on the Register. In recent years this element of the 
relationship has gradually diminished as less emphasis has been placed by the 
Commission on expanding the Register. 250 More importantly it has become clear 
248 L. Taylor, ' The plot to trim the Heritage Commission', Australian, Nov 2, 1990, p.11. 
249 Australian lleritage Commission, 1990, 'What Do We Want To Pass On To Future 
Generations?, An Overview of Criteria and Assessment Procedures for the Register of the National 
Estate', internal AHC document, pp. 7-8. 
250 Senator Coulter of the Australian Democrats highlighted this changed situation when he asked 
Senator Collins ' ... why the Australian Heritage Commission had imposed a de - facto moratorium 
on nominations Lo the Register of the National estate', Canberra Times, 'On the Hill', 11 Dcc,1992, 
p. 11. 
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over time that registration of sites is not a guarantee of their survival. As David 
Y enken commented 
... the Commission needs to recognise that the environment 
movement may not see the Commission in quite the same light as 
before because it now recognises that listing does not necessarily lead 
to full protection.251 
In addition to this disappointment, it has also become clear that as a Government 
agency, the Commission's agenda must largely be set by the responsible Minister 
and, in turn, Cabinet. From 1989-1990 and the election of Keating as Prime 
Minister, a widening split emerged between the AHC and voluntary conservation 
movement as the Commission was increasingly required to help bridge the gap 
between the Government's economic aspirations and its environmental 
responsibilities. Simmering criticism of new AHC policies were eventually given 
substance through the release of a critique of Commission forestry policy in the 
Senate by Senator Chamarette in December 1993. Entitled Conservation of Native 
Forests: The changing role of the Australian Heritage Commission, this thirty seven 
page document written by Daniel Rosaeur provides a critical review of Commission 
policies with respect to the AHC-CALM forestry agreement in WA. As well as 
making a wide range of methologic,al criticisms, the report claimed the organisation's 
role as an environmental advocate had been diminished in response to a persistent 
drive by the Keating Government to obtain resource security for a variety of 
extractive industries. The report argued 
... the Heritage Commission has undergone a significant change of 
direction to fit within the Federal Government's current resources 
policy framework (which basically involves non-intervention in the 
States, and securing resource industries against ongoing 
environmental claims).252 
251 Australian Heritage Commission, Heritage News, vol 16, nol, p. 10. 
252 D. Rosaeur,Conservation of Forests: The changing role of the Australian Heritage 
Commission, a report prepared for Senator Chamarcttc under the inaugural Australian National 
Intemships Program, Nov 1993, p. 36 
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This proposition was strongly rebutted by the Commission.253 However, the 
organisation was keenly aware that Commonwealth pressure to more closely 
cooperate with State Governments and industry had dented its status with 
conservation organisations.254 
Perhaps as a fitting postscript to its turbulent history, the achievement of bureaucratic 
consolidation by the Commission over a twenty year period has simultaneously 
weakened its links with community-based environmental organisations. Despite 
these difficulties the Commission has struggled throughout its existence to 
implement the policies and vision embodied in the Report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into the National Estate. While the AHC has not fullfilled the lofty 
aspirations marked out for the organisation by Justice Hope, time has never the less 
proved Whitlam correct when he said of the Commission's creation and subsequent 
performance: 
My Governmenr fim1ly placed the issue of the National Estate on the 
Australian political agenda. In so doing we went some of the way in 
preventing the prophecy of Kylie Tennant that 'the unborn Australian 
will ask for his birthright and be handed a piece of concrete'.257 
253 A detailed rebullal is contained in Australian Heritage Commission, Australian Heritage 
Commission response to the report entitled Conservation of native forests: the changing role of the 
Australian lleritage Commission, Internal document, 1994. 
254 A major internal briefing document prepared for Senator Faulkner on his appointment as 
Minister entitled Brief for incommg Minister confirmed staff were aware of this sentiment in the 
conservation movement at large. 
257 Whitlam, G. The Whitlam Government 1972 -1975, p.549 
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